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**Coercive and Catalytic Strategies for Promoting Human Rights:
State violence and the composition of foreign aid**

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**Coercive and Catalytic Strategies for Promoting Human Rights:
State violence and the composition of foreign aid**

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Hillary Genevieve Corwin

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Coercive and Catalytic Strategies for Promoting Human Rights: State violence and the composition of foreign aid

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There is tremendous variation in whether and how donors respond to severe human rights violations using foreign aid. Donors that respond choose between two strategic options: coercion, which uses aid and the threat of withdrawal as material leverage to influence recipient leaders' behaviors, and catalysis, which uses aid for developing political systems in the recipient country to limit state violence from within.

Once a donor decides to respond, what determines its strategic choices? I argue that three factors help to answer this question: (1) how exposed the donor's interests are to problems stemming from human rights violations, (2) how costly each strategy would be to the donor, and (3) whether the recipient is willing to pay the costs of pursuing outside options to obtain development finance.

I use Tobit models to estimate how donor interests moderate the relationship between state violence and aid to economic and governance sectors from all OECD donors to all eligible recipients from 2003-2018. I find that donors typically prioritize catalytic strategies during this time period, but substitute coercive strategies when political liberalization would be difficult to achieve or undesirable from the donor's perspective.

To estimate how donors respond to recipients' outside options for development finance, I use doubly robust difference-in-differences estimator with multiple treatments to investigate how recipients signing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) agreements with China affect donors' strategy. I find that when recipients signal that they are willing and able to bypass OECD donors' coercive punishments, these donors further increase their reliance on catalytic strategies for promoting human rights.

This has implications for understanding the relationship between human rights and foreign aid. Donors do not consistently rely on political conditionalities as leverage over leaders' policy decisions and typically attempt to strengthen and liberalize the domestic political environment for human rights in recipient states. When this is too costly for donors, they rely on coercive strategies. However, coercive strategy is under threat. Developing countries have access to a wider range of funding sources than in past decades, allowing them to access development finance without political conditionalities. Donors respond to these outside options by increasing their reliance on catalytic strategy, suggesting that donors are pursuing political liberalization in increasingly difficult environments.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Many western countries have legal obligations to promote human rights using their foreign policy.¹ Yet, they have limited power to address acts of violence that are committed by state actors in sovereign countries. Policymakers can attempt to wield diplomatic, economic, or military power to improve human rights abroad. Diplomatic responses are common and are examined in the literature on naming and shaming and norm entrepreneurship. Military interventions are far less common and, to the extent that human rights violations are used to justify interventions, these typically coincide with other reasons for countries to use military force or send peacekeepers. Economic initiatives are unique in that they can be used not only to pressure leaders into pursuing human rights improvements but also to address the root problems that lead to human rights violations. How policymakers choose between using their economic power to influence leaders or investing in changes to promote human rights has not yet been explored in the

¹Sections of this dissertation were previously published as: Corwin, Hillary. 2023. "Coercive and catalytic strategies for human rights promotion: State violence and foreign assistance," *World Development* 167: 106227, ISSN 0305-750X, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106227>. As sole author, Hillary Corwin was responsible for each component of the paper.

prior literature. This dissertation aims to fill that gap by focusing on a key component of how countries use economic pressure and support to pursue human rights improvements abroad. It examines how donors alter the composition of foreign aid to combat state violence in developing countries.

This dissertation focuses on state violence, which I define as the set of human rights violations that includes extrajudicial killings, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances that are perpetrated by state actors against civilians. Throughout, I use the term “human rights” narrowly to refer to the freedom from state violence and the terms “abuses” or “violations” to refer to state violence. State violence is a subset of broader political violence, which focuses specifically on the actions of state actors against civilians. Violent repression is a subset of state violence. Violent repression is a targeted action that is intended to subjugate a person or group, while state violence also includes acts of violence committed by law enforcement or military that was not ordered by political leaders.

Foreign aid is important to human rights promotion for several reasons. Beginning in the early 1970s, some donors began including human rights as an explicit component of their foreign aid policies. Some form of human rights promotion is now included in the stated development goals of all OECD donors. Donors have more direct control over aid than they do over other sources of economic leverage, such as trade or finance. This is because imposing economic sanctions that would restrict trade or finance in response to state violence requires governments to restrict the global economic activities of their firms. Trade

and finance involve diverse stakeholders, and governments do not control the flow of these funds. Regulation is costly, difficult to monitor for the sending government, and spans a complex web of actors. Although principal-agent problems exist in foreign aid delivery, the system is far less complex, and donors have more direct control over how much money is sent to what types of projects and programs in which recipient countries. Furthermore, human rights and broader development goals are often interrelated: many of the factors that are associated with human rights abuses are also associated with higher poverty and weaker economic growth.


The relationship between foreign aid and state violence is complex. Using aid to address state violence is costly for donors, may distract from other goals of foreign aid, and can either help or harm broader development efforts.

Donors have at least two strategic options for addressing state violence problems in aid recipient countries: donors can decrease aid that would benefit the leaders responsible for violence or increase aid to projects that could improve the domestic political environment for human rights. There is evidence that donors use both of these strategies. For example, when violence escalated in Ethiopia after the 2005 election, donors drastically decreased aid to economic sector projects and programs that would have benefited leaders or elites. In contrast, when violence escalated in Kenya after the 2007 presidential election, donors increased aid to governance sector projects that aimed to develop the rule of law and checks and balances in parliament. Unlike in the Ethiopian case, most donors chose not to punish Kenyan leaders and kept economic sector aid in place.

In both cases, violence levels have remained high and donors' strategies have been consistent. When confronted with state violence problems in developing countries, why do donors sometimes choose to decrease aid that would benefit leaders and sometimes increase aid to change the domestic environment for human rights?

Figure 1.1 shows variation in the composition of aid to recipient countries with the highest average levels of state violence during the 2003-2018 period. States to the right along the x axis have received higher total levels of aid to governance sector projects and programs while states higher on the y axis received higher total levels of aid to economic sector projects and programs. Recipient states in the bottom left corner, including Ethiopia, received low levels of economic aid without receiving much aid to improve governance. This suggests that donors are committing very little highly-fungible economic aid either to punish leaders of repressive states, to minimize the ability of aid to increase recipient leaders' repressive capabilities, or to politically distance themselves from problematic leaders. Countries further to the right, like Somalia, receive very little economic aid but substantial levels of governance aid, suggesting that donors have opted to limit aid that would benefit leaders as punishment for violence while supporting governance improvements that would help to counter violence. Kenya is toward the middle, suggesting that donors are forgoing punishment and opting to support governance there. Finally, donors appear not to respond to state violence in countries like the Côte d'Ivoire, where economic sector aid is plentiful but investments in governance improvements are minimal. What ex-

Figure 1.1: Total aid to economic and governance sectors for violent recipients (2003-2018 totals, in 2018 USD per 1000 population)



plains this variation?

To help answer this question, I examine how donors choose between coercive and catalytic strategies to promote human rights. Donors using coercive strategy manipulate aid to create a system of external rewards and punishments that incentivize compliance with human rights norms. Applicable types of aid to coercive strategy are the types that provide the strongest benefits to elites and leaders, either because the aid is highly fungible or because it broadly benefits members of society rather than the poorest members of society. In contrast, donors using catalytic strategy increase aid to projects that address underlying causes

of human rights violations. This not only includes projects that directly target human rights improvements, but also projects that build democratic, legislative, and judicial institutional capacity to increase checks and balances over executives, projects that promote civilian control over law enforcement and military, projects that address sources of domestic conflict, and similar.

I apply collective action theory to explain how donors choose between coercive and catalytic strategy. My argument is that donors' strategic choices are determined by donor-specific costs and benefits and the size and composition of the group of relevant actors in the development finance system. Variation in how exposed donors' interests are to negative externalities from state violence, variation in the reputational benefits to donors of promoting human rights, variation in the probability of successful political liberalization reforms, and variation in the set of relevant donors and lenders help to determine donors' strategic responses to state violence.

1.1 Situating the dissertation in the literature

This dissertation contributes to a long-standing debate about the relationship between foreign aid and human rights. A large set of extant literature is subsumed into each strategic category. Coercive strategy relates to research covering political conditionalities and coercive influence in international relations. Catalytic strategy relates to research on foreign aid for democracy assistance, capacity building, judicial reforms, civil society support, conflict prevention, and

peacebuilding. Additionally, this dissertation draws upon insights from the literature on the determinants of state violence, brings this diverse literature into dialogue, and fills an important gap by evaluating how donors choose between strategies for promoting human rights.

Research related to coercive strategy investigates donors' willingness to reward respect for human rights by increasing aid and to punish human rights violations by decreasing aid. Early studies found that donors provide less aid to countries that violate human rights (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe 1992; Apodaca and Stohl 1999), that donors provide more aid to countries that violate human rights (Carleton and Stohl 1985; Stohl and Lopez 1984), and no particularly strong relationship between aid and human rights (Neumayer 2003a,b). More recent research has helped to reconcile the debate by investigating aid disaggregations and conditional relationships between aid and human rights. There is evidence that donors cut aid to the economic sectors that benefit elites while leaving aid to other sectors that benefit vulnerable populations in place (Nielsen 2013), but that donors tend to withhold less aid from violent recipients as the benefits of aid to the donor increase (Nielsen 2013; Esarey and DeMeritt 2017; Heinrich et al. 2018).

This echoes broader scholarship on the political economy of foreign aid that argues donors use aid as material leverage to influence recipient leaders into making policy concessions (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2007; Morgenthau 1962). I characterize these donor behaviors as "coercive strategy," since the donor is using the promise of increased aid commitments and the threat or imposi-

tion of decreased aid to promote compliance with its demands in a manner that is consistent with economic coercion (Baldwin 1985). Coercion requires aid to benefit, and decreases in aid to hurt, decision makers in the recipient country. As such, donors use highly-fungible and broadly beneficial aid as leverage over leaders (Nielsen 2013). This includes direct budget support, business development and trade funds, and large infrastructure projects. This strategy is particularly vulnerable to problems of donor credibility because donors cannot credibly commit to decrease aid where it would harm their strategic interests to do so, resulting in donors failing to punish rights violations committed by recipients with close ties to the donor or those of high geopolitical importance (Nielsen 2013).

Research that focuses on coercive strategies alone overlooks developmental approaches to promoting human rights that began in the 1990s. This shift toward using aid to support democracy, human rights, good governance, and civil society projects created a viable strategic alternative to coercion in which donors use aid to target the underlying problems that contribute to state violence. I characterize this as “catalytic strategy,” since the donor is using aid to support changes to the domestic political environment for human rights in recipient countries. To this end, donors provide technical and material support to democratic and judicial institutions, promote civilian oversight over military and law enforcement officers, support civil society organizations, engage in conflict prevention and peacebuilding projects, and similar activities. By the early 2000s, this type of aid made up a substantial portion of donors’ aid portfolios.

There are ample reasons for donors to pursue developmental approaches

to address the root causes of state violence. The literature on state violence has extensively examined the attributes of recipient states as determinants of human rights performance. This includes democracy (Conrad and Moore 2010; Davenport 1999, 2004, 2007; Poe et al. 1994); legal protections such as judicial autonomy, rule of law, and constitutions (Cross 1999; Davenport 1996; Elkins et al. 2009; Keith et al. 2009); and sources of domestic conflicts including protest, dissent, and civil wars (Bell and Murdie 2018; Davenport et al. 2005; Davenport 2007). Hill and Jones (2014) investigate the ability of a large set of recipient attributes to predict state violence and find that the most powerful predictors are those related to conflict, dissent, judicial independence, and executive constraints.

The research related to catalytic strategy has examined how donors use aid to address the domestic problems that contribute to state violence. There is evidence that when donors use aid to support democratic transitions, this decreases the risk of civil conflict and violent repression (Savun and Tirone 2011). Democracy aid can promote democratic consolidation and improve electoral systems (Dietrich and Wright 2015). Donors have recently increased their emphasis on judicial autonomy as a component of their democracy promotion efforts, and this assistance has been crucial in promoting judicial reforms where recipients lack sufficient state capacity to pursue reforms without external help (Ariotti et al. 2021). Donors have made peacebuilding and statebuilding key priorities, but the ability of donors to use foreign aid to prevent or ease civil conflicts, violent protest, and terrorism is unclear (Findley 2018).

1.2 Argument and theoretical approach

My argument, in brief, is that a series of shifts in international relations and innovations in development practice gave donors the ability and willingness to promote human rights. The end of the Cold War gave donors the ability to pursue human rights improvements abroad. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western donors used foreign aid as a tool for political influence. When the Soviet Union collapsed, this facilitated donors' efforts to promote human rights using foreign aid. The decline of geopolitical competition meant that donors could focus on using foreign aid to pursue development goals rather than using aid to pursue or defend influence. Changes in donor interests increased donors' willingness to pursue human rights improvements. By the early 2000s, globalization and transnational terrorism gave foreign aid greater purpose, as donors became more exposed to negative externalities from least developed and developing countries.

Innovations in development practice through the 1990s diversified donors' toolkit for responding to state violence. Early attempts to use foreign aid to improve human rights, which began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, conditioned foreign aid on human rights performance by threatening aid withdrawal. Donors had policies to withhold aid from violent regimes, but these were only sporadically applied during the Cold War. Positive conditionalities, in which donors used the promise of increased aid as a reward for policy reforms, were introduced in the 1990s, adding a positive dimension to coercive strategy. Furthermore, democracy, human rights, and "good governance" projects and programs were intro-

duced in the early 1990s and were in consistent use by donors by the early 2000s. This general toolkit for promoting human rights remains in place. Donors continue to use positive and negative conditionalities for their coercive strategies, and donors continue to use democracy, human rights, and governance projects for their catalytic strategies.

Donor interests and geopolitical factors aligned in the early 2000s through mid-2010s to create an environment that was more conducive to human rights promotion than any time before or since. The key players in development finance were the OECD countries. These donors held similar interests, and these donors had strong influence over the important multilateral organizations that were involved in development finance (Stone 2011). Although these donors faced difficulties in coordinating their efforts to maximise their effectiveness, they shared similar preferences for a liberal international order and this combined with a low geopolitical competition environment to facilitate donors using foreign aid to promote human rights. The environment for policy convergence on human rights issues was comparatively easy during this time period.

Donors' political, economic, bureaucratic, and security interests all shape their foreign aid strategies for promoting human rights. Donors use catalytic strategy to address human rights problems, and increase their catalytic responses when and where it is most likely to succeed in improving human rights and when the donors gain stronger reputational benefits from promoting human rights. Donors still rely on coercive strategy, but use it as a substitute for catalytic strategy where catalytic strategy is most likely to backfire and increase violence, where

catalytic reforms are less likely to succeed, and where donors can anticipate security problems from improving the political power of the victims of state violence.

Geopolitical competition has returned. After several years of rapidly increasing involvement in development cooperation activities in Asia and Africa, increasing diplomatic and military tensions in the South China Sea, and increasing involvement in multilateral organizations, China launched its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. China's increasing prominence in global politics, coupled with Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014, has marked a decisive end to the era of low geopolitical competition. The return of great power politics threatens Western donors' ability to use foreign aid to promote human rights.

Western donors struggled to use foreign aid for promoting human rights during the Cold War because of the Soviet threat. The entire foreign policy apparatus of major donors was focused on containing and countering Soviet influence. It is not clear, however, whether the return of geopolitical competition signals an end to Western donors using foreign aid for promoting human rights. There are a few important distinctions between the current period and the Cold War. Donors' foreign aid policies have evolved since the end of the Cold War to include catalytic strategy and also to include positive conditionalities in coercive strategy. Additionally, China is fully integrated into and reliant upon the global economy, and thus has greater preference overlap with Western countries than the Soviet Union ever had.

Nevertheless, Chinese development cooperation is a major threat to coercive strategy. China provides leaders in aid-eligible countries with an outside

option for obtaining fungible economic sector development finance, giving recipients with a means of circumventing the political conditionalities that Western donors place on more fungible forms of foreign aid. If recipient leaders are willing to pay the costs of obtaining Chinese development finance, then they can render coercive strategy obsolete.

OECD donors may choose between several strategic responses where Chinese development finance has taken coercive strategy off of the table: OECD donors can increase economic sector aid to counter Chinese influence, which would echo some of the most problematic aspects of foreign aid and human rights that occurred during the Cold War. OECD donors can carry on with their existing strategies, refusing to alter their course just because a rival has emerged. Or OECD donors can increase their reliance on catalytic strategy, substituting catalytic strategy for coercive strategy and increasing their funding for democracy, human rights, and governance projects to counter state violence where China is active. The OECD donors with the strongest geopolitical interests in countering Chinese influence view human rights and democracy as crucial elements of promoting and protecting pro-Western interests in aid recipient countries, leading donors to respond to Chinese development cooperation by strengthening their catalytic responses to state violence.

Put briefly, donors' decisions are determined by cooperative and competitive dynamics in the international system and by the costs and benefits that donors accrue from state violence and human rights promotion policies. Western donors typically derive benefits from strong human rights protections in their

partner countries. Some of these benefits are shared across donors and others accrue to specific donors. That is, donors vary in how much they gain by partnering with regimes that have strong respect for human rights and how much they benefit from working to address the underlying problems that lead to state violence. In contrast to Western donors that benefit from stronger human rights and democracy in their partner countries, China primarily benefits from stability and economic exchange, making China indifferent about whether stability and economic exchange are achieved by leaders in partner countries respecting human rights or by violently repressing their populations.

1.3 Methodological approach

I examine foreign aid from all OECD DAC donors to aid eligible recipients from 2003-2018.²

In chapter 3, I examine the correlates of donor strategy. In it, I use Tobit estimators with donor and year fixed effects to model the relationship between state violence and foreign aid. The base models examine how levels of state violence in a recipient country correlate with donors' levels of aid to economic sectors or governance sectors. Higher levels of state violence that correspond to lower levels of economic sector aid indicate that donors are using coercive strategy. Higher levels of state violence that correspond with higher levels of gover-

²A complete list of donors and recipients are listed in the appendix. North Korea and a few very small aid-eligible countries are omitted from the analyses due to insufficient data quality or availability.

nance aid indicate catalytic strategy.

In the remaining models, I include a series of moderating variables that are related to donor interests and recipient country characteristics. This allows me to estimate how each shapes donors' strategic response to violence. While chapter 3 elucidates the conditional relationships that drive donors to pursue catalytic or coercive strategies in response to state violence, it does so from an observational perspectives.

Chapter 4 further examines the relationship between coercive and catalytic strategies, but does so using causal inference methods. Endogeneity prevents me from directly modeling the relationship between the two strategies. However, the emergence of Chinese development finance created an external shock in the foreign aid system that was outside of the control of OECD donors. I use the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI MoU or BRI agreement) as the treatment in doubly robust difference-in-differences models with multiple treatments. Because Chinese development finance lacks political conditionalities, and because BRI agreements are publicized and salient to OECD donors, when a recipient state signs a BRI agreement, this sends a strong signal to OECD donors that the recipient can circumvent coercive punishments. This effectively takes coercive strategy off of the table for OECD donors.

How a BRI MoU affects governance aid, particularly when recipient states have high levels of state violence, reveals important information about the relationship between coercive and catalytic strategies. If catalytic strategy is strongly reliant on the underlying threat of coercive punishments, then when a recipient

signs a BRI MoU this should decrease the level of governance project funding that a donor can pursue abroad. If catalytic strategy is generally independent of coercive strategy, then signing a BRI MoU should have no effect on governance aid. Finally, if catalytic strategy substitutes for coercive strategy, then signing a BRI MoU should prompt donors to further increase governance sector aid.

1.4 Preview of findings

In Chapter 3, I present evidence that donors prioritize catalytic strategy during the study period and that donors use coercive strategy as a substitute when dealing with recipient states that have high levels of state violence in countries with weak judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, weak state capacity, and more terrorist attacks. Donors have stronger catalytic strategic responses toward recipient states with high levels of state violence that also have stronger executive constraints and stronger state capacity and when the human rights violations have been the subject of international naming and shaming campaigns.

I find very little evidence that donors consistently use coercive strategy during this period. In keeping with much of the prior literature on aid withdrawal and suspensions, I find that the empirical evidence for coercive strategy is highly sensitive to model specification and that any substantive effects are small. I find much stronger evidence that donors consistently use catalytic strategy to address state violence. These results are robust to numerous model specifications and estimators and suggest that state violence is a substantively important determinant

of governance aid.

I find evidence that donors' political, economic, and security interests moderate both coercive and catalytic strategies. Donor interests affect strategic choices in a manner that is consistent with the theory. Stronger economic interests in recipient states decrease coercion, since aid cuts would harm these interests, but more distant political ties and problems with terrorism increase coercion, indicating that donors are more willing to withhold aid where they have less influence to lose and where state violence is driving high-stakes negative externalities. Closer political ties predict stronger catalytic response, demonstrating that donors substitute catalytic policy in the place of coercion toward closer regimes, while terrorism predicts a weaker catalytic response, indicating that donors are unwilling to institutionalize the political rights of these groups.

In Chapter 4, I find that when a recipient state signs a BRI agreement with China, OECD donors increase their governance sector aid. This effect is concentrated among recipient states with higher levels of state violence. This is a strong indication that donors use catalytic strategy to substitute for coercive strategy when coercive strategy is no longer viable. It also suggests that donors do not generally rely on underlying, unobserved coercive threats to get recipients to agree to governance sector projects. When donors lose the power of coercion they increase the intensity of their catalytic strategies. Although there is qualitative evidence that OECD donors have responded to the BRI by creating similar initiatives, I do not find quantitative evidence of Cold War-style rivalry dynamics with respect to economic sector development assistance during the first 5 years of

the BRI. When a recipient state signs a BRI agreement this does not, on average, trigger OECD donors to competitively increase their economic sector aid in any group of recipient states. Such a finding would suggest that donors are responding to BRI agreements by using economic sector aid to bid against China to gain or to preserve influence.

1.5 Scope conditions

This dissertation focuses on the period from 2003-2018. Prior to this period, the sectoral composition of foreign aid data had systematic differences in reporting between donors. After 2003, the data are complete across OECD DAC donors and share common definitions. Empirical challenges prevent me from responsibly extending this study further backward in time to demonstrate a change in donor tactics. However, there are also theoretical reasons to limit the study to this time period. This is also the era of foreign aid when democracy promotion using foreign aid became widespread and prevalent.

The findings of this study are unlikely to generalize and should not be assumed of prior time periods. This study does not refute findings in the prior literature that investigated earlier time periods. The types of aid that are relevant to catalytic strategy did not exist during the Cold War and were gradually adopted by donors over the course of the 1990s.

Chapter 4 investigates the early stages of OECD donors' responses to the BRI. The quantitative analysis stops in 2018. The relationship between China and

powerful Western countries continues to change, and it is still possible that many of the problems experienced during the Cold War with donors using aid for influence, regardless of recipient attributes, will emerge in the future.

1.6 Contribution and implications

Prior literature has focused primarily on aspects of coercive strategy: political conditionality, aid withdrawal and suspension, and/or rewarding human rights. Some literature has explored elements of catalytic strategy, but has tended to focus on whether foreign aid is effective in democracy promotion rather than answering questions about when donors use democracy promotion in response to state violence. To my knowledge, this is the first study that has investigated both of these strategies under an integrated and comparative framework. By studying these strategies, or elements of these strategies, in isolation, the prior literature leaves many questions unanswered and risks making false inferences about the relationships between foreign aid and human rights. This dissertation takes the first step toward addressing these gaps.

When researchers focus on whether donors are willing to reward recipients for respecting human rights and to punish recipients for violating human rights, they make two implicit assumptions. First, that recipient leaders are choosing to engage in repression, and second, that the promise of aid coupled with the threat of withdrawal is sufficient to influence these decisions. There is reason to believe that these assumptions rarely hold. The first assumption can be prob-

lematic because state violence is not always a choice. Coercion may be appropriate where state violence is the result of opportunistic repression by leaders, but not where leaders do not adequately control the sources of violence. The second assumption can be problematic because for coercion to be effective, donors must leverage enough beneficial aid to alter the costs and benefits to recipient leaders of using violent repression. This requires two types of credibility: donors' commitments to reward adequate human rights performance with a substantial amount of aid must be credible, and donors' commitments to punish human rights violations by withholding a substantial amount of aid must also be credible. Furthermore, for a coercive strategy to influence a leader to change strategy, the amount of aid that donors are leveraging must be worth more to the leader than the benefits of violence, and that aid cannot be easily replaced by another donor or lender.

This means that there is a large set of scenarios where coercive strategy is either inappropriate or unfeasible: where recipient leaders do not control violence, where recipient leaders would lose power without violence, where donors would harm their own interests by withholding aid, where donors do not have strong enough interests to use large amounts of aid to reward respect for human rights, and where recipients have attractive-enough outside options to replace aid that a donor withholds. This, however, does not mean that donors will fail in all of those circumstances to respond to state violence using foreign aid. Donors often increase or maintain aid to governance projects where state violence is a problem and where coercive strategy would either be ineffective to alter recipi-

ent behaviors or harmful to the donors' interests.

Accounting for catalytic strategy demonstrates that donors have stronger commitments to countering state violence than studies focusing on coercive strategy alone would suggest. Donors substitute catalysis in the place of coercion when recipients are important and coercion in the place of catalysis when the victims of state violence are not politically-aligned with the donor. This has implications for studying the efficacy of aid in addressing state violence, since heterogeneity in donor interests alters donors' approaches. These findings have important implications for collective action between development practitioners: donors' interests drive variation between coercive and catalytic responses. Understanding these conditional relationships helps to predict when donor interests will work to facilitate or impede contributions to governance reforms and coordination on aid withdrawal or suspensions.

Introducing catalytic strategies into the equation does not directly contradict prominent findings in the prior literature. In many cases, my findings corroborate those of earlier research that found that whether donors reward and punish recipients for human rights outcomes is highly conditional and substantively trivial on average. However, introducing catalytic strategy provides valuable insights into donor behaviors and the relationship between foreign aid and human rights.

Donors substitute catalytic strategy in the place of coercion where they may partner with recipient leaders to target development toward institutional improvements that are related to human rights within the country. Where do-

nors cannot engage in genuine partnerships with recipient leaders, donors' only option is coercive strategy.

Investigating the relationship between coercive and catalytic strategy challenges key takeaways from the prior research and has implications for human rights promotion policies. Influence and interest alignment are key factors that shape how donors address human rights problems in developing countries. Where donors have stronger influence and interest alignment with recipient leaders, donors tend to rely on catalytic strategies. Where donors lack the potential for genuine partnerships on reform they are more likely to rely on coercive strategies to impose external rewards and punishments on recipient leaders. If researchers do not consider catalytic strategy, the takeaway would be that donors are less likely to address human rights where they have stronger influence and interest alignment with recipient leaders. Incorporating catalytic strategy tells a different story: donors substitute developmental strategies in the place of punitive strategies in these circumstances, promoting long term institutional changes that would change the domestic environment for human rights.

An important policy implication of this research pertains to rising South-South development cooperation. This form of development finance does not have human rights requirements and therefore provides outside options to violent recipient states for obtaining highly-fungible development finance. China, in particular, poses a significant threat to coercive strategy. Because China competes with the OECD for influence in the global South, when OECD donors withhold foreign aid to punish a recipient country, China has incentives to step in to

fill the gap. This undermines the punishment strategies that would be necessary for OECD donors' coercive strategies to have an effect. The finding that OECD donors do not respond to Belt and Road Initiative agreements by increasing economic aid demonstrates that the OECD has not returned to Cold War competitive foreign aid dynamics. Rather, when donors lose the power of coercion, they increasingly rely on catalytic strategy.

1.7 Plan of the dissertation

Chapter two presents a theoretical overview of coercive and catalytic strategies for human rights promotion. I begin the chapter by formally defining coercive and catalytic strategy and discussing the historical origins of the strategies. I then discuss the mechanisms through which these strategies target human rights improvements and the constraints and limitations of each strategy. I then discuss my approach for measuring coercive and catalytic strategy before presenting initial evidence that donors address state violence in a manner that is consistent with coercive and catalytic strategies. I conclude by evaluating alternative explanations.

Chapter three builds on the theory by evaluating the determinants of donor strategy and presenting empirical evidence for the arguments. In it, I evaluate how donors' interests moderate the relationship between state violence and donors' choice of foreign aid strategy. Furthermore, I investigate how recipient attributes moderate this relationship.

Chapter four examines how power dynamics in the international system change the prospects for coercion and catalysis, with implications for understanding how the rise of South-South development cooperation shapes traditional donors' human rights promotion efforts.

Chapter five concludes, offers suggestions for future research, and discusses the policy implications of this research.

Chapter 2

A theory of coercive and catalytic aid strategies for promoting human rights

A few of the most influential findings in the political economy of foreign aid literature are that donors prioritize their strategic, political, and economic interests over the policy performance of recipient countries when deciding where to send foreign aid and that donors pursue their interests abroad by exchanging foreign aid for policy concessions (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2007). However, donor interests are not necessarily separate from, or in opposition to, the development needs of recipient states. In an examination of development goals more broadly, Bermeo (2018) argues that the relationship between donor interests and foreign aid has changed over time. The importance of geopolitical influence declined after the Cold War, and since the early 2000s donors have targeted development aid to limit negative spillovers. As globalization and transnational terrorism have left donor interests more exposed to problems stemming from instability and poverty in low-income countries, donors have adapted their foreign aid strategies to more genuinely address problems in recipient countries that harm their interests.

To date, research that has examined whether and how donor countries respond to human rights conditions in recipient countries using bilateral foreign assistance has often examined donors' willingness to reward adequate human rights performance by increasing aid or to punish repressive recipient leaders by decreasing aid (Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Carleton and Stohl 1985; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Neumayer 2003a; Nielsen 2013; Poe 1992). A consistent finding is that donors prioritize their interests above human rights promotion when allocating aid.

This is puzzling because, as Bermeo has demonstrated, donors' interests have become increasingly exposed to negative externalities from least developed and developing countries, and this prompts donors to target their development efforts toward addressing the causes of these negative externalities. State violence intensifies conflicts and drives instability, creating negative externalities for donors. Public opinion in donor countries views close ties with violent regimes unfavorably (Heinrich and Kobayashi 2020), and the cycle of political violence between government and dissidents can increase the threat of terrorism (Karstedt-Henke 1980). Taking these factors into account and applying Bermeo's targeted development theory, one would predict that stronger donor interests in aid recipient countries would drive stronger donor responses to state violence.

Why, then, have so many studies found that donor interests undermine human rights promotion? These studies focus on coercive strategies, and many of these studies focus on earlier periods when most donor policies for responding to state violence centered on actions that would fall under coercive strategy.

My answer to this question is that donors optimize their strategies by choosing between coercive and catalytic responses to state violence. Research focusing on coercive strategy alone misses the primary means that donors use to promote human rights and captures when donors use their strategic backup option. In the post-2000 period donors prioritize catalytic strategy and substitute coercive strategy when catalytic strategy would be too costly or would take too long to have an effect. Donors' strategic optimization is driven by the donors' interests, which include pursuing strategic responses to state violence that might have an effect.

In this chapter, I introduce a classification of foreign aid that distinguishes between coercive and catalytic strategy based on the underlying mechanisms through which donors intend to influence respect for human rights. First, I define catalytic and coercive strategies and discuss their origins, human rights mechanisms, and measurement. I then turn to how the vulnerability of donor interests to negative externalities from state violence, foreign aid cuts, and the probability of project success shapes the relationship between state violence and donor strategy. I advance hypotheses relevant to these theoretical expectations and discuss the observable implications of the theory.

2.1 Defining and measuring coercive strategy

Coercive strategy uses aid as a material inducement or punishment to influence the behaviors of another state. This includes using positive and negative conditionalities to influence respect for human rights in a potential aid recipi-

ent state. I adopt the Molenaers, Dellepiane, and Faust (2015, p. 2) definition of political conditionalities: "Political conditionality refers to the allocation and use of financial resources to sanction or reward recipients in order to promote democratic governance and human rights." The decision to focus on "coercive strategy" rather than "political conditionality," "carrots and sticks," or "rewards and punishments (sanctions)" is almost entirely semantic except that I am interested in the *strategic behavior of donors* and thus rely heavily on the theoretical insights from the literature on coercion.

Coercion is a tactic that senders use to influence targets' behaviors by manipulating the target's perceptions about the threat of future costs that the sender could impose if its demands are not met. For coercion to be effective, the target must anticipate the imposition of costs and the target must be able to avoid the imposition of costs by accommodating the sender's demands (Schelling 1966, p. 2). In economic coercion, a sender uses its economic power to influence the perceived costs and benefits to a target of a given behavior (Baldwin 1985, p. 38). When donors use aid commitments and the threat or imposition of withdrawal as material leverage to promote respect for human rights in a recipient country, the donor is engaging in coercive strategy.

There are legal rules and policy statements that guide donors to respond to state violence using coercive strategy. One prominent example is the 1971 amendment to the United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which reads:

No assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in consistent pattern of gross violations of

internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.¹

This law requires policymakers to consider human rights when allocating aid, but also contains an escape clause that allows aid to continue despite abuses. The extent to which such continued support is intended to “directly benefit the needy people” in a country or as window dressing to allow a donor to continue channeling aid to repressive but important recipients is an open question (Schoultz 1981).

The immediate inclusion of this exemption into the United States Foreign Assistance Act belies one of the most significant problems with donors using coercive strategies for promoting human rights. If donors care about the victims of state violence, then they also probably care about their broader well-being. Regarding this clause, Braaten (2017) sums up the difficulties that donors face when balancing coercive punishment strategies that would harm recipient country leaders with attempts to limit collateral damage to the victims of human rights abuses: “there are two components of US foreign policy working at cross-purposes here. On one hand is the notion of promoting human rights and sanctioning governments, which violate those rights, and on the other hand is en-

¹United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended (P.L. 87–195), Sec 116.

sureing that needy people are not denied assistance, which can also play into the promotion of human rights" (p. 65).

Snyder (2018) traces the origins of this legal framework surrounding aid withdrawal in the United States to domestic and transnational opposition to the United States' close partnerships with violent regimes during the Cold War. Snyder argues that activists in the late 1960s had become frustrated with inaction from the United Nations on human rights issues and shifted their attention to the United States government as the most capable actor in the international system for dealing with human rights violations. This led groups to pressure members of Congress to alter the United States' approach toward violent governments. These pressures culminated in the incorporation of human rights issues into the Foreign Assistance Act in the 1971 amendment, increased the salience of human rights issues for the American public, altered public opinion so that a majority of Americans supported incorporating human rights pressures into foreign policy by 1974, and prompted the creation of a human rights bureau within the State Department by 1977 (Snyder 2018, 169-172).

The United States is not alone in having legal requirements to incorporate human rights promotion into its foreign policy but stands out in that the law specifies that aid should be withheld from violent recipients. Other donors have legal requirements that explicitly tie human rights promotion into their foreign policy priorities but are less explicit about cutting aid in response to human rights violations. The European Economic Community (EEC), European Union (EU), and European Commission (EC) are examples of this.

The Lomé Agreements were a series of aid and trade agreements between the European Community (EC) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. The agreements formalized human rights conditionalities in the EC-ACP development relationship and included both positive and negative conditionalities. Rewards for meeting human rights standards and agreeing to human rights conditionalities ranged from admission into the Lomé process and EC-funded projects to further improve human rights outcomes. Negative conditionalities included aid withdrawal, aid suspension, and the suspension of preferential trade status (Arts 2000).

The Maastricht Treaty, which went into effect in 1993, requires European Union members to incorporate human rights promotion into their foreign policies. Article J.1, concerning the adoption of a common foreign and security policy includes the objective "to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms," and Articles J.2 and J.3 require joint cooperation across all member states to reach those objectives.² Articles 3 and 21 of the Lisbon Treaty further integrate human rights protections into the European Union's foreign policy priorities.³

Both Treaties require not only human rights promotion, but also specify that the European Union's development cooperation goals are centered on promoting growth. Specifically, Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty requires members to "foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of de-

²*Treaty on European Union*. OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 58-59.

³*Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union*. OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 19-29.

veloping countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty."⁴ Article 130u of The Maastricht Treaty states that the goal of development cooperation is to foster "sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them; the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; the campaign against poverty in the developing countries."⁵ The European Union requirements for member countries to consider human rights in foreign policy are explicit but the texts treat them as lower priorities than sustainable development and combating poverty.

Like the United States, the European Union has adopted legal requirements to incorporate human rights promotion into its external foreign policies. Both the United States and European Union legal requirements leave room for policymakers to maneuver. In the United States' law, there is an embedded escape clause. In the European Union law, the Articles nest human rights requirements with goals that define the primary goal of foreign aid as poverty eradication and an additional goal of fostering sustainable economic development. This means that policymakers in donor countries must weigh poverty and sustainable development goals against human rights goals when deciding whether to withhold aid.

Donors manipulate foreign aid that benefits recipient state leaders or influential elites to generate costs for inadequate and benefits for adequate respect for human rights. To identify types of aid that are relevant to coercive strategy,

⁴Ibid p. 29.

⁵*Treaty on European Union*. OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 92.

I follow the logic in Nielsen (2013), which investigates selective economic sector aid withdrawal in response to state violence. This fits with coercive strategy since donors manipulate aid that benefits leaders if allocated and harms leaders if withheld.

Aid to economic sectors, large infrastructure projects, and direct budget support are all relatively-fungible forms of development assistance that provide stronger benefits to leaders and elites. Direct budgetary support is exceptionally fungible, and other economic sector projects can supplant government spending when they are similar enough to projects that the government would have pursued anyway (Winters and Martinez 2015). These fungible aid types free up government funds to use in other areas and can provide benefits to recipient governments (Bermeo 2016). Table 2.1 lists project types related to coercive and catalytic strategy, and more detailed OECD descriptions of these project and program designations are available in the appendix. The categories that I include in economic sector aid differ somewhat from other works. For example, this breakdown differs from Dietrich (2021, p. 145) in that I do not include aid to food security, agricultural projects, or multi-sector projects in the economic sector. The reason for this coding decision is that cuts to food or agricultural projects are likely to do disproportionate harm to poor and food-insecure individuals in a target country. As such, there is no theoretical reason to believe that donors would be willing to use this type of aid as leverage over leaders. Additionally, I exclude multi-sectoral

projects due to their strategic ambiguity.⁶

Table 2.1: OECD CRS sector categories related to coercive and catalytic strategies

Coercive strategy-relevant sectors	Catalytic strategy-relevant sectors
transportation	governance
storage	civil society
communications	conflict*
energy	peace*
banking	security*
financial	human rights
business	democratic participation
industry	legal and judicial development
mining	
construction	
trade	
tourism	
import support	
action relating to debt	
general budget support	

* These categories do not include any projects that would directly increase the repressive capacity of law enforcement and military officers.

2.1.1 Mechanisms, constraints, and limitations

Schelling (1966) outlines the logic of coercion from a military perspective, but this logic can be extended to economic coercion, including foreign aid with-

⁶Some multi-sectoral projects include economic sector elements, while others include governance elements. Excluding this category introduces some amount of measurement error to the dependent variables, but based on an audit of a random sample of multi-sectoral projects, this appears to introduce a smaller amount of measurement error than would be introduced if multi-sector projects were included. Including multi-sector projects in either of the dependent variables does not change the main results.

drawal. To Schelling, coercion involves a sender who has the power to hurt a target using the threat of violence to influence the target's behavior.

To inflict suffering gains nothing and saves nothing directly; it can only make people behave to avoid it. The only purpose, unless sport or revenge, must be to influence somebody's behavior, to coerce his decision or choice. To be coercive, violence has to be anticipated. And it has to be avoidable by accommodation. The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy. (pg. 2)

To Schelling, the latent power to and willingness to harm a target maximizes the senders' influence over the target's behavior. To maximize influence, coercion requires the sender to know what is beneficial to the target and what would harm the target. It requires the target to understand what behaviors would lead to punishments and what behaviors would not. The punishment must follow from the recipient's behavior. Punishment must not be certain and must not be arbitrary. The target must be able to avoid the punishment by complying with the sender's demands. A sender has the most bargaining power over a target when the target believes the sender's threats. Thus, the bargaining power of coercive strategies rests on clear demands and credible threats from senders, the sender's ability to harm the target, and the target's ability to avoid or stop punishments by complying with the sender's demands.

Schelling's logic is instructive for coercive strategy in foreign aid in many respects, but by focusing on military power, his analysis omits a crucial element

of coercive strategy that pertains to foreign aid. Military actors can only impose costs by harming a target. Economic power has an additional dimension in that donors can both promise rewards and threaten punishments. Larger rewards for compliance can translate to greater punishments for noncompliance. Donors can gain bargaining power over recipients by using foreign aid to create both positive and negative sanction; economic power is drawn from both actual or promised rewards for compliance and actual or promised punishments for non-compliance (Baldwin 1985).

These mechanisms provide insights into the constraints and limitations that donors face when trying to leverage foreign aid to gain influence over human rights outcomes. These mechanisms cumulatively enhance the strength of coercion.

The type of aid that donors manipulate in coercive strategy must have the power to hurt recipient leaders. This means that donors need to leverage large amounts of aid that disproportionately benefit leaders and elites. This is problematic because benefiting elites tends not to be an explicit goal of foreign aid. Leaders and elites may benefit from the economic spillovers of development programs, from improved well-being of their citizens that lowers dissent and contestation, from aid that targets projects or budgets that the government would have provided anyway which makes the aid highly-fungible, and sometimes by simply siphoning off aid disbursements for personal gain (Andersen et al. 2022). But development aid is typically targeted toward some form of economic growth that would benefit non-elites. To the extent that withholding economic aid harms

elites, it should do even more harm to vulnerable populations that have little say in politics.

Donors are in a difficult position when addressing human rights violations with aid. It is possible that donors can carefully target and manage selective aid withdrawal to keep aid from falling into the hands of leaders or elites who could use those resources to bolster their power and further repress populations, but doing so without doing greater harm to those in poverty can be exceedingly difficult in practice.

Collateral damage to the general population from donors' attempts to punish repressive leaders can be substantial. Madagascar demonstrates the challenges that donors face when responding to state violence by decreasing aid. In 2009, a military coup led to a violent political crisis. At the time, Madagascar would have seemed to be the ideal theoretical case for coercive strategy to be effective. The government was exceptionally reliant on foreign aid: prior to the coup, the International Monetary Fund estimated that foreign aid comprised 75% of the country's budget. Key donors suspended all but emergency aid. This, in combination with other forms of economic retaliation from abroad and problems stemming from the political crisis itself, led to a dramatic increase in unemployment, poverty, and childhood malnutrition.⁷ Even if these economic punishments were effective in contributing to the eventual return to democratic gov-

⁷Madagascar: Measuring the Impact of the Political Crisis. (2013, June 5). *The World Bank*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/06/05/madagascar-measuring-the-impact-of-the-political-crisis>

ernance in the country, the change came at a tremendous price to development efforts and outcomes. In this case, donors were willing to suspend aid due to the coup and extreme acts of political violence by security forces. However, the collateral damage to vulnerable populations in this case demonstrates why donors can be hesitant to use aid to punish leaders.

Recipient leaders must believe that if they comply with human rights policy demands, donors will reward this compliance with substantial amounts of beneficial aid. However, donors face credibility problems with rewards. Foreign aid is volatile for reasons beyond recipient leaders' actions. Donor policies and economic performance are better predictors of aid shocks—large positive or negative changes in foreign aid delivery—than changes to recipient policies and economic performance (Iannantuoni 2022). Highly volatile aid decreases donors' credibility to deliver on promises, undermining this element of coercive strategy.

Recipient leaders must believe that their failure to comply with donors' human rights policy demands will result in meaningful punishments. There are many credibility problems with punishments. Aid withdrawal can create collateral damage for donors' economic interests, especially where donors use aid to promote trade. Donors use aid to "buy influence" in global politics, and using aid withdrawal to pressure recipients means that donors forgo that influence. Donors are also interested in broader development goals, and the credibility of donors' threats to withhold aid is lower where withholding aid would harm their development goals (Swedlund 2017a).

Donors must credibly leverage enough foreign aid to meaningfully alter

recipient leaders' cost-benefit calculations. Recipients must believe that punishment will be more costly than forgoing repression (or fixing other causes of state violence). This means that donors must credibly commit to reward recipients who comply with human rights norms with enough aid to make it worth their while. Conversely, recipients must believe that donors will impose higher costs by withholding foreign aid than the costs that the recipient would incur from addressing the causes of state violence. Coercive strategy requires donors to alter recipients' cost-benefit calculations of violent repression or offset the costs that recipient leaders incur for addressing other causes of state violence.

Recipient leaders must be capable of achieving compliance with donors' demands. Recipient leaders must control violence and use it opportunistically. However, leaders do not always control violence, and violence may be necessary to maintain control within the state where leaders do not have the resources to accommodate dissent or to peacefully project power.

Donors and recipients interact in the broader context of the international system. The context of the international system can be particularly threatening to coercive strategy, because the contributions of individual donors to coercive strategy are harmed by the actions of non-contributors. The power of coercive strategy to create costs and benefits for aid recipient countries is maximised when donors can effectively coordinate their strategies. Because these dynamics are in place, as the pool of donors grows larger and donors' policy preferences become more diverse, the prospects for coercive strategy plummet (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Peinhardt and Sandler 2015).

Donors must at a minimum achieve strong enough cooperation to prevent donors from undermining each other's punishments. If one donor suspending aid is met with another donor *increasing* aid proportionately in order to capture influence, then donors cannot expect coercive strategy to be effective and are less likely to suspend aid, knowing that rivals will use the opportunity to capture influence.

Intense geopolitical competition prevents donors from consistently punishing human rights violations (Dunning 2004; Lebovic 2005; Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Nielsen 2013). Donors did not consistently reward and punish state violence or use aid for democracy promotion until the end of the Cold War. The existence of the Soviet Union as an outside option for aid prevented western donors, not only the United States, from consistently and credibly committing to withhold aid in response to state violence. The United States occasionally suspended aid where state violence became sufficiently widespread, well-documented, and politically salient to voters, but these suspensions were typically short term and not consistently applied.

Like the United States, the United Kingdom also faced pressures in the early 1970s to incorporate human rights issues into its foreign policy. In 1973, in response to a series of human rights violations and attacks against British citizens by the Idi Amin administration, the United Kingdom cancelled all foreign aid and a \$10 Million loan to Uganda (Gitelson 1977, p. 370). The United Kingdom was the largest single donor to Uganda at the time, so this could have been a substantial blow to Ugandan government. However, Amin turned from the United

Kingdom to the Soviet Union, which provided ample arms shipments alongside its foreign aid, helping to increase the repressive capacity and further destabilizing East Africa (Gitelson 1977, p. 372).

China has made development finance a key component of its foreign policy strategy, which has allowed it to gain influence among its partners in the Global South. China has focused its development finance in niches like energy, natural resource extraction, and infrastructure. These are relatively fungible projects that can benefit leaders. China has branded its development finance strategy as an alternative to Western foreign aid, and allows the leaders of its partner countries access to these projects without having to comply with democracy, human rights, or good governance conditionalities. As such, China threatens coercive strategy by giving the leaders of recipient countries outside options for obtaining development finance.

Geopolitical competition, where donors have incentives to capture influence from their rivals, differs from coordination failures. Large donors may still create costs for recipient leaders if other donors fail to suspend aid, but only maintain aid at prior levels. For example, major donors coordinated on economic sanctions that included foreign aid withdrawal after the Tiananmen Square massacre. Japan, facing pressure from Japanese and Chinese business interests, was the first country to resume providing foreign aid to China, but it did so in a limited capacity. Japan restored a portion of an aid package that it had promised to China. United States President George H.W. Bush responded to Japan's resumed aid by saying, "they can make up their own minds on a lot of questions. They work

very cooperatively with the U.S., but sometimes they have interests that prevail."⁸ Whereas Japan restored its limited aid to China, the Soviet Union replaced the income that Uganda lost from other donors.

2.2 Defining and measuring catalytic strategy

Donors use catalytic strategy to promote, enable, or speed up processes that would, if successful, improve the domestic environment for human rights in the recipient country either by changing the target state's institutions or by altering relationships between the government and its citizens. For example, when donors use aid projects to improve domestic institutions linked to human rights accountability in recipient states, the donor is engaging in catalytic strategy. This includes support for good governance, civil society inclusion, peace processes, and judicial oversight. To the extent that higher levels of state violence increase the salience and urgency of governance problems to donors, we should expect donors to devote more governance aid to recipients with higher levels of state violence. Just as catalytic strategy is closely related to political conditionality, there is substantial overlap between catalytic strategy and literature on democracy promotion and capacity building. Because I am interested in donors' strategic attempts to facilitate changes in the domestic political environment for human rights of aid recipient countries, I use the term catalytic strategy.

⁸Auerbach, S. (1990, July 8). U.S. Won't Oppose Japan's Aid to China. The Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/07/08/us-wont-oppose-japans-aid-to-china>

Since the late 1990s, there have been several policy shifts that would move donors' human rights promotion strategies away from coercion and towards catalysis when possible. More recent policy prescriptions by working groups on human rights and development advise donors to cut off aid only as a last resort. For example, an OECD working group issued the following recommendation regarding human rights conditionality in foreign aid in 1997:

Development cooperation stresses positive measures for the promotion of participatory development and good governance. The withholding of assistance should be reserved for cases where persistent violations of men's, women's and children's basic rights are not being addressed by the government and *no adequate basis of shared values and interests exists to permit a real partnership.*⁹

This prioritizes supportive rather than punitive measures to combat state violence toward recipients that are receptive to donor influence and that have stronger shared interests with donors. The emphasized text prescribes using aid withdrawal only as a last resort where other efforts have either failed or have no reasonable expectation of success. The report provides a series of best practices for promoting respect for human rights using foreign aid. It recommends that donors prioritize policy dialogue, assistance to critical institutions with an emphasis on judicial systems, and support for civil society organizations linked to human rights.

⁹OECD. 1997. *Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance*: 3.

Catalytic strategy emerged as a component of broader human rights, democracy, and “good governance” promotion efforts by powerful western countries in the 1990s and early 2000s.¹⁰ During this time, donor spending on governance sector projects increased rapidly (Carothers 1999, p. 49).

In 2000, the European Union (EU) and European member states signed the Cotonou Agreement with 79 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries.¹¹ The Cotonou Agreement contains elements of both coercive and catalytic strategy. Key elements of coercive strategy changed with the Cotonou Agreement. The Agreement marked a shift from EU donors using negative conditionality to promote human rights and democracy to using positive conditionalities. The EU began using the promise of increased aid as a reward for meeting human rights and democracy norms rather than merely withholding aid to punish violations (Crawford 2001; Börzel and Risse 2009).

The major innovative element of Cotonou, however, was that it moved beyond donors promoting human rights by using aid as a material reward and punishment. It also specifically shifted aid toward capacity-building partnerships with recipient governments and non-state actors for “promoting institutional re-

¹⁰Different donor countries have tended to use different descriptions of the political reforms that are relevant to catalytic strategy. The Scandinavian donors have a long history of emphasizing “human rights,” broadly defined, above other political reforms. The United States has framed its assistance around “democracy promotion.” European donors put more emphasis on “good governance,” loosely defined. All of these framings are compatible with catalytic strategy, and all include discussions of basic human rights protections as a key component of the political reforms that the donor is pursuing.

¹¹Partnership agreement 2000/483/EC between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, pp. 3-353).

forms and development, strengthening the institutions necessary for the consolidation of democracy, good governance and for efficient and competitive market economies; and building capacity for development and partnership."¹² The Agreement emphasized using aid to support political reforms and institutional developments to create long-term constitutive changes in states. In doing so, the agreement marked a major shift toward using catalytic strategies for human rights promotion.

Article 33 focuses on cooperative institutional development and capacity building with the ACP, specifying the following approach (emphasis added):

1. Cooperation shall pay systematic attention to institutional aspects and in this context, shall *support the efforts of the ACP States to develop and strengthen structures, institutions and procedures* that help to:
 - (a) promote and sustain democracy, human dignity, social justice and pluralism, with full respect for diversity within and among societies;
 - (b) promote and sustain universal and full respect for and observance and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;
 - (c) develop and strengthen the rule of law; and improve access to justice, while guaranteeing the professionalism and independence of the judicial systems; and
 - (d) ensure transparent and accountable governance and administration in all public institutions.¹³

¹²2000/483/EC Article 20

¹³2000/483/EC Article 33.

Cotonou laid out a specific framework that made human rights a cornerstone of EU-ACP development cooperation and emphasized a developmental, capacity-building, and cooperative approach that viewed respect for human rights as a vital component of economic development efforts and nested human rights and economic development within a good governance framework. This shift toward catalytic strategy is notable in that human rights promotion is less unilaterally imposed by the Global North and is viewed as a cooperative endeavor in which the governments and civil society organizations of recipient states play an important role.


Since Cotonou, several major European countries and the United Kingdom have established internal human rights-based foreign aid policies that require compliance, and there are several multilateral agreements that incorporate human rights provisions into foreign aid.¹⁴ Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have all established explicit human rights policies over their foreign aid agencies. Australia and the United States also incorporate human rights into their foreign assistance policies but have weaker formal requirements for compliance.

Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 compare the composition of foreign assistance between donors in the 1990-1999, 2000-2009, and 2010-2019 time periods, respectively. Each figure reports the percentage of aid a donor committed over the dec-

¹⁴See OECD (2013) *Integrating Human Rights Into Development* 5-6 for a list of human rights and development policies.

ade to each of several categories: governance, economic, social, food and agricultural, emergency, and other.¹⁵

Figure 2.1: Composition of foreign aid between donor countries: 1990-1999




There are a few patterns that emerge pertaining to governance sector aid. First, the number of donors increases between each period. This is largely driven by the emergence of new European donors. Within Europe, these newer donors

¹⁵Calculations by author using OECD CRS data. The reported percentages are based on ten year aggregations of bilateral official development assistance commitments, sorted by the primary purpose code that the donors reported to the OECD. The first column of table 2.1 provides a summary of the types included in the economic sector, the second column indicates project types included in the governance sector. The social sector category consists primarily of education and health projects. Food and agriculture is limited to food security and agricultural sector aid. Emergency aid includes disaster response, refugee costs, and similar. Other consists of multi-sectoral and unclassified aid. All categories sum to 100%.

tend to devote more of their aid to governance than the more established donors do. Many of these new donors are Eastern and Central European countries that received substantial democracy assistance after the Cold War.

Figure 2.2: Composition of foreign aid between donor countries: 2000-2009




Second, Scandinavian donors devote relatively large percentages of their assistance to governance sector projects. This lends some face validity to donors genuinely using governance aid to promote human rights. The Scandinavian countries were early champions of global human rights.

Third, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia all devote large percentages of aid to governance. Each of these donors plays a hegemonic role

in regional or global politics.

There is little relationship between the colonial legacy of donors and how much they allocate toward governance aid. If anything, donors with colonial legacies devote less of their aid to governance projects. The United Kingdom and Portugal provide roughly average percentages of aid to the governance sector while France, Spain, Japan, and Italy provide much less.

Figure 2.3: Composition of foreign aid between donor countries: 2010-2019




Catalytic strategy aligns with the OECD’s prescription by promoting political liberalization and strengthening domestic sources of accountability that would limit state violence when possible. Projects to improve democratic gov-

ernance, judicial systems, state capacity, transparency, accountability, and civil society inclusion are most applicable to catalytic strategy. These projects aim to build responsive and open political institutions, rule of law, access to information and freedom of expression for civil society, free and fair elections, and political participation. Because democratic and legal institutions are among the best predictors for human rights performance (Hill and Jones 2014), aid allocation targeting projects in related sectors are more likely to be used in a manner that is consistent with catalytic strategy. As shown in figure 2.4, aid to support good governance, judicial reforms, and civil society inclusion increased rapidly during the 1990s and the early 2000s and has remained at a relatively high level since.

There is evidence that foreign aid can improve democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights (Carnegie and Marinov 2017). Strong legal systems, constitutional provisions, and independent judiciaries constrain leaders from using state violence (Davenport 1996; Keith et al. 2009; Powell and Staton 2009), and these domestic institutions are more strongly associated with human rights than international sources of influence (Hill and Jones 2014). Slough and Fariss (2021) examine a randomized free legal assistance project in Haiti that decreased the duration of illegal pretrial imprisonment. They find that access to legal representation helped to clear a set of bureaucratic hurdles that were leading to human rights abuses. This not only demonstrates that catalytic strategy can improve legal protections for citizens of countries with high levels of state violence, but also demonstrates that leaders do not always control human rights outcomes. The human rights issues in Haiti were related to state capacity and

bureaucratic inefficiencies that legal assistance helped to resolve. Furthermore, Ariotti et al. (2021) find that donors can improve judicial independence by facilitating reforms in low-capacity settings where leaders are willing but lack the means to enact reforms.

Figure 2.4: Time series plot of the average percentage of foreign aid committed to governance, judicial institution, and civil society projects by OECD DAC donors.



2.2.1 Constraints and limitations

Whereas coercive strategy relies on the power to hurt, catalytic strategy rests on the power to help. Partnerships rely on aligned interests between a donor


and recipients to increase coordination, efficiency, and the stability of changes. Recipient leaders who do not share the same goals as a donor will not share ownership of the projects. When donors impose catalytic strategy projects on reluctant recipients, the recipient has no incentives to sustain the project after the grant ends, and the recipient may retaliate in ways that harm human rights promotion outcomes.

In catalytic strategy, donors fund projects that address domestic causes of state violence. To this end, donors pursue projects that increase democratic competition, limit electoral violence, empower and diversify independent veto players in government, promote the free flow of information, combat corruption and impunity, and subordinate state actors to civil society. Nearly all of these types of projects aim to improve the domestic environment for human rights in ways that can threaten the tenure and extractive capacity of recipient state leaders. When this happens, catalytic strategy can backfire and inadvertently harm human rights outcomes. As such, catalytic strategy faces significant obstacles to implementation and efficacy.

Although several studies link democracy aid to improved democratization and human rights improvements, the process of democratic transition can increase state violence. In one example of this phenomenon, Brown (2004) illustrates how the process of democratizing Kenya in the 1990s led President Daniel arap Moi to employ electoral violence and ethnic cleansing in order to retain power. Although foreign aid donors played an important role in Moi's decision not to seek re-election and a relatively peaceful transition of power in 2002, the process

of democratization increased the severity of human rights violations in the short run. Furthermore, state violence surrounding elections remains common in the country. Democratization is not a magic bullet for promoting human rights. If democratic consolidation fails, the increased political competition from partial democratization may drive leaders to pursue violent tactics to retain power.

Figure 2.5: Partial democratization and persistent state violence in Kenya



Civil society organizations are important actors in promoting human rights globally. These organizations observe the behaviors and human rights practices of state actors. Their monitoring and reporting activities are key to transmitting information from within countries to broader international audiences

and, in turn, facilitate the ‘naming and shaming’ activities of transnational human rights networks, which a large body of prior literature identifies as crucial to the diffusion of human rights norms (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Keck et al. 1998; Risse et al. 2013).

Traditional donors have, understandably, made supporting civil society organizations a key component of their human rights and development strategies. The European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is a notable exception to typical forms of catalytic strategy. The EIDHR prioritizes civil society engagement, but does so in a way that can cut target governments out of the stakeholder group as needed by directly funding civil society organizations. This dramatically increases the number of states in which donors can pursue catalytic strategy by sidestepping the need for implementing partners and aid recipient state leaders to share values or engage in partnerships. This has generated significant backlash against civil society and non-governmental organizations.

The governments of some states have responded to the EIDHR by restricting the activities of civil society organizations. Civil society organization restrictions range from administrative obstacles and requiring civil society organizations to disclose the sources of foreign funding to violent crackdowns and the political imprisonment of workers (DeMattee 2019). To the extent that civil society support increases violent crackdowns, it may be counterproductive for donors to pursue such activities. However, leaders are more likely to take administrative approaches to countering civil society organizations, which would simply make catalytic strategy less effective in achieving its goals (Chaudhry 2022). As

the severity of civil society organization restrictions increase, recipient leaders may successfully constrain the operations and capabilities of civil society groups (Smidt et al. 2021).

Donors also prioritize projects that increase the capabilities and independence of the judiciary. Independent domestic courts, when aided by information from civil society organizations, are a powerful tool for improving domestic compliance with international human rights agreements (Lupu 2013). Crackdowns on civil society organizations in the presence of state violence prevent domestic courts from constraining leaders and holding state actors accountable for violence against civilians.

In sum, donors can only expect catalytic strategy to improve human rights when they have an adequate foundation of liberal political institutions to build upon and where leaders are not opposed to human rights improvements. While there are many scenarios in which this would be the case, this means that catalytic strategy is not always appropriate and may even contribute to worsening state violence when it is applied in inappropriate contexts.

2.3 Collective action theory and donor strategy

My theoretical approach is rooted in collective action theory. State violence generates negative externalities that harm donors' interests, so adequate human rights outcomes have some of the non-rival and non-excludable properties of a public good. This would predict under-provision and free-riding on

the contributions of major donors. However, many smaller donors contribute to human rights promotion. This is because there are also selective, donor-specific private benefits from promoting and achieving human rights improvements that decrease incentives to free-ride. These vary in intensity between donors. Variation is determined by how exposed donors' interests are to costs from the human rights violations of a recipient country and how donors' interests are affected by the costs and benefits of their policy response. Donors have different costs and benefits due to differences in their relationships with the recipient country, differences in their domestic and international reputational benefits from promoting human rights, and differences in their exposure to negative externalities from violence. These costs and benefits help to explain which donors will be most likely to contribute to promoting human rights and under what circumstances. Donor-specific benefits help to explain why some donors contribute more to human rights promotion than others. The costs and benefits of different spillovers to donors based on the recipient state context help to explain why donors sometimes choose coercive and sometimes catalytic strategies.

The prospects for effective partnerships between a donor and a recipient country are also explained by collective action theory. Foreign aid projects and programs are the result of bargaining between donor and recipient countries (Swedlund 2017b). Catalytic strategy relies on partnerships between a donor and a recipient, requiring sufficiently aligned preferences to increase coordination, efficacy, and the sustainability of changes. Whereas catalytic strategy requires partnerships between donors and recipients, donors may unilaterally impose co-

ercive punishments. However, the conditionalities that coercive strategy uses are subject to several problems of asymmetry. If a recipient country does not share the goals that are imposed on them by Western donors, this can lead to time-inconsistency problems in which the recipient agrees to conditionalities and reverses their policies after receiving aid disbursements. Conditionality is also subject to credibility problems, since recipients are difficult to compel or deter if they have not been held accountable for their policies in the past Sandler (2004). This informs the expectation that donors will increase their catalytic strategy efforts where shared interests in political liberalization drive stronger partnerships, and donors will rely on coercive punishments where the grounds for partnership are weakest.

The final key component of collective action theory that helps to explain why donors choose coercive versus catalytic strategy is how individual contributions aggregate to determine the prospects for success (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Peinhardt and Sandler 2015). Coercive and catalytic strategies differ strongly in this respect. Coercive strategies have the greatest impact when donors can coordinate their strategies. Coercive strategy becomes more difficult as the number of important actors in development finance increases and as the preference heterogeneity between these actors increases. At the extreme, as is the case with China, one development financier can unilaterally undermine coercive strategy if it chooses not to cooperate. In contrast, catalytic strategy is less harmed by cooperation and coordination failures. Donors' contributions to improving the political environment for human rights are summative and often specialized. Co-

operation increases the level of human rights promotion, and coordination can improve the efficiency of human rights promotion, but cooperation failures do not undermine catalytic strategy in the same way as coercive strategy. This informs the expectation that donors will substitute catalytic strategy where Chinese development finance undermines coercive strategy.

2.4 Strategic substitution between coercive and catalytic strategies

When optimizing their strategies, donors may choose to use one, neither, or both of these strategies. In the post-2000 period, catalytic strategy has become donors' primary response to state violence problems. The challenges, shortcomings, and unintended consequences of coercive strategy had been apparent for decades, but donors lacked an institutionalized strategic alternative until the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The OECD DAC working group's policy prescriptions in 1997 and the European Union's Cotonou Agreement in 2000 coincided with growing negative spillovers to donors from aid-eligible countries as a result of globalization and transnational terrorism. Catalytic strategy emerged as an alternative to coercive strategy as donor interests became strongly aligned with addressing the problems of state violence. Beyond policy prescriptions and international agreements, catalytic strategy is less likely than aid withdrawal to harm broader development goals, including but not limited to human rights outcomes, as long as the strategies are


pursued in cooperation with recipient state governments. Governance projects are tailored to developing institutions that are linked to both human rights improvements and broader economic growth and stability. If donors can improve these institutions, positive spillovers into other development goals are likely.

Successful coercion may require donors to leverage enough aid to meaningfully alter recipient leaders' cost-benefit analysis of repression. Furthermore, it requires recipient leaders to control human rights outcomes, which is not always the case. Coercive strategy relies on donors being able to credibly threaten to withdraw aid, but aid withdrawal can harm human rights outcomes and broader development goals. Aid volatility can harm institutional development and intensify state violence by prolonging and intensifying domestic conflicts (Iannantuoni 2022; Nielsen et al. 2011). Aid suspensions in response to rights violations may do more harm than good.

The collective action properties of coercive and catalytic strategy suggest that higher numbers of donors with more diverse preferences will harm the prognosis for coercive strategy and help the prognosis of catalytic strategy. If donors fail to coordinate their strategies and this results in donors committing foreign aid without enforcing political conditionalities, then the punishment strategies on which coercive strategy relies will be diluted and coercive strategies will be less effective. In contrast, more donors with more diverse preferences positively impact catalytic strategy, because the contributions of individual donors with different specializations and different relationships with recipient countries aggregate to have an additive impact. The number of active donors has increased dramati-

ically since the early 2000s, as shown in Figure 2.6. As the number of donors has increased, the preference heterogeneity of these donors has also increased, suggesting that the prospects of collective action for catalytic strategy improved over time while the prospects for coercive strategy diminished.

Figure 2.6: Count of active donors per year, as reported by the OECD CRS and AidData.



Catalytic strategy is not a panacea. Catalysis operates through a differ-

ent strategic logic than coercion and is applicable under different circumstances. Coercion may be the only appropriate policy response when there is no basis for partnership between a donor and recipient. Foreign assistance projects require agreements to be reached between donor and recipient leaders, and the outcomes reflect a bargaining process (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2007; Swedlund 2017b). Catalytic strategy requires donors and recipients to reach agreements on these projects and reforms. Successful catalysis may require long-term, ongoing support from a donor in coordination with a recipient. This means that catalytic strategy can have high opportunity costs for donors: aid dollars spent attempting to develop one country's domestic environment for human rights cannot be used to pursue the donor's foreign policy objectives in other sectors or in other recipient countries. In contrast, a sender using coercive strategy may unilaterally choose to decrease economic sector aid to harm a target. The cost to the donor depends on the benefits that the donor derives from economic sector aid.

Hypothesis 1: Donors will substitute coercive strategy in the place of catalytic strategy when the costs of catalytic strategy are exceptional and where there is no adequate basis for partnership between the donor and recipient government.

Both strategies are costly to donors, and donor interests shape the severity of these costs. For coercive strategy, donors must sacrifice using aid for other policy concessions and when decreasing economic aid as a punishment must accept the economic collateral damage. For catalytic strategy, donors must forgo

other uses of aid to prioritize support for institutional reforms that may require a long duration to take effect. Whether and how state violence harms donor interests varies between donors and across recipients. For example, some donors face much stronger reputational harm from being associated with violent regimes, and some problems stemming from state violence create more severe security concerns for donors than others.

In Chapter 3, I present my empirical approach for testing Hypothesis 1. I discuss a series of theoretically-important variables related to donor interests that could be expected to moderate the relationship between state violence and donor strategy, based on a review of the prior literature.

If we assume that one recipient and one donor state are interacting with each other in isolation, then we can also assume that coercive strategy will be strongest when the donor can credibly commit to reward the recipient for complying with human rights norms and credibly threaten to punish the recipient for violating human rights norms. This is a useful simplification, but it ignores the broader context of the international system. Donors and recipients do not interact in isolation, and there has been substantial variation over time in the global environment for development finance and human rights.

Complexity in the development finance system can pose a significant threat to coercive strategy. When recipient leaders have outside options for obtaining development finance from donors and lenders that are indifferent to their recipients' human rights performance, then this can pose significant challenges for coercive strategy.

The threat to coercive strategy is highest when competitive dynamics emerge between development financiers. If states are competing for global power and use development finance to gain influence in developing countries, then reducing foreign aid to punish human rights violations will provide competitors with the opportunity to seize influence. By decreasing economic sector aid in response to human rights violations, the donor that is using coercive strategy can lose twice over: First by surrendering influence to its competitor, and second by having its competitor neutralize any harm that otherwise may have been done to the recipient from the donors' coercive punishment strategy. The prospect of both losing influence over a recipient to a competitor and also failing to promote human rights improvements renders coercive punishment strategies untenable.

Consequently, highly competitive dynamics in the international system make coercive strategy unappealing to donors. Catalytic strategy may not be completely immune to competitive dynamics, but it is far less reliant on cooperation and coordination across donors than coercive strategy is. Where donors lose the power of coercive strategy, they may be increasingly willing to substitute catalytic strategy. Catalytic strategy not only offers Western donors with a strategic alternative to coercive strategy but may also help Western donors to gain and preserve influence in recipient states—however, only to the extent that catalytic strategy can effectively promote and protect political liberalization.

Hypothesis 2: Donors will substitute catalytic strategy in the place of coercive strategy when recipient states demonstrate that they are willing to pursue outside options for development finance.

In Chapter 4, I discuss my empirical approach for testing Hypothesis 2. I draw upon lessons learned from the literature on foreign aid efficacy, political conditionality, and human rights promotion during and after the Cold War to consider the implications of Chinese development finance on OECD donors' coercive and catalytic strategy. I leverage variation in the timing of BRI agreements and causal inference techniques to determine how donors respond to losing the power of coercive strategy.

Put briefly, my argument is that Chinese development finance offers recipient leaders with access to loans and grants that do not have the same political conditionalities to promote human rights, democracy, and "good governance" attached to them, making the rise of China as a development financier particularly problematic for coercive strategy. China is using its development cooperation to build influence globally, further threatening coercive strategy: China has strong incentives to fill the economic sector niches that have been left by Western donors to gain influence. Some of these niches exist because Western donors are unwilling to provide fungible economic sector aid to the recipient because of governance problems.

Recipient leaders can choose to pursue Chinese development finance as an alternative or complement to Western development aid. However, despite its "no strings attached" branding, Chinese development finance is costly to recipients. Chinese development finance is more likely than OECD finance to be provided as a loan with interest, and recipient leaders are typically trading increased autonomy in their strictly-domestic policies for requirements to promote Chi-

nese interests at home and abroad, which can prompt domestic backlash. When a recipient state pursues Chinese development finance, this sends a strong signal to Western donors that the recipient is both willing and able to pay the costs to undermine Western donors' coercive strategies.

Chapter 3

How donor interests moderate coercive and catalytic strategy

This chapter presents quantitative empirical analyses of the relationship between state violence and coercive or catalytic strategies. Beyond exploring the relationship between state violence and foreign aid, it examines whether and how a range of donor interests shapes donors' strategic responses to violence. Many of these interests have been identified by the prior literature as competing with human rights for determining foreign aid.

3.1 Research design

I examine official development assistance commitments from all 29 current OECD DAC donor countries to 126 ODA-eligible recipient countries in the 2003-2018 time period.¹ Although early shifts toward catalytic strategy can be traced back to the late 1990s and catalytic strategies became integrated into some

¹Country lists in appendix. Recipient inclusion is limited only by data availability.

donor policies by 2000, the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data on commitments has complete coverage beginning in 2003.² I choose to begin the analysis in 2003 to avoid empirical problems from systematic reporting differences between donors in prior periods. The unit of analysis is the donor-recipient year.

3.1.1 Dependent variables

The dependent variables measure foreign aid commitments by sector. Commitments are preferable to disbursements, since commitments are more common in the prior literature, which argues that commitments more accurately capture donors' decision-making process and tend to be less volatile than disbursements (see, for example, Bermeo 2017; Neumayer 2003b; Dreher et al. 2011). I calculate these values using project-level aid data from the OECD CRS. To limit the influence of outliers, the dependent variables are transformed using the natural log.

The GOVERNANCE AID dependent variable is the natural log of one plus the sum of bilateral ODA projects and programs related to catalytic strategy between a donor and recipient in a given year, in constant 2018 USD, standardized per 1000 population using aid data from the OECD and population data from the World Bank. Where catalytic strategy is hypothesized, we should observe higher levels of GOVERNANCE AID in response to state violence. The ECONOMIC AID vari-

²For more information about coverage see the Technical Guide to the OECD CRS dataset, last accessed 23 Nov 2022 at <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/crsguide.htm>.

able uses the same formula for assistance related to coercive strategy. Where coercive strategic responses are hypothesized, we should observe decreased levels of ECONOMIC AID in response to state violence.

Relevant projects and programs to each dependent variable are described in Table 2.1 and detailed in Appendix section A.4. Table A.2 presents the full set of variables with technical descriptions, and Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables.

3.1.2 Measuring state violence

The primary independent variable measures physical violence against civilians by state actors. This variable, STATE VIOLENCE is the recipient's inverted dynamic latent human rights score (Fariss et al. 2020), which estimates the frequency and severity of physical integrity rights violations including extrajudicial killings, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances. Higher values indicate more human rights violations. This is preferable to many other measures because it is continuous, standardized, and suitable for comparison over time. Higher levels of state violence should correspond to lower economic aid if donors are engaging in coercive strategy and higher governance aid if donors are engaging in catalytic strategy.

3.1.3 Donor interest moderators

Donors may incur reputational costs at home and in the international system if they are perceived to be partnering with violent recipient leaders or are perceived to be doing nothing about state violence. Donors vary in their overall respect for human rights and in their sincerity about promoting human rights internationally and thus vary in their exposure to reputational costs. This is because donors' human rights commitments are influenced by domestic political pressures that compel donors to react in response to highly-salient events in recipient countries, but only when voters care more about human rights promotion than other foreign policy goals (Eisensee and Strömberg 2007; Nielsen 2013; Heinrich et al. 2018). There is evidence that catalytic strategy is more useful for improving public opinion than coercive strategy. Heinrich and Kobayashi (2020) use a survey experiment to determine how voters evaluate aid to problematic regimes, including those with high levels of state violence. They find that donors providing support addressing problems abroad mitigates negative public opinion. However, they find no evidence that punishment strategies similarly mitigate negative public opinion. Reputation matters, and politicians are sensitive to public opinion and international reputational costs stemming from their partnerships with violent recipient governments. Matanock and Johnson (this issue) survey Members of Parliament in the United Kingdom and find that politicians adjust their foreign aid strategies primarily to protect the United Kingdom's reputation. All else being equal, this evidence suggests that donors with stronger domestic respect for human rights will be more willing to pay for catalytic re-

sponses. The variable `DONOR RIGHTS` is dynamic latent human rights score for the donor (Fariss et al. 2020). Higher values indicate stronger respect for physical integrity rights in the donor country. I use this as a proxy for public opinion on human rights in the donor country and the donor's reputational stake in human rights in the international system. To the extent that this logic holds, donors with stronger domestic respect for human rights should be expected to have the strongest interest in addressing problems of state violence.

Donors may be less willing to decrease economic aid in response to violations where they enjoy political benefits and enhanced influence from their foreign aid (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2007; Wang 1999). Furthermore, donors may be more willing and able to promote domestic political reforms in recipient countries if they hold stronger influence over leaders. Both of these relate to political interest alignment between donor and recipient leaders. As a proxy for political interest alignment, I include `UN IDEAL POINT DISTANCE`, a widely-used measurement of the political distance between two states, calculated by analyzing the differences between United Nations general assembly voting records in a given year (Bailey et al. 2017). Higher values suggest weaker shared preferences and influence between donor and recipient leaders.

Trade is particularly susceptible to costs stemming from coercive punishments. Donors often use foreign aid to promote trade deals that would increase their bilateral exports to recipient states (Cali and Te Velde 2011). The types of aid that donors withhold in coercive strategy are particularly problematic for exporters who benefit alongside recipient leaders from aid-for-trade deals and im-

port support. High exports from the donor to recipient should decrease the donor's willingness to use coercive strategy. Bilateral economic interests may increase a donor's exposure to negative spillovers from recipient state violence. Multinational firms based in donor countries that either trade with, or invest in, recipient states can incur substantial costs stemming from state violence. These include spotlight effects, diminished human capital, productivity declines, disrupted operations, and political risk linked to increased violence and decreased confidence from international financial institutions (Blanton and Blanton 2007; Jensen 2008). However, state violence is often predictable, and multinational corporations operating abroad can invest in political risk insurance, diversify supply chains, and broaden their customer bases to insulate themselves from these costs. While economic interests should undermine coercive strategy, there is no reason to believe that it would decrease catalytic strategy. The variable LN BILATERAL EXPORTS is the natural log of exports from the donor to the recipient from the International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics data.

One of the most important donor interests in the post-2001 period has been transnational terrorism. Violent repression pushes moderate dissidents out of opposition movements and drives tit-for-tat strategies between the government and the remaining dissidents. This leads to the radicalization of remaining dissidents, the intensification of domestic conflicts, and the adoption of terrorist strategies by opposition groups (Karstedt-Henke 1980). When state violence drives terrorist attacks, donors have stronger incentives to respond to the state violence. Donors may be harmed both by negative externalities from state violence

and by developing institutions that would increase the political rights and power of opposition groups vis-à-vis the government. This is especially true in the case of terrorism. Although a repression-dissent cycle leads to terrorism and donors may want to break the conflict cycle by stopping state violence, donors may not want to increase the political rights of terrorist organizations. For this reason, donors may be unwilling to support the same types of inclusive and democratic institutional development in the presence of strong and active terrorist groups than they would be willing to support in the absence of such organizations. Terrorism is expected to drive donors to substitute coercive strategies in the place of catalytic strategies. The variable LN TERRORISM EVENTS is the natural log of one plus the count of terrorist attacks, calculated using ICEWS event data.

Catalytic strategy is expensive and most reforms would require long-run partnerships to meaningfully alter the domestic environment for human rights. It stands to reason that donors will be more willing to pay for catalytic strategy where the strategy has a high probability of success and where donors would derive the strongest benefits from success. Two factors determine the cost and probability of success for catalytic strategy. First, countries with weak STATE CAPACITY may require large aid allocations to promote successful reforms. I use the World Bank's government effectiveness estimate measure from the World Governance Indicators. This measure captures the quality of government services and policies in the recipient state. Second, the level of democratization in the recipient country is likely to shape donors' estimates of the costs of promoting reforms and the probability of successful reforms. I use the variable EXECUTIVE

CONSTRAINTS, which measures legislative and judicial constraints on the executive using V-Dem indices. This accounts for the strength and independence of key veto players in recipient governments that may help to limit violent repression. Countries with weaker state capacity and weaker democratization may be the states most in need of governance aid to promote reforms. However, many donors focus on short-term indicators to assess the efficacy of aid (Dietrich 2021), and to the extent that donors allocate democracy aid to more autocratic states, the aid projects tend to be less ambitious (Bush 2015). Autocratic leaders are also less likely to agree to governance projects that would promote political liberalization, which may leave donors that have interests in deterring state violence with no choice but to decrease economic sector aid to autocratic countries.

For the purposes of this study, the STATE CAPACITY and EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS variables are preferable to other commonly used measures of state capacity and democracy because the measures do not incorporate information related to human rights performance and have excellent coverage for low-income countries during the period of this study.

Finally, non-governmental and international organizations use “naming and shaming” campaigns that publicly disseminate information and draw negative attention to human rights abuses in an effort to increase awareness about human rights violations internationally. Substantial evidence supports the notion that these campaigns influence donors’ responses to state violence. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) argue that donors lack incentives to punish recipients through bilateral reductions in aid and that human rights violations themselves do not trig-

ger coercive punishments. Rather, UN resolutions that draw attention to violations lead to large reductions in aid from multilateral organizations. Similarly, Dietrich and Murdie (2017) demonstrate that shaming campaigns prompt donors to change the channel of foreign aid delivery. Rather than providing government-to-government aid, donors shift to providing aid through non-governmental and international organizations.

Naming and shaming campaigns aim to increase the public's awareness in donor countries of the state violence problems that occur abroad. Citizens of donor countries, when made aware of human rights violations, may increase pressure on donor governments to address violations. Extant literature has found that naming and shaming campaigns can shift public opinion in donor countries, but the evidence that this translates to donors decreasing aid to punish recipient leaders is highly conditional and typically depends on the strategic relationship between the donor and recipient (Esarey and DeMeritt 2017; Heinrich et al. 2018; Nielsen 2013). There is evidence, however, that improving public awareness in donor countries of rights violations in recipient countries increases constituent demand for the donor to engage more with the recipient in order to address problems (Heinrich and Kobayashi 2020). This suggests that naming and shaming campaigns would increase support for catalytic strategy. I test for these relationships using the SHAMING variable, which is the count of UNCHR or UNHRC resolutions targeting physical integrity rights violations in the recipient country (DeMeritt and Conrad 2019).³

³Because DeMeritt and Conrad's shaming data is only available through 2011 and does not

All continuous independent variables are centered at their mean to hold variables constant at meaningful values and to decrease nonessential multicollinearity between interaction terms and their component variables (Smith and Sasaki 1979). All time-variant independent variables are lagged one year to decrease reverse causality concerns.

3.1.4 Control variables

I include a series of control variables that are linked to aid and state violence and other controls that are common to the aid literature. High levels of peaceful dissent may draw aid and increase repression. I account for dissent using a binary variable coded as 1 if the recipient has a count of protests is in the top quartile of aid-eligible countries. I include binary variables for a recipient being a former colony of the donor or having a shared military alliance with the donor. I control for the natural log of the recipient's population size because countries with larger populations tend to receive less aid per capita and can be more difficult to govern peacefully; for the natural log of GDP, since poorer countries receive more aid and are less capable of governing peacefully; for aid concentration, since the share of aid per donor may affect donor strategy and recipients with aid shared evenly across many donors may be more difficult to deter (this measure includes aid reported to the CRS from non-OECD donors and AidData's estimations of Chinese ODA-like aid); for bureaucratic inertia using lagged de-

include several small recipient countries, I do not include this as a control in other models, and the number of observations drops considerably in models 8 and 16.

pendent variables; and for the natural log of refugee flows from the recipient to donor country.

This study focuses on donor decisions about how much aid to commit to economic and governance sectors. However, there is substantial theoretical overlap with research that investigates how donors choose between channels of aid delivery. Dietrich (2021) demonstrates that a donor's decision to allocate aid through non-governmental versus government-to-government channels depends on the donor's domestic political economy. Dietrich argues that donors observe state capacity problems, which include state violence, in a recipient country and choose between channels of aid delivery. This decision is driven by the donor's domestic political economy—whether it is a statist, traditional public sector donor or a neoliberal donor. I include the control `STATIST DONOR`. The empirical overlap between the economic sector and government-to-government channel is substantial, and the most fungible forms of economic assistance are delivered through the direct budget support programs of economic sector aid. However, large amounts of governance aid are also delivered through government-to-government channels, with a small fraction bypassing the recipient government (Dietrich and Wright 2015).

3.1.5 Econometric Models

Donors' coercive responses to state violence vary between cutting economic aid entirely and decreasing the level of economic aid. Catalytic policies vary between initiating governance projects and increasing the overall level of

governance aid. Because of this, there are many dyad-years in which donors chose not to allocate any new economic sector aid (72% of observations) or any new governance sector aid (62% of observations). I test the hypotheses using a Tobit estimator, which has the advantage of modeling both the non-negative nature of aid commitments and the level of positive aid commitments.

I include year fixed effects to capture any year-specific changes in global patterns of foreign aid and state violence, such as violence stemming from the Arab Spring movements and reductions across donors due to the global financial crisis. I include donor fixed effects in all models except for those testing the DONOR RIGHTS moderator to isolate within-donor differences and to prevent unmodeled time-invariant differences between donors from driving results. Robust standard errors are clustered on the donor.

Changes in state violence typically occur slowly over time, while large and rapid changes are comparatively rare. I prioritize modeling the more typical case, in which there are large differences in the level of state violence between states and less change within states over time. Several of the explanatory variables of interest also change slowly over time (and, within some recipient countries, exhibit no variation at all). Respect for human rights within donor countries, judicial and legal constraints on the executive (as with other measures of democracy), state capacity, and terrorism all typically exhibit slow within-country change. For many recipient countries, there were no terrorist attacks over the time period examined, resulting in no within-country change. For these reasons, and because much of the theory focuses on differences between recipients, I follow similar

research designs, including Bermeo (2018) and Nielsen (2013), in not including recipient fixed effects in the primary results.

3.1.6 Robustness Checks

I include a series of robustness checks in the supplemental appendix. To ensure that the results are not driven by outliers, I include a series of robustness checks that omit (1) recipient outliers, such as the “war on terror” states and small island countries, (2) small donors, and (3) the United States (as a donor with out-sized influence). I include a replication of the primary results using OLS. The results are generally robust to these alternative models.

I did not include recipient fixed effects in the primary results, since they can eliminate theoretically important information about differences between recipients for variables that do not change or change slowly over time (Beck and Katz 2001; Beck 2001; Bell and Jones 2015; Plümper and Troeger 2007). However, there can be substantial differences between models depending on which types of fixed effects are included (Fuchs et al. 2014), and including recipient fixed effects can control for time-invariant omitted variables that could lead to biased results. To this end, I include robustness checks with a variety of donor, recipient, region, and year fixed effects. The core results are consistent across the various fixed effects models: the relationship between state violence and governance aid remains positive and significant, and there are no substantial differences for the economic aid dependent variable. Of the moderating variables, the effect of executive constraints is robust across models. The state capacity and terrorism

moderators are consistent between the donor and region fixed effects models for both dependent variables, but lose significance for the governance aid dependent variable when fixed effects are included. The interaction term for UN shaming is positive throughout, but its significance varies between several of the models. The interaction term for donor rights loses significance when donor fixed effects are introduced.

3.2 Results and discussion

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report the results for the economic and governance sector aid dependent variables, respectively. The negative coefficient for state violence in the economic sector base model (1) in Table 3.1 suggests that donors provide less economic aid where state violence is higher, but this is not statistically significant at conventional levels and the coefficient is quite small, suggesting little substantive relationship. The positive coefficient in the governance sector base model (9) in Table 3.2 demonstrates that donors provide more governance aid where state violence is higher, with strong statistical significance. This result is consistent across models and robustness checks. There is strong quantitative evidence that donors provide higher levels of governance aid where state violence is higher.

These results suggest that donors do not rely primarily on coercive strategy for responding to state violence in the post-2001 period: the coefficient is in the expected direction, but is not significant at conventional levels and has low sub-

stantive importance. Donors do not appear to strongly decrease economic sector aid where state violence is higher on average across recipient countries during the 2003-2018 period. This does not, however, mean that donors are ignoring state violence. The governance aid results suggest that donors consistently use catalytic strategy to address state violence. Substantively, donors' catalytic response appears to be important. A one standard deviation higher state violence score corresponds to an expected sixteen percent increase in governance sector aid. Furthermore, there is evidence that donors use coercive strategy as a substitute when pursuing or achieving political liberalization would be costly to donors.

Table 3.1: The relationship between state violence and economic aid

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
State Violence (SV)	-0.0439 (0.0933)	-0.0289 (0.0994)	-0.0433 (0.0920)	-0.0279 (0.0950)	-0.177* (0.0930)	0.0129 (0.0900)	-0.127 (0.0889)	0.101 (0.0969)
Donor Rights	0.410 (0.775)	0.397 (0.627)	0.410 (0.775)	0.408 (0.776)	0.410 (0.772)	0.409 (0.772)	0.410 (0.775)	0.916 (0.863)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.547** (0.232)	0.578 (0.384)	-0.549** (0.236)	-0.531** (0.228)	-0.552** (0.231)	-0.546** (0.231)	-0.517** (0.228)	-0.568** (0.223)
Ln Exports	1.144*** (0.170)	1.670*** (0.164)	1.144*** (0.171)	1.144*** (0.170)	1.135*** (0.173)	1.134*** (0.170)	1.140*** (0.170)	1.092*** (0.185)
Exec Const	1.047*** (0.143)	1.470*** (0.184)	1.047*** (0.143)	1.059*** (0.143)	0.783*** (0.154)	1.067*** (0.142)	1.108*** (0.144)	1.134*** (0.169)
State Cap	0.102 (0.208)	-0.0892 (0.198)	0.105 (0.210)	0.0894 (0.208)	0.136 (0.212)	0.0694 (0.205)	0.0596 (0.208)	0.426* (0.223)
Ln Terror	-0.0855 (0.0636)	-0.175*** (0.0525)	-0.0867 (0.0609)	-0.0754 (0.0659)	-0.101 (0.0647)	-0.0827 (0.0643)	0.132 (0.0875)	-0.189** (0.0902)
UN Shaming								-3.726*** (1.399)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0318 (0.0747)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.0287 (0.0993)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0266 (0.0218)				
Exec Const x SV					0.694*** (0.107)			
State Cap x SV						0.464*** (0.0659)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.162*** (0.0456)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.192 (0.865)
High Dissent	-0.120 (0.128)	-0.151 (0.142)	-0.122 (0.125)	-0.0971 (0.132)	-0.117 (0.128)	-0.162 (0.127)	-0.123 (0.127)	0.119 (0.188)
Ln GDP	-2.307*** (0.213)	-2.775*** (0.196)	-2.309*** (0.213)	-2.299*** (0.214)	-2.301*** (0.214)	-2.246*** (0.212)	-2.306*** (0.213)	-2.330*** (0.234)
Ln Population	1.738*** (0.179)	1.716*** (0.173)	1.741*** (0.180)	1.741*** (0.180)	1.715*** (0.178)	1.612*** (0.179)	1.725*** (0.178)	1.595*** (0.204)
Conflict	-0.505*** (0.114)	-0.370*** (0.0907)	-0.509*** (0.117)	-0.508*** (0.115)	-0.421*** (0.114)	-0.353*** (0.120)	-0.382*** (0.0976)	-0.661*** (0.140)
Aid Concentration	-0.779 (0.588)	-0.632 (0.617)	-0.761 (0.596)	-0.696 (0.546)	-0.885 (0.595)	-1.138* (0.596)	-0.736 (0.581)	-2.228*** (0.629)
Statist Donor	2.373** (1.149)	1.039 (0.955)	2.372** (1.150)	2.369** (1.150)	2.357** (1.144)	2.421** (1.145)	2.364** (1.150)	3.551*** (1.375)
Constant	-5.889*** (0.729)	-3.710*** (0.780)	-5.894*** (0.729)	-5.886*** (0.728)	-5.720*** (0.713)	-5.778*** (0.719)	-5.714*** (0.727)	-6.591*** (0.929)
Sigma	4.590*** (0.254)	5.196*** (0.214)	4.590*** (0.254)	4.590*** (0.254)	4.575*** (0.255)	4.575*** (0.254)	4.588*** (0.254)	4.413*** (0.272)
Donor Fixed Effects	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. Tobit estimation with standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table 3.2: The relationship between state violence and governance aid

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
State Violence (SV)	0.363*** (0.0829)	0.367*** (0.0816)	0.368*** (0.0835)	0.403*** (0.0825)	0.296*** (0.0777)	0.390*** (0.0800)	0.229*** (0.0796)	0.493*** (0.0879)
Donor Rights	0.341 (0.400)	0.588 (0.502)	0.341 (0.401)	0.329 (0.402)	0.341 (0.400)	0.340 (0.400)	0.340 (0.399)	0.569 (0.480)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.888*** (0.161)	0.369 (0.386)	-0.905*** (0.164)	-0.821*** (0.160)	-0.883*** (0.161)	-0.886*** (0.161)	-0.837*** (0.159)	-0.799*** (0.188)
Ln Exports	0.848*** (0.120)	1.336*** (0.139)	0.845*** (0.119)	0.851*** (0.119)	0.842*** (0.122)	0.845*** (0.119)	0.839*** (0.120)	0.827*** (0.144)
Exec Const	0.685*** (0.141)	1.132*** (0.145)	0.688*** (0.141)	0.738*** (0.142)	0.534*** (0.153)	0.695*** (0.141)	0.798*** (0.139)	0.838*** (0.160)
State Cap	-0.591*** (0.141)	-0.779*** (0.134)	-0.567*** (0.145)	-0.635*** (0.143)	-0.574*** (0.143)	-0.610*** (0.141)	-0.669*** (0.140)	-0.276* (0.167)
Ln Terror	0.0915** (0.0451)	-0.00520 (0.0469)	0.0870** (0.0440)	0.132*** (0.0450)	0.0784* (0.0461)	0.0924** (0.0451)	0.467*** (0.0613)	0.00775 (0.0626)
UN Shaming								-2.857*** (0.681)
Donor Rights x SV		0.147* (0.0875)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.175** (0.0764)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.109*** (0.0154)				
Exec Const x SV					0.385*** (0.0921)			
State Cap x SV						0.173*** (0.0431)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.274*** (0.0320)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.802*** (0.383)
High Dissent	0.281*** (0.108)	0.234** (0.114)	0.262** (0.105)	0.374*** (0.106)	0.289*** (0.108)	0.266** (0.108)	0.271** (0.108)	0.416*** (0.134)
Ln GDP	-1.705*** (0.147)	-2.146*** (0.160)	-1.719*** (0.147)	-1.670*** (0.144)	-1.703*** (0.148)	-1.683*** (0.146)	-1.700*** (0.147)	-1.680*** (0.154)
Ln Population	0.823*** (0.115)	0.807*** (0.120)	0.840*** (0.116)	0.831*** (0.116)	0.809*** (0.114)	0.775*** (0.113)	0.796*** (0.114)	0.634*** (0.136)
Conflict	0.194 (0.130)	0.277** (0.113)	0.165 (0.131)	0.170 (0.128)	0.261** (0.123)	0.259** (0.129)	0.383*** (0.127)	0.115 (0.171)
Aid Concentration	-1.976*** (0.536)	-1.871*** (0.524)	-1.865*** (0.542)	-1.635*** (0.503)	-2.040*** (0.542)	-2.120*** (0.535)	-1.899*** (0.530)	-3.172*** (0.586)
Statist Donor	1.095* (0.585)	-0.876 (0.748)	1.090* (0.585)	1.090* (0.587)	1.092* (0.585)	1.109* (0.584)	1.084* (0.584)	1.508** (0.752)
Constant	-4.550*** (0.503)	-1.167* (0.663)	-4.564*** (0.507)	-4.535*** (0.497)	-4.464*** (0.498)	-4.512*** (0.504)	-4.251*** (0.492)	-4.519*** (0.623)
Sigma	3.696*** (0.170)	4.241*** (0.212)	3.691*** (0.171)	3.683*** (0.169)	3.689*** (0.172)	3.693*** (0.170)	3.685*** (0.170)	3.587*** (0.185)
Donor Fixed Effects	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. Tobit estimation with standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

The positive coefficient in the governance sector base model (9) in Table 3.2 demonstrates that donors provide more governance aid where state violence is higher, with strong statistical significance. This result is consistent across models and robustness checks. There is strong quantitative evidence that donors provide higher levels of governance aid where state violence is higher.

These results across all models in Table 3.1 suggest that donors do not primarily rely on coercive strategy for responding to state violence in the post-2001 period: the coefficients for the state violence variable are negative in most models, so they are in the expected direction for coercive strategy, but are rarely significant at conventional levels and the coefficients themselves tend to be small, suggesting that state violence is of low substantive importance. On average, donors do not appear to strongly decrease economic sector aid toward recipients with higher levels of state violence during the 2003-2018 period. This does not, however, mean that donors are ignoring state violence. The governance aid results across all models in Table 3.2 suggest that, on average, donors respond to state violence in a manner that is consistent with catalytic strategy. Substantively, donors' catalytic responses also appear to be important. A one standard deviation increase in a recipient's state violence score corresponds to an expected thirty six percent increase in governance sector aid in the base model.

Models 2-8 for the economic sector aid dependent variable and Models 10-16 for the governance sector dependent variable include interactions between state violence and theoretically-important moderating variables that are suggested

by the prior literature. The results provide evidence that donors' interests shape their strategic responses to state violence. These results suggest that donors use coercive strategy as a substitute for catalytic strategy when pursuing or achieving political liberalization would be costly to donors.

3.2.1 How donor interests moderate coercive strategy

Models 2-8 in Table 3.1 include interactions with the theoretically-important donor interest moderators for the relationship between state violence and economic aid. I include visualizations of all statistically significant interactions in Figures 3.1 through 3.3. These visualize continuous by continuous interactions. The lines represent the predictive margins at the mean and at high and low levels, which are quantified as plus and minus one standard deviation from the mean. Differences in slope between these three levels indicate that the relationship between state violence and economic sector aid varies according to the level of the moderating variable.

The results in Table 3.1 indicate that only a few variables shape the relationship between state violence and economic sector aid. There is no evidence in Model 2 to suggest that donors with stronger respect for human rights respond differently to state violence than donors with weaker respect for human rights. The donors with the strongest reasons to promote human rights abroad and the strongest incentives to respond to state violence in partner states do not appear to be more willing to reward respect for human rights or punish human rights vi-

olations than other donors. Model 3 does not provide evidence that donors are more willing to overlook human rights violations by countries with closer political and policy alignment in international organizations. Model 4 fails to find a relationship between economic interdependence and donors' coercive strategy. Finally, Model 8 does not suggest that there is a strong relationship between shaming at the United Nations and donors' coercive strategy. Only a few donor interest variables appear to shape donors' coercive strategies, on average: executive constraints, state capacity, and terrorist attacks in the recipient country. Donors exhibit stronger coercive responses to state violence if recipient countries have weaker democratization, weaker state capacity, or more severe problems with terrorism.

Figure 3.1 visualizes how executive constraints in the aid recipient country moderate the relationship between state violence and economic sector aid. It is consistent with donors opting to punish more autocratic leaders for state violence by decreasing economic aid.

Figure 3.1: Predictive margins for executive constraints (economic aid dependent variable)




Figure 3.2 shows that donors exhibit much stronger coercive punishments toward recipient countries that have weak state capacity. This result is somewhat paradoxical in that recipients with weaker government effectiveness may be less capable of peacefully maintaining control, and leaders may have weaker control over law enforcement and military officers. However, donors may fear that providing relatively fungible forms of aid in these circumstances could translate to relatively large increases in the repressive capacity of leaders.

Figure 3.2: Predictive margins for state capacity (economic aid dependent variable)





Figure 3.3 provides evidence that donors punish leaders more severely for violence that exacerbates domestic conflicts, drives extremism, and creates terrorist threats.

Figure 3.3: Predictive margins for terrorism (economic aid dependent variable)



3.2.2 How donor interests moderate catalytic strategy

Models 9-16 in Table 3.2, visualized in Figures 3.4 through 3.10, present the results for the same set of theoretically-important donor interest moderators as in the previous subsection. These models test how these moderators shape catalytic strategy responses. The relationship between state violence and governance aid is stronger than its relationship with economic sector aid, and all of the theoretically-important moderator variables are statistically significant when interacted with state violence to predict governance sector aid.

The coefficient for the interaction of donor rights and state violence on governance sector aid, reported in model 7 and visualized in Figure 3.4, is posi-

tive and strongly significant. The visualization shows that donors with stronger domestic respect for human rights exhibit stronger catalytic responses than donors with weaker human rights records. While donors with high and low human rights scores provide similar amounts of governance sector aid to recipients with strong human rights records, as state violence increases, donors' responses diverge. The donors that ostensibly have the strongest interest in supporting human rights abroad are more willing to commit higher levels of aid to governance projects when using foreign aid to address state violence.

Figure 3.4: Predictive margins for donor rights (governance aid dependent variable)




Figure 3.5 is consistent with expectations drawn from a variety of prior research that has found that naming and shaming campaigns increase donors' responses to state violence (Dietrich and Murdie 2017; Lebovic and Voeten 2009).

The cross-over effects demonstrate that naming and shaming campaigns increase donors' catalytic responses to state violence. This result is strongly consistent with Heinrich and Kobayashi's (2020) survey experiment results, which find that constituents prefer increased engagement with recipient countries to address the problems associated with "nasty regimes." Donors further increase their catalytic strategic responses to state violence when naming and shaming campaigns have increased the salience of human rights violations.

Figure 3.5: Predictive margins for UN shaming (governance aid dependent variable)





Figure 3.6 suggests that donors provide less governance aid to recipients who hold more distant UN ideal points when the recipient has a strong human rights record, but the importance of ideal point distance diminishes as state violence increases. This relationship reflects donors giving preferential treatment

to recipients who vote with them in the UN and, presumably, who hold relatively similar policy preferences to the donor. This preferential treatment diminishes as recipients' state violence increases.

Figure 3.6: Predictive margins for UN ideal point distance (governance aid dependent variable)



Similarly, Figure 3.7 demonstrates that donors provide more governance aid to export partners with strong respect for human rights, but this separation between types of export partners diminishes as state violence increases. Thus, the significant coefficients in Table 3.2 Models 11 and 12 reflect the importance of policy alignment and economic benefits to donors when recipients have strong human rights records rather than a separation between these types when state violence is a problem.

Figure 3.7: Predictive margins for exports (governance aid dependent variable)




Figure 3.8 demonstrates that donors provide more governance sector aid to recipients with high levels of state violence if the recipient has stronger executive constraints. This provides evidence that donors are unwilling or unable to use aid to pursue political liberalization in more autocratic countries, which is consistent with the expectations drawn from Bush (2015). It is also consistent with donors hesitating to promote political liberalization where increased political competition could exacerbate state violence.

Figure 3.8: Predictive margins for executive constraints (governance aid dependent variable)






Figure 3.9 demonstrates that donors provide more governance aid to recipients with weaker state capacity if the recipient has a strong human rights record, but this relationship diminishes as state violence increases. Bureaucratic incentives to demonstrate results and concerns about the cost effectiveness of development projects may be preventing donors from responding more strongly to state violence in low capacity contexts using governance aid.

Figure 3.9: Predictive margins for state capacity (governance aid dependent variable)



Finally, Figure 3.10 provides evidence that donors resist promoting political liberalization where the recipient state government faces terrorist threats. Although donors have strong incentives to address state violence that leads to terrorism, political liberalization efforts would increase the political power of extremist groups vis-à-vis the government. These results suggest that donors are less willing to pursue strategies related to political liberalization, civilian control over law enforcement and military, or judicial reforms where terrorist groups are active.

Figure 3.10: Predictive margins for terrorism (governance aid dependent variable)




Thus far, I have discussed the results of the economic and governance aid dependent variables separately. To understand strategic substitution, the results need to be compared. When taken together, the executive constraints, state capacity, and terrorism interactions with state violence for the economic and governance sector aid dependent variables provide evidence in support of the first hypothesis. Donors substitute coercive strategy in the place of catalytic strategy when recipient countries have higher levels of state violence in the contexts of weaker executive constraints, weaker state capacity, and more terrorist attacks. These are the situations in which donors should expect the highest costs of and barriers to achieving the reforms necessary to improve respect for human rights and, in the case of terrorism, in which donors would not benefit from increas-

ing the political power of the victims of state violence vis-à-vis the recipient state government.


The comparison in Figure 3.11 shows that donors prioritize coercive strategy in the place of catalytic strategy toward recipients with high levels of state violence in contexts of autocracy and weak democratization. This suggests that donors shy away from increasing political contestation in contexts where such efforts could result in increased political violence. This result is somewhat consistent with Bush (2015), in that donors avoid ambitious democracy promotion in more autocratic states.

Figure 3.11: Strategic substitution due to executive constraints

(a) Economic aid DV



(b) Governance aid DV




The comparison in Figure 3.12 shows that donors substitute coercive strategy in the place of catalytic strategy toward recipients with weaker state capacity. This is a troubling finding. Where recipient leaders face the most significant challenges to peacefully remaining in power, donors are most likely to respond to state violence by cutting aid to the economic sector and decreasing assistance to governance improvements.

This may reflect donors rationing foreign aid by prioritizing projects that are more likely to be effective. In countries with very weak state capacity, especially where state violence is driven by rogue law enforcement and military officers in territories that the state has little control over, the barriers to effectively improving human rights can be substantial. The threshold of governance aid that donors may need to provide to bring about changes may be prohibitive.

This also may reflect donors' hesitance to provide fungible economic sector aid in these contexts. Where state capacity is weak, recipient leaders may lack the resources to govern peacefully. When dissidents threaten the stability of the state or tenure of leaders, repression offers a cheap alternative to accommodation. If donors provide fungible aid in these contexts, recipient leaders may use that aid to increase their repressive capacity.

Figure 3.12: Strategic substitution due to state capacity

(a) Economic aid DV



(b) Governance aid DV





Figure 3.13 compares the terrorism moderator results for economic and governance sector aid. The graphs visualize how high levels of terrorism change the relationship between levels of state violence and levels of economic aid (subgraph a) or governance aid (subgraph b). Terrorism presents donors with a difficult task. When state violence radicalizes dissidents to the point where the victims of state violence turn to terrorist tactics, donors have strong incentives to combat state violence. The negative externalities of terrorism for donors are plentiful. Terrorism impedes donors' ability to achieve their development goals within the aid recipient country, can destabilize nearby states and worsen regional instability, and can directly threaten the economic and security interests of donors at home and abroad.


Although donors have strong incentives to address state violence that drives terrorism, increasing the political rights of the targets of state violence vis-à-vis the recipient government is problematic under these circumstances. The political empowerment and legitimization of terrorists would be detrimental to donors' political and security interests.

Figure 3.13: Strategic substitution due to terrorism events

(a) Economic aid DV



(b) Governance aid DV



3.3 Conclusions

This chapter examined how donors optimize their use of coercive and catalytic foreign aid strategies to promote human rights. I argued that catalytic strategy had emerged as donors' preferred strategy for addressing state violence problems by the early 2000s, marking a paradigm shift in the relationship between aid and human rights. I provided evidence that donors responded to state violence with catalytic strategy during the 2003-2018 period, including donors' agreements with recipient countries, policy prescriptions from international organizations, and quantitative analyses of aid commitments. This is an important finding, since catalytic strategy involves donors increasing aid to governance sector projects when the donor could have otherwise used aid to pursue different foreign policy interests. Donors face an opportunity cost by using governance sector aid to address state violence. Furthermore, catalytic strategy is an important strategic innovation for responding to state violence. Donors now have a developmental approach to address state violence, which has fewer threats to credibility than coercive strategy.

The results provide no evidence that donors consistently use coercive strategy in response to state violence during the period of this study. However, there is evidence that donors use coercive strategy as a substitute when dealing with recipients with high levels of state violence in the context of weaker democratic institutions, weaker state capacity, and more terrorist attacks. Coercive strategy has not become irrelevant. Donors substitute coercion when the costs of suc-

cessfully achieving political liberalization are highest.

This chapter contributes to the literature by elucidating how donors determine whether to use coercive or catalytic strategies for addressing state violence problems. The theory and findings have implications for the study of human rights and foreign aid. That we do not consistently observe donors decreasing economic sector aid in response to state violence does not mean that donors are not using foreign aid to address state violence. Donor strategies have evolved to prioritize catalytic over coercive strategy in most circumstances, which means that a large set of influential literature on foreign aid and human rights is focused on what has become a secondary type of strategy. This is not a flaw with the prior literature: catalytic strategy did not exist for much of the period that this early literature studied, and did not become formally integrated into most donors' policies until the early 2000s. This has important implications for future studies of human rights and foreign aid. Donors strategically choose between coercive and catalytic strategies, and donors generally prioritize catalytic strategy.

The theory and results call into question a common implicit assumption in the extant literature: that donor interests are separate from and compete with donors' human rights commitments. Donors' interests and human rights commitments are interdependent. Stronger donor interests in recipient countries can increase donors' responsiveness to state violence and influence donors' decisions about what strategy to use.

This research opens opportunities and has implications for future stud-

ies. This study, which was motivated by OECD DAC prescriptions for human rights and development policy, limited complexity by examining the behaviors of OECD DAC donors as a group rather than by examining differences between donors. By focusing primarily on within-donor variation as driven by bilateral relationships and recipient characteristics, this study leaves donor-centric explanations to future research. As demonstrated in Figure A.4, there is significant variation between donors in how much aid they provide to economic and governance sectors. As discussed in section 2.2, there is substantial variation among donors' internal human rights-based foreign aid policies. This suggests that there is important variation at the donor level that may drive coercive and catalytic strategy. Studies like Dietrich (2021), Swedlund (2017), and Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp (2014) have demonstrated the importance of considering donor-centric explanations of policy.

Additionally, data limitations prevented this study from examining these relationships prior to 2003. Qualitative research and research on donors with adequate earlier data availability could examine these relationships prior to this study period. Finally, an important empirical implication is that donors strategically select coercive or catalytic strategies for promoting human rights. Research on aid effectiveness for promoting human rights should consider this source of selection bias.

The findings have implications for development practitioners: Donor interests shape the prospects for cooperation between donors on both coercive and

catalytic strategies. Coercion can require substantial coordination between donors to create a meaningful system of rewards and punishments. The rise of catalytic strategy and the proliferation of an increasingly diverse set of donors suggests that political conditionalities face more challenges than ever to promote policy changes in recipient countries.

The biggest takeaway is that just because we do not consistently observe donors withholding or suspending foreign aid in response to state violence, this does not mean that donors are failing to use foreign aid to promote human rights. Donors prioritize catalytic strategy for human rights promotion. However, coercive strategy is not obsolete. It is a secondary, strategic substitute for catalytic strategies that donors use when they face high costs of promoting change.

Chapter 4

Foreign aid and human rights with the return of great power competition

One explanation for the rise of catalytic strategy in the late 1990s and early 2000s is that coercive strategy is more likely to be effective if donors can coordinate their strategies. If all donor countries are able to coordinate their coercive strategies, then the threat of decreased aid for non-compliance with human rights norms, and the promise of increased aid for improvements, may be substantial. If only one donor out of many uses coercive strategy, then the pain inflicted by aid cuts on a violent recipient state will be minimal (assuming that the donor does not provide a large share of the recipient's aid). The greatest challenge to the ability of coercive threats to influence recipients is when one donor is willing to increase its economic sector aid in response to another donor decreasing its aid. By offsetting another donor's punishment strategy, this action renders coercion powerless.

In contrast, catalytic strategy relies less on coordination and may benefit from a larger set of donors with more diverse interests, so long as the set of donors is broadly interested in promoting human rights. Catalytic strategy benefits

from a broader pool of democratic donors if those donors pool their resources or pursue governance improvements in a specialized manner.

Coordination failures between donors are well-documented and appear to be quite persistent (Aldasoro et al. 2010; Steinwand 2015). These coordination failures, even within the OECD, can threaten coercive strategy. The pool of donors and lenders for developing countries has grown and diversified over time. As discussed in Chapter 2 and shown in Figures 2.1 through 2.3, the number of OECD donors has increased over time, many smaller new donors now provide foreign aid, and OECD donors differ in the sectoral composition of their development portfolios. Donors vary in how much aid they devote to different sectors. These donors also have varying approaches to development strategy, and differ in whether they bypass or engage with recipient governments in their foreign aid delivery according to the donors' domestic political economies (Dietrich 2021).

Despite all of this variation, coercive strategy became easier after the Cold War ended. Donors were relatively homogeneous in their interests and pursued similar goals in development. Donors shared interests in promoting democratization, good governance, human rights, and anti-corruption. To achieve these goals, donors attached relatively comparable political conditionalities to foreign aid, and the majority of recipient states' options for loans contained similar conditions. Powerful donors could shape the terms of finance to decrease conditionality for some recipients, but donors paid reputational costs for doing so which limited these behaviors (Stone 2011).

If the shift toward catalytic strategy was driven by a diversifying pool of do-

nors that rendered coercive strategy less feasible, then this would be difficult to observe since these changes occurred slowly over time and there are many potential confounding explanations. However, China's precipitous rise in development cooperation, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative, serves as a shock to the international development finance system. This can help to reveal the dynamics that cause donors to shift from coercive to catalytic strategies. My argument is that, although coordination problems existed prior to the wide availability of Chinese finance, these were trivial compared to the outside options created by China's so-called "no strings attached" approach to development finance. Chinese development finance offers potential aid recipient countries ways to obtain economic sector finance without complying with Western demands for human rights, democratization, and "good governance." Chinese development finance is available to leaders who are willing to pay a different set of costs to avoid political conditionalities. These costs include higher interest rates (due to obtaining non-concessional loans rather than concessional loans or grants), the threat of surrendering territory for non-payment, requirements to support Chinese interests in the international system, and domestic backlash against Chinese loans and projects.

The full extent of the threat that China poses to Western donors' human rights strategies depends, to some extent, on how Western donors themselves respond to increased competition. China's global ambitions have signaled a return to great power competition by dismantling hierarchies and challenging Western dominance. This has important implications for international development ef-

forts and for promoting human rights. Policymakers and politicians in Western donor countries have voiced concerns that Chinese development finance will undermine Western conditionalities by offering an alternative source of funding.¹ There are many ways in which Chinese development cooperation may undermine human rights, but perhaps the greatest threat would be by reigniting great power competition that leads Western donors to abandon their human rights promotion strategies in order to use aid to gain or preserve influence in recipient countries. This was the case during the Cold War, when great power competition prevented foreign aid from promoting policy changes.

Gaddis (2006) addresses one of the more paradoxical outcomes of great power competition during the Cold War. Competition between the United States and Soviet Union often played out in third countries in an incredibly destructive manner as governments and rebels clashed along ideological lines, with each side supported by and acting in the interest of one of the rival superpowers. Great power competition also gave leaders of otherwise trivial unaligned states substantial autonomy when they could play the two superpowers off against each other (Gaddis 2006, p. 154):

There were limits to how much either Moscow or Washington could order smaller partners around, because they could always defect to the other side, or at least threaten to do so. The very compulsiveness

¹These concerns increased with the BRI, but began as soon as China started increasing its development cooperation activities in Africa. For an early example, see S. Hrg. 110-649 CHINA IN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY. JUNE 4, 2008. pp. 5-6. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110shrg45811/html/CHRG-110shrg45811.htm>

with which the Soviet Union and the United States sought to bring such states within their orbits wound up giving those states the means of escape. Autonomy, in what might have seemed to be inhospitable circumstances, was becoming attainable. Tails were beginning to wag dogs.

The foreign policies of both superpowers prioritized gaining or maintaining influence above all else. The outside options presented by a rival superpower made it impossible for Western foreign assistance to promote beneficial reforms abroad.

The key change that allowed foreign aid to incentivize reforms in recipient states was the fall of the Soviet Union, which, in turn, made Western donors' threats to withhold aid more credible (Dunning 2004; Bearce and Tirone 2010). The absence of a powerful rival left recipients with no viable outside options, so donors did not have to worry about a rival stealing influence. Consequently, recipients had stronger incentives to agree to reforms after the Cold War ended. More credible coercive punishment strategy became the key to foreign aid promoting democratization and sound economic policies in recipient states.

Power dynamics in the international system have shifted over the past decade, signaling the return of great power competition. China has rapidly risen to become one of the most powerful countries in the world and has turned its focus outward. China is now politically, economically, and militarily powerful. It has wielded its growing power to challenge Western influence on the global stage. This power shift threatens the United States' dominance and has led to

a wealth of concerns about the implications of the return of great power competition. Recipient states can choose between sources of development finance, and their choices are becoming more diverse and plentiful (Bunte 2019). If the Cold War is any indication, the availability of these outside options may pose a serious threat to human rights promotion.

Does the rise of China as a global power mean that aid policy will prioritize influence over development again, as it did during the Cold War? While the Cold War may give some insights into competitive dynamics between rival donors, there are substantial differences between the two eras that provide grounds for optimism. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is deeply integrated into the global economy and thus relies strongly on international economic integration. China benefits from economic stability and trade relations. This provides some grounds for preference overlap between Western donors and China, but may also lead to tensions if Western donors pursue political reforms that destabilize recipient states. Additionally, OECD donors have diversified foreign aid strategies which include catalytic strategy, a potential substitute for coercive strategy if coercive punishments are rendered ineffective by outside options. Catalytic strategy is less reliant on cooperation and coordination between donors, and may be more resilient than coercive strategy as preference and policy heterogeneity between donors increases.

While Chinese development finance, rhetoric, and influence in the international system all present direct challenges to OECD donors' coercive strategy, this is less true of catalytic strategy. China's foreign policy rhetoric emphasizes

non-interference in the domestic political systems of its partner countries. China does not typically care about the human rights records of its partners or what regime type its partners have. As long as its partner country is stable enough to provide China with economic benefits and is willing to support Chinese interests, China is willing to tolerate authoritarian or democratic political systems. If political instability harms Chinese economic interests or does excessive damage to China's global image, then China becomes more willing to cut off its development cooperation with recipient countries or interfere in the country's domestic politics. Where catalytic strategy does not harm stability or impact China's interests, there is no reason for China to oppose catalytic strategy or political liberalization. Consequently, Chinese development finance is a far greater threat to coercive strategy than it is to catalytic strategy.

This chapter investigates the rise of Chinese foreign assistance to answer several questions about OECD donors' strategies for promoting human rights: Have OECD donors continued to use foreign aid to promote human rights, since violent states can simply turn to China for their development finance needs? Is there any indication that donors increase their economic sector aid to counter Chinese influence? To what extent does catalytic strategy substitute for coercive strategy, and to what extent does catalytic strategy rely on underlying, unobserved coercive threats to secure approval from recipient countries?

Much of China's development finance has been secretive. Chinese debt contracts contain confidentiality clauses that keep recipients from disclosing the amount, terms, and sometimes even the existence of the contract (Gelpern et al.

2022). For this reason, it would be difficult for OECD donors to observe and react to much of China's lending. However, China has taken a very different approach with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China typically signs BRI agreements with member states in public ceremonies, and China reports on these agreements in global media and official statements. When an aid recipient country signs a BRI agreement, this sends a strong signal to OECD donors that they have lost the power of coercive punishment.

I use variation in the timing of when recipient countries sign BRI agreements to measure the effect of these agreements on OECD donors' economic and governance sector aid. If donors respond to BRI agreements by increasing their fungible economic sector aid, this would suggest that donors are increasing aid to preserve influence. If donors decrease governance aid in response to BRI agreements, this suggests that donors rely on coercive leverage to compel recipients to agree to governance reforms. Alternatively, if BRI agreements do not change governance aid, this suggests that coercive and catalytic strategies are fairly independent. Finally, if BRI agreements increase governance aid, this suggests that donors use catalytic strategy as a substitute for coercive strategy when coercive strategy is least likely to be effective.

I examine the 85 aid recipient countries that signed BRI agreements with China between 2013 and 2018 using a doubly-robust difference-in-difference estimator with multiple treatment periods, developed by Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021). I find that OECD donors respond to BRI agreements by increasing governance aid and that this effect is concentrated among recipient countries with

high levels of state violence. Donors increase governance aid when recipient countries with high levels of state violence sign BRI agreements. Contrary to concerns that Chinese development finance might result in a race to the bottom, I do not find evidence of Cold War competitive dynamics in economic sector aid in any subgroup. OECD donors appear to maintain their economic aid levels and political conditionalities despite the rise of China and despite these donors announcing several alternatives to the BRI.

The remaining chapter is structured as follows. I begin by discussing the literature that examines how geopolitical competition during the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Union shaped the willingness and ability of western leaders to pursue reforms in recipient countries using foreign aid. This is important background information since this chapter is concerned with geopolitical competition and coercive strategy, and this literature gives important insights into those dynamics. However, catalytic strategy only became prevalent after the end of the Cold War, which limits the applicability of this prior literature to the current context. Next, I discuss the relationship between the BRI and OECD donors' strategies for promoting human rights. China's influence on the world stage presents a substantial threat to coercive strategy, but OECD donors appear committed to keeping political conditionalities in their foreign aid, even in their initiatives that compete with the BRI. This suggests that donors have not abandoned coercive strategies. I discuss why China is generally less concerned with countering catalytic strategy and exceptions to China's willingness to ignore political systems. The shock of BRI agreements to the foreign aid system provides insights

into the underlying relationship between coercive and catalytic strategy. In the next section, I present my research design, which treats BRI agreements as shocks to donor strategy that give causal leverage to modeling the relationship between competition and donor strategy. I then present my findings that BRI agreements increase catalytic responses to state violence but do not appear to change economic sector aid. I conclude by discussing the implications of this research for human rights and international development.

4.1 Human rights, foreign aid, and geopolitical competition in the Cold War

During the Cold War, Western donors struggled to use foreign aid to promote policy changes in recipient states. The threat of Soviet influence spreading like wildfire if left unchecked loomed large, and, consequentially, rich and powerful Western states used their foreign aid less to promote policy change or development and more to gain influence over recipients. The result was Soviet containment at the expense of sound development practices.

Even as transnational networks of human rights activists began to actualize reforms in the United States Congress and install human rights protectors into official positions within the foreign policy bureaucracy, officials in the executive branch continued to prioritize geopolitical competition (Snyder 2018). In a particularly telling example, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the Chilean Foreign Minister under Pinochet at the height of state violence in 1975,

"I hold the strong view that human rights are not appropriate in a foreign policy context."²

After government-supported death squads killed several Jesuit priests and massacred towns during the Salvadoran Civil War, public outcry in the United States forced the government to respond. Vice President George H.W. Bush was flown into the Salvadoran jungle in a Black Hawk helicopter to demand that the Salvadoran government disband its death squads. The Salvadoran approach to the meeting was nothing short of brazen. They held their meeting with the Vice President of the United States—the entire purpose of which was to address egregious human rights violations—in a meeting room with walls that were riddled with bullet holes and floors that were stained with pools of blood.³ Bush demanded that the Salvadoran government-backed forces stop killing civilians, and threatened to withhold crucial aid if the government failed to meet basic human rights standards. The Salvadoran government promised to address the problems, but the CIA was skeptical that any real improvements had been made.⁴ The Salvadoran government appeared to have called the United States' bluff, as aid continued to flow from the United States to El Salvador despite its continued egregious state-supported human rights abuses. The governments of the United States

²As quoted in Peter Kornbluh. (2003) *The Pinochet File: A declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability*. New York: New Press, p. 228.

³John Solomon. March 21, 2011. "George H.W. Bush — Revisited" *The Center for Public Integrity*. Last accessed 26 Feb 2023 from: <https://publicintegrity.org/accountability/george-h-w-bush-revisited/>

⁴The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 13 July 1983. "El Salvador: Performance on Certification Issues. NIC M 83-10011. Last accessed 23 February 2023 from: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000049227.pdf

and El Salvador both knew that if the United States withheld enough aid to meaningfully harm Salvadoran leaders that it could tip the scales in the civil war, and the Soviets could gain another foothold in America's backyard. Because the United States feared nothing more than having another Soviet satellite country in the Americas after Cuba, the Salvadoran government enjoyed effective impunity for its human rights violations as long as the Soviet threat continued.

During the Cold War, leaders in aid recipient countries had an outside option for obtaining foreign aid. That outside option, the Soviet Union, was a powerful rival of the Western powers. The rivalry allowed small recipient countries that would have otherwise been inconsequential players on the world stage to play the superpowers off against each other. Donors could not withhold aid for geostrategic reasons. This allowed recipient leaders facing leftist threats to obtain large sums of foreign aid from Western donors, even when that aid contributed directly to state violence. The United States and its allies, ostensibly some of the most powerful countries in the world, became effectively powerless to cut off aid from violent recipient countries, lest their rival use that gap to gain a foothold. This was not limited to violent regimes. Leaders of the unaligned movement, including Yugoslav President Tito, Indian Prime Minister Nehru, and Egyptian President Nasser masterfully played the two superpowers off against each other to gain autonomy (Gaddis 2006).

It was only after the Cold War ended, when the threat of Soviet expansion and the outside option of Soviet support had disappeared, that western donors were able to consistently and credibly commit to withholding foreign aid from

recipient countries if they did not meet policy demands. In the post-Cold War period, donors began to attach more credible political and economic conditionalities to foreign aid. As a result, foreign aid began to promote sound economic policies, political liberalization, and compliance with human rights norms.

Donors rapidly increased their use of political conditionalities after the Cold War ended (Molenaers et al. 2015). These early conditionalities were largely punitive. Donor governments threatened to terminate aid if recipient governments did not meet the conditions (Crawford 2001). Dunning (2004) argues that, in Africa, the end of the Cold War resulted in a decline in donors using foreign aid to meet geopolitical objectives and improved credibility of donors' threats to withhold aid in the absence of democratic reforms. As a result, foreign aid became associated with modest increases in democratization, but only in the post-Cold War period.

Cold War geopolitics also undermined the ability of foreign aid to incentivize economic reforms. Bearce and Tirone (2010) argue that the end of the Cold War led to a decline in the strategic benefits of foreign aid, and after the fall of the Soviet Union aid began to foster beneficial economic reforms. Both Dunning (2004) and Bearce and Tirone (2010) argue that it was the decline in the strategic benefits of foreign aid to donors that allowed foreign aid to promote reforms in recipient countries.

Several changes to foreign aid strategy have occurred since the end of the Cold War. Bearce and Tirone (2010) made the out-of-sample prediction that the Global War on Terror would lead to a decline in aid effectiveness because foreign

aid would once again provide donors with military and strategic benefits. Donors increased foreign aid to Cold War levels, suggesting that foreign aid was being used to promote security goals. However, the problems with strategic priorities that Bearce and Tirone predicted did not manifest. With the benefit of hindsight, Bermeo (2018) argued that instead of undermining aid effectiveness, donors' security interests in the Global War on Terror played an important role in driving donors to pursue targeted development strategies. To limit their exposure to the negative externalities from "underdevelopment," donors increasingly used aid to address underlying problems in potential aid recipient countries.

Beginning in the early 2000s, political conditionalities evolved, with donors relying on more positive than negative conditionalities to promote change (Molenaers et al. 2015). Donors are now more likely to pursue reforms by promising higher levels of more fungible assistance for reaching policy milestones than they are to threaten aid cuts for non-compliance. Donors optimize their coercive and catalytic strategies to promote human rights and prioritize catalytic strategy when the costs of political liberalization are not prohibitively high (Corwin 2023). Achieving development goals is often in donors' self-interests. This is not exclusive to OECD donors. China also benefits from stability and economic growth in its partner countries.

4.2 The Belt and Road Initiative and OECD donors' strategies for promoting human rights

There are many reasons to be concerned about the deleterious consequences of Chinese development finance to human rights and good governance. Chinese development cooperation has increased rapidly and offers recipients an outside option for obtaining development finance from an increasingly powerful rising state, echoing aspects of Cold War dynamics. Additionally, the 2017 United States National Security Strategy confirmed that the United States views China's rise as part of the return to great power competition: "...great power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally. [...] They are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor."⁵ How does this return to great power competition affect OECD donors' strategies for promoting human rights? Does this security position indicate a return to Cold War dynamics where powerful countries focus on using aid to buy influence? To help answer these questions, this section investigates the Belt and Road Initiative and OECD donors' responses and introduces my argument about the relationship between the BRI and donors' strategies for promoting human rights.

One of China's most prominent and visible policies has been the BRI, which it launched in 2013. The BRI challenges the OECD donors' dominance in development finance and lacks the same types of political conditionalities that are typ-

⁵National Security Strategy of the United States of America. December 2017. p. 27.

ically attached to the OECD's foreign aid. Through the BRI, China has poured massive investments into development finance across multiple regions. This finance consists of loans with interest rates that vary from low concessional levels to full market rates and also grants that more closely resemble traditional foreign aid. Notably, Chinese development finance has a much higher ratio of loans to grants than traditional donors' development finance. Despite having higher average financial costs for recipient governments than traditional donors' official development assistance, many states in the Global South have entered into BRI partnerships. By the end of 2022, 150 countries from across Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean had signed BRI cooperation agreements.⁶ These countries span all levels of income and development.⁷ Policy makers, transnational human rights activists, and researchers have voiced concerns that the rise of Chinese development cooperation will harm global democracy and human rights outcomes, broadly defined.⁸

One reason for these concerns is that China provides access to development finance without attaching the same types of political conditionalities as OECD donors. Recipients may access Chinese finance without meeting human rights, democracy, control of corruption, or other "good governance" criteria. Furthermore, Chinese development finance disproportionately targets many of

⁶Shimeng, L and Jianing, C. (2023 Jan 05). "Infographics: Belt and Road Achievements in 2022." *Belt and Road Portal*. <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/rdxw/300621.htm>

⁷See Table A.20 in the Appendix for a full list of countries and years of BRI agreement.

⁸Many of these concerns relate to a broader set of human rights that extend beyond the narrower physical integrity rights focus of this dissertation. This includes labor rights, environmental protection, and safeguarding. While some aspects of this theory and discussion may generalize to broader aspects of human rights, I leave those determinations to future research.

the same sectors that other donors use as leverage: large infrastructure projects, business, industry, energy, natural resources, and trade promotion. This finance creates outside options for repressive leaders, who may bypass even the most credible OECD donors' threats to cut aid by going to China for help. For these reasons, the outside option presented by Chinese development finance takes the teeth out of OECD donors' coercive punishment strategies.

This chapter focuses narrowly on how Chinese development finance affects OECD DAC human rights promotion strategies. The first part of my argument is perhaps quite obvious: the BRI poses a significant threat to coercive strategy because it finances similar projects and explicitly rejects political conditionality. The BRI prioritizes trade, infrastructure, energy, and finance for development cooperation, and its projects target fungible and broadly beneficial economic sector projects. China's BRI branding strategy emphasizes that these projects disavow any formal attempts to alter the domestic politics of member countries in any way.

At the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Xi Jinping summed up China's development strategy toward Africa as having "five nos," as follows:

The "Five Nos" refers to: (1) No interference in the way African countries pursue their development paths according to their national conditions; (2) no interference in a country's internal affairs; (3) no imposition of China's will on African countries; (4) no attachment of political strings to assistance to Africa; and (5) no seeking of selfish political

gains in investment and financing cooperation.⁹

Of course, China uses its development finance to pursue its global interests. “No interference” and “no impositions of China’s will” represent China’s branding strategy for the BRI, not China’s actual willingness to provide its partners with development finance under any circumstance. China fills a niche in demand for development cooperation that was created, in part, by Western political conditionality. It fills that niche by allowing recipients to choose their own governance and economic systems, so long as this does not interfere with China’s political or economic interests. For example, recipient leaders must prioritize the repayment of Chinese loans, cycles of dissent and repression cannot severely impact China’s returns on investment or reputation, and recipient leaders are expected to provide political support to China in international fora.

There are theoretically important parallels between great power competition during the Cold War and the return of great power competition with the rise of China that are relevant to this theory. Great power competition during the Cold War led to substantial problems with foreign aid. During the Cold War, donors used foreign aid to gain and maintain geopolitical influence. Consequently, donors could not leverage aid to compel recipient leaders to reform policies or deter leaders from adopting policies that would harm development and human

⁹This is the English-language phrasing, intended to reach global audiences, as reported by China’s state-owned global media CGTN. Source: Yutong, Yang. (2018, 09 July). “China-Africa ties: ‘Five Nos’ and eight initiatives for the new era” *CGTN*. https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d674d344d444d7a457a6333566d54/share_p.html

rights. Western donors could not credibly commit to withhold aid in response to state violence, poor governance, or problematic economic systems out of fear that the Soviet Union would replace the aid to capture influence. There are some indications of rivalry and some indications of cooperation between the OECD countries and China in development cooperation. One purpose of this chapter is to ascertain whether OECD donors respond to BRI agreements by increasing economic sector aid. This would be an indication that the OECD donors are treating China as a great power rival in international development, are using foreign aid to pursue influence, and could signal a return to the Cold War maladies of foreign aid.

An important distinction is that during the Cold War, catalytic strategy was not yet common. The second part of my argument concerns catalytic strategy. There is a clear, intuitive relationship between Chinese development finance and coercive strategy. However, the relationship between Chinese development finance and catalytic strategy is less clear. Typically, Chinese development finance targets infrastructure, trade, and natural resources instead of political systems or governance performance.

In this chapter, I examine variation in the time that recipient states signed BRI agreements to measure the effect of the BRI on coercive and catalytic strategies in order to make inferences about the relationship between the two strategies. BRI agreements undermine coercive strategy, but do not directly challenge catalytic strategies.

My argument is that there are three possible relationships between coer-

cive and catalytic strategy that BRI agreements would help to reveal. First, catalytic strategy may rely on the underlying threats of coercive strategy to compel recipient leaders to accept reforms. If this is the case, following a BRI agreement, donors will struggle to get recipient leaders to agree to governance reforms and we will observe a decline in governance aid. If catalytic strategy relies on the underlying threat of coercive punishment to get recipient leaders to acquiesce, then the signing of a BRI agreement should decrease catalytic strategy. Second, catalytic strategy may be independent of coercive strategy, with no real relationship between the two other than both involve donors using foreign aid. In this case, following a BRI agreement, there will be no change in governance aid. Third, donors may use catalytic strategy as a substitute for coercive strategy when coercive strategy is not possible. In this case, following a BRI agreement, donors will increase governance aid. If donors substitute catalytic strategy when economic aid withdrawal cannot be meaningfully harmful, then BRI agreements should increase catalytic strategy.

In addition to leveraging the BRI to better understand the relationship between coercive and catalytic strategies, I test for any evidence of OECD donors returning to Cold War competitive foreign aid dynamics. If signing a BRI agreement results in an increase in economic sector aid from the OECD donors to the recipient, this would be evidence that donors are abandoning any remaining coercive foreign aid strategies or are increasing more fungible types of aid to compete with China for influence over recipient leaders. If OECD donors opt to use foreign aid to compete with China for influence over recipient countries in a Cold War-style

rivalry, then BRI agreements should trigger an increase in economic sector aid.

4.3 The Belt and Road Initiative is a costly signal

Recipient leaders can use BRI agreements to signal to OECD donors that they are no longer bound by coercive strategy. Importantly, signing a BRI agreement is a costly, and therefore credible signal, and BRI agreements are highly salient to Western donors.

China's official rhetoric claims that it as a champion of the Global South, that it engages in win-win development partnerships with recipient countries, and that it is a powerful partner in anti-colonialization efforts. In reality, China, like other powerful states, uses development finance for its own purposes. Chinese finance reflects aspects of the nonaligned movement, in that their finance allows recipient leaders a great deal of autonomy in their internal affairs. However, Chinese finance also has imperialistic elements, and China has been accused of engaging in "debt-trap diplomacy" by Indian and Western media sources (Brautigam 2020). Chinese state-owned firms have bankrolled overly ambitious projects in countries with weak economies. This included projects with little hope of financial solvency, and China has secured massive concessions when the countries could not pay their debts. Perhaps the most notable of these projects was the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, which was surrendered to China in a 99-year lease after Sri Lanka could not pay its debts.¹⁰

¹⁰Schultz, K. (2017 12 Dec). "Sri Lanka, struggling with debt, hands a major port to China." *The*

China is a master of economic coercion. Many of China's multinational firms are state-owned enterprises that the government exercises significant control over and uses as tools of foreign policy (Norris 2016). China is willing to wield its economic strength as a weapon against any country or group that criticizes it, large or small. For example, China restricted salmon imports from Norway in response to the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to a Chinese dissident, which led Norwegian officials to cancel a meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2014 (Chen and Garcia 2016). China threatened to ban the NBA in China after the Houston Rockets general manager tweeted support for Hong Kong protesters, prompting a surge of vocal support for China from throughout the NBA and leaving executives scrambling to preserve their relationship with one of their largest markets.¹¹

In developing countries, China provides finance under the principles of nonintervention and sovereignty, which it brands as having “no strings attached.” This rhetoric aside, Chinese finance attaches a different sort of strings. Gelpern et al. (2022) analyzed 100 Chinese contracts and found that they typically contain strong confidentiality clauses that prevent borrowers from discussing the loans with others, clauses that prioritize repayment to China before other creditors and block debt restructuring, and clauses that allow China to manipulate the terms of the loan to influence recipients’ domestic and foreign policies. There is evidence that China successfully uses its economic relationships to gain policy con-

New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lanka-china-port.html>

¹¹<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nba-china-crisis-nba-ties-with-china-worth-billions-now-under-strain/>

cessions from partner countries. Countries that trade with China have strongly converged with it in on foreign policy issues and in multilateral forums (Flores-Macías and Kreps 2013). In 2022, several Muslim-majority states in the United Nations Human Rights Council voted against holding a debate about the Chinese government's actions against Uyghurs in Xinjiang.¹² It was only the second time in the UNHRC's history that a motion had been defeated, and leaders from Qatar, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan indicated that their votes to reject the motion were driven by concerns about alienating China.¹³

Unlike its commercial loans, China's BRI agreements are anything but secretive. China likes to show off its BRI agreements. China seeks BRI partners in large forums and conferences, often signing and publicizing agreements with multiple countries at the same time. These agreements are highly visible to OECD donors and send a strong signal that the signatory has an attractive outside option for development finance and is now immune to political conditionalities. Therefore, BRI agreements offer a useful starting point for examining the OECD's policy reactions.


¹²A/HRC/51/L.6 Voting Results.

¹³"U.N. Body Rejects Debate on China's Treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Blow to West" (2022, 06 Oct). *Reuters*. <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-10-06/u-n-body-rejects-historic-debate-on-chinas-human-rights-record>

4.4 The rise of China and coercive strategy

Has the rise of Chinese development finance doomed foreign aid to the same problems it faced during the Cold War? Figure 4.1 charts the increase in Chinese development finance over the past two decades, which has now risen to a level that challenges the dominance of OECD donors in economic development.

Figure 4.1: China's overseas loans and grants 2000-2017 (AidData).



Western donors have responded to rising Chinese finance. The Obama administration announced its "Pivot to Asia" policy in late 2011. The policy substantially shifted U.S. foreign policy priorities toward the Pacific region. It centered around security, trade, multilateral engagement, and human rights priorities. The policy hedged against the possibility that U.S. re-engagement in the region would antagonize China by also including aspirations to cooperate with

China (Anderson and Cha 2017). The Trump administration passed the BUILD Act of 2018, which created the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, a consolidated U.S. development finance institution, which was billed as an alternative to the BRI.¹⁴ The Biden administration, in partnership with the Group of Seven, announced the Build Back Better World Initiative as an alternative to the BRI, with the intention of investing in infrastructure for developing countries.¹⁵ The European Union has announced its Global Gateway program, which would invest up to €300 billion between 2021 and 2027 in sectors including energy and transport.¹⁶

Although these Western donors have announced strategies to challenge the BRI, they have not mimicked China's "no strings attached" approach. Each of the strategies includes political conditionalities for good governance, respect for human rights, transparency, and control of corruption. Furthermore, none of the initiatives have come close to delivering the volume of finance that the BRI has promised.

¹⁴S.2463 - BUILD Act of 2018.

¹⁵White House Press Release. (2021, 12 June). Fact Sheet: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/>

¹⁶European Union. Global Gateway. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en

4.4.1 Small states and the limitations of exploiting China-U.S. rivalry

There is mixed evidence that leaders of developing countries can play China and the United States off against each other to gain autonomy. The United States and the Philippines have a long history of security and trade partnerships and cooperation, and Obama made the Philippines a priority country in his Pivot to Asia strategy. President Duterte came to office in the Philippines in 2016 and used his office to support extrajudicial killings of suspected drug dealers and users. President Obama was quick to publicly criticise Duterte for these human rights violations. Duterte responded by threatening to shift his foreign policy away from the United States and toward China. He stated in a speech, “Respect is important. If this is what happens now, I will be reconfiguring my foreign policy. Eventually I might, in my time, I will break up with America. I’d rather go to Russia and to China.”¹⁷ Duterte subsequently cancelled joint military exercises between the Philippines and United States in an attempt to appease China.¹⁸

Duterte attempted to use this “break up” with the United States to gain favor with China in talks over a maritime dispute in the South China Sea, to attract Chinese investments, to improve its commercial and trade relationships with China, and to deter the United States from further criticising his human rights record.

¹⁷Buena Bernal and Holly Yan. “Philippines’ President says he’ll ‘break up’ with US, tells Obama ‘go to hell’” *CNN*. October 4 2016. Last accessed February 13 2023 from: <https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/04/asia/philippines-duterte-us-breakup/index.html>

¹⁸“Rodrigo Duterte to end joint US and Philippine military drills” *The Guardian*. 29 September 2016. Last accessed 15 February 2023 from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/29/rodrigo-duterte-to-end-joint-us-and-philippine-military-drills>

In return, China made commitments to invest in large infrastructure projects in the Philippines—but it did not deliver on those commitments—and China’s stance on the South China Sea remained unchanged (Castro 2022).

In addition to securing commitments for infrastructure projects that never materialized from China, Duterte was able to secure a more conciliatory tone from the United States. President Trump took a softer stance on human rights as his administration attempted to restore important strategic ties in the region. This was described in the statement below, made by Murray Hiebert, Senior Advisor and Deputy Director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to inform its Southeast Asia strategy (emphasis added):

In a phone call to Duterte in late April, Trump congratulated him for the “unbelievable job on the drug problem,” and invited him to the White House. In another call to Prime Minister Prayuth of Thailand the next day, he congratulated him for the 2014 coup doing a good job of stabilizing the situation after toppling a democratic government. *In both cases, the President appears to have been trying to mend fences with countries that have been treaty allies of the United States [which] had really faced a bit of a drift apart from the United States and had moved closer to China, as a result of tensions with the U.S.*¹⁹

These phone calls signal a softening of the U.S. position on human rights

¹⁹Statement of Murray Hiebert to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Wednesday, July 12, 2017. *S. HRG. 115–710*.

issues in order to prioritize balancing against China's increasing power in the region. However, these concessions were limited and were far from the "tails beginning to wag the dogs" phenomena observed during the Cold War. Popular support in the Philippines turned against Duterte for shifting away from long standing geopolitical relationships with the relatively favorable United States and Australia and toward China without gaining the promised infrastructure or South China Sea concessions. Duterte's gamble to play China and the United States off against each other resulted in the Philippines gaining only minimal autonomy and losing political and military power rather than gaining significant economic and security concessions.

In short, Western donors have responded to China's rise in development cooperation by creating development initiatives that are similar to the BRI in their infrastructure focus, but there is scant substantive evidence to suggest that the Cold War style foreign aid problems have returned in full to international development. Western donors have included similar political conditionalities in their global infrastructure initiatives to those in other areas of foreign aid. Furthermore, the case of the Philippines demonstrates that smaller states have struggled to leverage the rivalry between the United States and China to gain meaningful policy concessions or autonomy.

4.4.2 Global demand to end unilateral economic coercion

By offering its partners trade and aid without political conditionalities, China is filling a massive niche in development finance. There is significant de-

mand for Western countries to limit their use of unilateral economic coercion to push for policy changes in recipient countries, which the United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council have examined repeatedly.²⁰

Urges all States to refrain from adopting or implementing any unilateral measures not in accordance with international law and the Charter of UN, in particular those of a coercive nature with all their extraterritorial effects; rejects unilateral coercive measures with all their extraterritorial effects as tools for political or economic pressure against any country; calls upon Member States that have initiated such measures to commit themselves to their obligations and responsibilities arising from the international human rights instruments to which they are party by revoking such measures at the earliest time possible; reaffirms the right of all peoples to self-determination, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development; urges the Commission on Human Rights to take fully into account the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures; requests the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to give urgent consideration to the present resolution in her annual report to the General Assembly (A/RES/73/167, 2018).

The UN returns to the issue often with resolutions condemning unilateral coercion. Coercion is defined very broadly in the resolutions to include trade and

²⁰This began with the UN Commission on Human Rights' Human rights and unilateral coercive measures resolution on 4 March 1994, E/CN.4/RES/1994/47.

aid cuts that are designed to pressure states into changing their political or economic policies. The resolutions frame unilateral coercion as a human rights violation that deprives countries of their right to development.

The OECD donors and a handful of Eastern European countries vote against these condemnations while China and nearly every other country in the world vote for them. This divide is demonstrated in Figure 4.2, which shows the vote breakdown for one such resolution, A/RES/73/167 from 2018.²¹ This illustrates that there is a clear divide between the OECD donors, who would prefer to keep economic coercion in their foreign policy toolkits, and aid recipient countries, who would prefer to obtain development finance and access to trade without facing political conditionalities or sanctions. There is clear demand in developing countries for “no strings attached” economic partnerships. China is willing to supply this demand for a price, and OECD donors are unanimously committed to keeping the option of unilateral economic coercion open to them.


China does not need to provoke Cold War-style geopolitical rivalry with Western states to undermine the OECD’s efforts to promote political reforms. China allows leaders in their partner countries to bypass the political conditionalities of OECD aid. Offering an outside option for development finance without political conditionalities is enough to severely limit the efficacy of OECD donors’ coercive strategies. “No strings attached” Chinese finance renders political con-

²¹Although these resolutions and vote patterns have been similar over time, I chose the 2018 vote as an example, since it is the final year of the quantitative analysis in this chapter, and since it was a General Assembly vote and therefore demonstrates the preferences of a larger set of countries than Human Rights Council votes.

ditionalities obsolete as long as China is willing to finance the types of projects that OECD countries would have used as leverage at the same or higher spending level.

China is willing to support, provide aid to, and trade with very violent regimes, as long as China benefits from the arrangement. China's early development strategies prioritized access to oil to fuel the country's rapid industrialization, growth, and development. This led to the Chinese government and its state-owned enterprises partnering with and supporting some particularly brutal regimes, including those in Sudan and Zimbabwe (Brown and Sriram 2009). In both cases, China provided highly repressive leaders with political cover in the United Nations Security Council and continued to provide support, weapons, and aid to the regimes long after other countries had stopped. China blocking sanctions forces other countries to engage in unilateral coercion. China only decreased its assistance to Zimbabwe after political instability and economic turmoil reached a level that would have made continued engagement a net loss.

Figure 4.2: A/RES/73/167 Vote to condemn unilateral coercive measures (2018).



In these cases, China prevented the United Nations Security Council from imposing formal, multilateral economic sanctions on the regimes, but the dynamics were strongly reminiscent of sanctions busting activities. A vast majority of powerful countries cut economic ties to the regimes, and this allowed China to gain substantial economic benefits for continuing to do business with them when no one else would. Similar dynamics—political and economic benefits from sanctions busting—are particularly strong predictors of the failure of sanctions to achieve their intended purpose (Early 2015).

China has demonstrated that it is willing to continue doing business with exceptionally violent regimes when there are economic benefits. This means that its growing ambitions in international finance constitute a real and increasing threat to OECD donors' coercive strategy, even if OECD donors themselves continue to use political conditionalities to safeguard human rights.

4.5 Research design


150 countries from across all regions and at all income levels have signed BRI agreements with China. By doing so, signatories gain access to infrastructure and development finance networks without political conditionalities. There is substantial concern that this finance will harm human rights outcomes and political reforms in aid recipient countries by allowing recipients to circumvent political conditionalities. The threat posed to coercive strategy is clear. Chinese finance gives recipients access to economic sector development finance with-

out requiring the recipient to demonstrate adequate human rights, good governance, democracy, or anti-corruption practices. How the BRI affects OECD donors' strategy is not yet clear but is crucial for understanding the severity of the threat posed by South-South development finance to human rights globally.

I use the year of BRI agreements as shocks to foreign assistance policies. If these agreements affect OECD donors' strategies, we should observe changes in their foreign aid commitments to the economic and governance sectors beginning shortly after the announcement of the agreement. Variation in the timing of when recipient countries signed BRI agreements with China provides the causal leverage necessary for measuring the effect of signing a BRI agreement on coercive and catalytic strategies. The identifying assumption is that foreign aid trends in treated, not-yet treated, and untreated dyads would have changed similarly over time if a treated recipient had not signed an agreement.

This analysis includes BRI agreements signed by 80 aid recipient countries from 2013 to 2018, shown in Figure 4.3 and listed in the Appendix. I estimate the average treatment effect on the treated using a Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) doubly-robust difference-in-difference estimator with multiple periods. This allows for the estimation of individual group time-specific treatment effects and for heterogeneity in treatment effects between cohorts of different years. This does not rely on strict assumptions that early adopters are the same as late adopters and allows for parallel trends to hold conditional upon pre-treatment covariates. I use a simple average of the treatment effects for all cohorts to estimate an average treatment effect on the treated, which I report in the next section.

Figure 4.3: Variation in the timing of BRI agreements.



The economic aid and governance aid variables used for this analysis are the same as those described and used in Chapter 3. These use the natural log of donors' foreign aid commitments adjusted by population. I use commitments, rather than disbursements, to more accurately capture donors' short-term responses to changes in the aid recipient countries. In each of the event study graphs, year zero reflects the year the agreement was signed and one is the first year after signing. Donors cannot typically adjust their policies immediately, so any effects of signing a BRI agreement are most likely to occur in year one or later.

I test for several possibilities. Regarding economic sector aid, it is possible that OECD donors view Chinese finance as a geopolitical competitor and will attempt to counter Chinese influence by increasing their own economic sector aid. If this is the case, then the OECD donors would respond to new BRI agreements by increasing economic sector aid, indicating that recipient countries are successfully playing China and OECD countries off against each other to obtain higher levels of fungible finance without instituting reforms.

Regarding governance sector aid, I use BRI agreements to test for three different possibilities. First, if catalytic strategy relies on underlying coercive threats from OECD donors to secure agreements with recipients for reforms, then a new BRI agreement should decrease OECD governance aid. Second, if donors use catalytic strategy independently of coercive strategy, then the signing of a BRI agreement should not change OECD governance sector aid. Third, if donors use catalytic strategy as a substitute for coercive strategy where coercive strategy is unlikely to be effective, then signing a BRI should trigger an increase in OECD

Table 4.1: BRI signatories with high state violence, by BRI cohort

2013:	Afghanistan, Cambodia, Pakistan.
2014:	Thailand.
2015:	Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Somalia, South Africa, Turkey, Uzbekistan.
2016:	Egypt, Myanmar.
2017:	Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Viet Nam, Yemen.
2018:	Angola, Chad, Congo, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.

governance sector aid.

Table 4.1 lists the 35 ODA-eligible countries with relatively high and persistent levels of pre-treatment state violence that signed BRI agreements between 2013 and 2018. These states are sorted into cohorts according to the year that each signed a BRI agreement with China.

4.6 Results: OECD donor reactions to BRI agreements

Table 4.2 reports the average treatment effects on the treated and p-values for signing a BRI agreement for economic aid and governance aid across three groups. The first group includes all potential aid recipient countries. The second includes only potential aid recipient countries with relatively low levels of state violence prior to 2013, and the third group includes only potential aid recipient countries with relatively high levels of state violence prior to 2013.


Table 4.2: Effect of signing a BRI agreement on Foreign Aid by Sector

	Ln Economic Aid	Ln Governance Aid
All Recipients	0.0145 [0.786]	0.0902** [0.023]
Low State Violence	0.0832 [0.832]	0.0645 [0.373]
High State Violence	-0.0967 [0.212]	0.2205*** [0.003]
High State Violence (Outliers dropped)	-0.1070 [0.179]	0.1618** [0.019]

Results from doubly-robust difference-in-difference models with multiple treatment periods. The coefficients are the average treatment effect on the treated, which is the percent change in economic or governance sector aid per 1000 population after a BRI is signed. The p-values are reported in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. Rows are sub-groups. Columns are dependent variables. The bottom model omits Afghanistan and Venezuela to ensure that results are not strongly driven by outliers.

Figures 4.4 to 4.7 are event-study graphs showing the estimated average treatment effect on the treated for four years before and four years after a BRI agreement is signed. The graphs show the combined estimates for all recipient countries in the sample with the BRI agreement year centered at zero. In each, the pre-treatment estimates (black) hover near zero between treatment and control groups, providing confidence that the conditional parallel trends assumption is satisfied.²²

Figure 4.4: ATT of signing BRI agreement on OECD economic aid commitments for all recipients



4.6.1 Effect of BRI agreements on OECD economic aid

Figure 4.4 visualizes the difference-in-difference results for the economic sector dependent variable across all recipients. Both the pre-treatment and post-treatment trends are relatively flat and not statistically different from zero. The results do not provide any evidence that there is a significant relationship between a recipient state signing a BRI agreement and the OECD donors' economic sector

²²Diagnostics of the pre-trend test, reported in Appendix C.1, fail to reject the null hypothesis that all pre-treatment are equal to zero. This provides further confidence that the parallel trends assumption holds for these analyses.

aid. Similarly, there is no significant relationship for the low or high state violence subgroups. Visualizations by subgroup are included in the Appendix C.1.

This finding provides evidence that OECD donors continue their existing economic sector projects with recipient states that choose to pursue BRI finance. China's engagement does not appear to result in donors abandoning any coercive punishments that are in place. It also does not result in competitive dynamics, with donors bidding for influence.


This does not mean that the absence of political conditionalities in Chinese foreign aid is not problematic from a human rights perspective. Chinese finance may still undermine incentives for recipient countries to institute reforms that are required by political conditionalities by providing an outside option. However, the Cold War dynamics that led to massive aid packages from Western donors despite human rights crises do not appear to be playing out.

4.6.2 Effect of BRI agreements on OECD governance aid

Signing a BRI agreement corresponds to a substantial increase in governance sector aid. As shown in Figure 4.5 and Table 4.2, for all recipients, the average treatment effect of signing a BRI agreement results in a nine percent increase in governance aid from OECD donors. This suggests that when donors lose the power of coercive punishment, they rely on catalytic strategy to pursue reforms in recipient states.

A subgroup analysis reveals that this effect is driven by donor responses in


Figure 4.5: ATT of signing BRI agreement on OECD governance aid commitments for all recipients



countries with high levels of state violence. Figure 4.6 shows the average treatment effect of signing a BRI on governance aid, limited to recipients with low average levels of state violence before 2013. There is no significant or substantive relationship.


Restricting the sample to recipient states with high average levels of state violence in the pre-treatment period demonstrates that the increase in governance aid after signing a BRI agreement is a catalytic strategic response to state violence. For this group, signing a BRI agreement leads to a 22% increase in governance aid. Figure 4.7 visualizes this result.

Figure 4.6: ATT of signing BRI agreement on OECD governance aid commitments to recipients with low state violence



A 22% increase in governance aid is unexpectedly large. It is possible that this result is driven by outliers for which governance aid increased radically at the same time that they signed a BRI agreement but for an unrelated reason or that a handful of results are driving the lion's share of the results. Afghanistan is a particularly important outlier to omit from the analysis: It joined the BRI in 2013 and held its first presidential election in 2014. The presidential election prompted a surge in foreign aid to promote a peaceful transition of power and prevent electoral violence. It would be unreasonable to assume that donors weighed the importance of the BRI more heavily than the country's first presidential election.

Figure 4.7: ATT of signing BRI agreement on OECD governance aid commitments to recipients with high state violence




Afghanistan had by far the largest difference between pre-BRI and post-BRI governance aid per capita. Venezuela also experienced a very large increase in governance sector aid per capita after signing its BRI agreement in 2018, although alternative reasons for this spike are less obvious.

To ensure that the result is not driven by such outliers, I omit the two BRI signatory countries that had the largest changes in average governance sector aid between the pre- and post-BRI periods. These countries are Afghanistan and Venezuela. Omitting these countries causes the ATT coefficient to drop to 0.16, which remains statistically significant at conventional levels, and suggests a 16%

increase in governance sector aid per capita if these outliers are omitted from the analysis. These results are visualized in Figure 4.8.²³

Figure 4.8: ATT of signing BRI agreement on OECD governance aid commitments to recipients with high state violence, with recipient outliers Aghanistan and Venezuela omitted.



Donors respond to BRI agreements by increasing governance sector aid,

²³It is possible that other outliers, such as the United States as a donor or Iraq as a recipient are driving these results. Unfortunately, with the smaller sample size of the restricted, high state violence sample, dropping either of the two results in models that do not meet the parallel trends assumption. The pretrend coefficients are statistically significant and different from zero, and thus cannot be used in good faith. To assuage concerns that these outliers are driving the catalytic strategy results, I include a robustness check in the appendix that uses the full pool of recipient countries and a longer pre-treatment period to improve matching and satisfy the parallel trends assumption. Figure A.12 provides the event study graph with Afghanistan, Venezuela, Iraq, and the United States omitted. The results are similar in terms of statistical significance and coefficient size to those reported in Figure 4.5, which includes all donors and recipients.

but not economic sector aid. This suggests that, at least for now, there are very clear differences between the Chinese era of great power competition in international development and the Cold War era. There is no quantitative evidence of competitive dynamics in which OECD donors drive up spending on fungible projects in response to China's BRI, and the human rights performance of aid recipient states is a strong determinant of whether donors double down on their governance aid spending when they lose the power of coercion.

Donors are not simply responding to BRI agreements by pouring money into good governance and anti-corruption efforts across all recipients. Rather, they are sending more governance aid to countries that have poor human rights records. This demonstrates that donors are substituting catalytic strategies for promoting human rights where coercive strategies are no longer viable.

4.7 Discussion and Implications

4.7.1 Is the return of great power competition the end of human rights promotion?

Although Chinese development assistance has diminished the feasibility of coercive punishments, this does not mean that it has eliminated OECD donors' willingness to engage in human rights promotion using foreign aid. Faced with BRI agreements, donors substitute catalytic strategy in the place of coercive strategy toward recipient states with high levels of state violence.

This is a clear departure from the pathologies of foreign aid and human rights that happened during the Cold War. By the time China rose to become an important player in development finance, donors had already begun to prioritize catalytic strategy, and catalytic strategy has offered OECD donors a path forward for pursuing human rights, good governance, and democratization abroad when coercive strategy cannot succeed. When Chinese finance renders coercive strategy obsolete, OECD donors further increase governance sector aid.

This chapter examined the relationship between OECD donor strategy, human rights, and the BRI. In it, I presented several pieces of evidence that are grounds for optimism regarding human rights and foreign aid, despite the return of great power competition to foreign assistance. OECD donors continue to attach political conditionalities to aid and finance, even in the initiatives that are intended to compete with the BRI. There is no evidence that OECD donors competitively increase economic sector aid in response to BRI agreements, suggesting that increased competition is not driving Western donors to shift to more fungible forms of aid to buy influence. Where BRI agreements undermine coercive strategy, OECD donors substitute catalytic strategy.

Although there is little evidence that Chinese foreign aid leads to Western donors abandoning their human rights promotion activities, Chinese development finance still poses a threat to human rights. There are many avenues through which China's rise in development cooperation may harm human rights broadly and human rights promotion in particular. China gives political cover

and direct support to violent regimes, weakens international human rights regimes, and is changing norms surrounding human rights, non-intervention, and state sovereignty (Brown and Sriram 2009; Gamsso 2019; Hodzi et al. 2012; Piccone 2018; Wuthnow 2013).

4.7.2 Limitations and scope conditions

This study investigates early Western responses to BRI agreements over a short period. Tensions between the West, most notably the United States, and China continue to evolve and have escalated since 2018, when this quantitative analysis ends. The inaugural hearing of the United States Congress Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party was held on February 28th, 2023, where speakers focused heavily on the importance of “countering China’s malign influence” globally. In 2021, the Senate Appropriations Committee introduced a “Countering China’s Foreign Influence Fund” to put “\$300 million to combat malign Chinese influence and promote transparency and accountability in projects associated with the People’s Republic of China’s debt-trap diplomacy and the Belt and Road Initiative.”²⁴ The House has introduced a similar “Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence Act.”²⁵ This rhetoric and these non-specific discretionary funds suggest that the United States may be or may soon begin to

²⁴The Senate Appropriations Committee. (2021) “State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 2021.”

²⁵H.R. 2329 -Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence Act. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/2329/text>

engage more in using fungible economic aid as a tool of influence. It is too early to tell, but I believe that this will be an important topic for future research.

Additionally, Western alternatives to the BRI are beginning to make inroads in financing infrastructure projects in BRI partners as the problems with BRI debt are driving BRI members, such as Bangladesh, to cancel projects and look for new infrastructure partners.²⁶ These strategic dynamics are also still unfolding and promise to continue to change over time.

4.7.3 Implications: Catalytic strategy and great power politics

The results suggest that OECD donors are increasingly substituting catalytic strategies for coercive strategy. If donors are doing so where coercive strategies would have been more appropriate but are no longer possible, then this may have the unintended consequence of exacerbating rather than alleviating human rights problems. If donors are diverting governance aid toward non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations in a way that threatens repressive governments, this may increase incentives for the government to restrict these organizations' activities. There has been a rapid proliferation of anti-civil society organization laws in recipient countries that would limit donors' abilities to promote human rights and political liberalization in those countries (Chaudhry 2022; DeMattee 2019).

²⁶Parkin, Benjamin. (2022, 08 August). Bangladesh's finance minister warns on Belt and Road loans from China. *The Financial Times*. <https://www.ft.com/content/65632129-dd75-4f23-b9c4-9c0496840a54>

In Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1, I discussed the constraints and limitations of catalytic strategy and discussed how partial democratization in Kenya contributed to persistent state violence problems. If donors are pursuing political liberalization in more hostile environments, then this may threaten leaders' tenure and in doing so inadvertently increase violent repression. In Chapter 3, I provided quantitative evidence that donors generally respond to state violence using catalytic strategy if the recipient country has stronger democratic institutions and using coercive strategy if the recipient country has weaker democratic institutions. This demonstrates that donors are optimizing their strategic choices by considering the domestic context of the recipient state and the probable impact of their policy choice on human rights.

That donors respond to BRI agreements by increasing catalytic strategy may be problematic if donors are doing so in decreasingly appropriate contexts. When donors' catalytic strategies threaten to further destabilize the countries in which China holds strong political, economic, or security interests, then this may provoke China into countering Western human rights and democracy promotion efforts. China is typically willing to ignore the regime type, political systems, and human rights records of its partner countries, but it is less willing to tolerate instability that harms its political and economic interests. Tensions between the United States and China in this manner could further destabilize fragile states and would suggest that a different type of destabilizing geopolitical dynamic is playing out in United States-China relations.

The case of Myanmar/Burma suggests that these patterns are beginning to emerge. Geostrategic dynamics that include development finance dimensions are currently playing out in Myanmar/Burma and illustrate the challenges and dangers of Western donors using foreign aid to promote human rights with the return of great power competition.

4.7.3.1 Myanmar/Burma: Coercive and catalytic strategies, the BRI, a coup, and a civil war

Beginning in 2010, there was growing optimism about the Burmese democratic transition. The country began to hold elections and initiated political and economic reforms that would open the country to trade, normalize its international relations, and integrate it into broader global politics. Early human rights victories included the release of political prisoners, the reintegration of child soldiers, a ceasefire agreement between the government and Ethnic Armed Organizations, and press freedom reforms. The Obama administration made Burma an important part of its "Pivot to Asia" strategy. However, optimism was short-lived, and democratic consolidation never occurred.

The 2015 elections included the disenfranchisement of the Rohingya ethnic group, which had been allowed to vote in previous elections, and arbitrary refusals to allow Rohingya incumbents from running for re-election.²⁷ After the

²⁷Maung, U Shwe. (2015, 2 Nov) Myanmar's Disenfranchised Rohingya. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/opinion/myanmar-election-disenfranchised-rohingya.html>

election, military forces became increasingly violent against ethnic Rohingya. This prompted a small scale retaliatory attack by a Rohingya insurgent group against military targets. In 2017, the military's indiscriminate acts of state violence against ethnic Rohingya escalated rapidly, killing thousands and culminating in a refugee crisis and international condemnation for ethnic cleansing. Myanmar had never boasted a strong human rights record, but this surge in state violence drew criticism. Many of the Western countries that had been supporting democratic transition and economic opening in Myanmar/Burma imposed economic sanctions, increased humanitarian aid, and shifted governance support to civil society organizations.


The government of Myanmar signed its first BRI agreement in 2016, as Western human rights organizations were criticizing its elections and treatment of Rohingya ethnic minorities. The BRI gave the government an outside option for support, and the government responded to Western threats and criticism over ethnic cleansing by strengthening its ties with China. In January 2020, the civilian government signed a series of 33 BRI agreements.²⁸ The military opposed strengthening ties with China, just as it had opposed existing contracts for Chinese investments in Myanmar.²⁹

On February 1 2021, the Burmese military overthrew the civilian govern-

²⁸Reed, John. (2020, 18 Jan) China and Myanmar sign off on Belt and Road projects. *Financial Times*. <https://www.ft.com/content/a5265114-39d1-11ea-a01a-bae547046735>

²⁹Han, Enze. (2021, 6 Feb) China does not like the coup in Myanmar. *East Asia Forum*. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/02/06/china-does-not-like-the-coup-in-myanmar/>

Figure 4.9: OECD DAC donors' economic and governance aid to Myanmar.



ment. In its immediate response to the coup d'état, China remained neutral between the democratically-elected NLD government with which it had signed numerous BRI agreements and the military junta that seized power. Rather than exerting notable political pressure on coup leaders, China's first priority upon meeting with the junta was to request security assistance around its pipeline.³⁰ On March 7th, China called for the former government and junta to work toward de-escalation, conflict resolution, and stabilization. China's foreign min-

³⁰Si Yang and Lin Yang. (2021, 12 March) Leaked Documents Suggest Fraying of China-Myanmar Ties. VOA. https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_leaked-documents-suggest-fraying-china-myanmar-ties/6203234.html

ister stressed that, “China has long-term friendly exchanges with various parties and factions in Myanmar, including the NLD, and friendship with China has always been the consensus of all walks of life in Myanmar. No matter how the situation in Myanmar changes, China’s determination to promote China-Myanmar relations will not waver, and the direction of promoting friendly cooperation will not change.”³¹ However, as Western donors increased their democracy support in the wake of the coup, and as pro-democracy supporters have targeted Chinese interests, China has increased its support for the junta. On March 9th, two days after China stressed that political control was an internal matter for the Burmese to figure out on their own, pro-democracy supporters in the country called for attacks on Chinese businesses and a major BRI gas pipeline infrastructure project.³² Since then, China has distanced itself from the NLD and has generally offered lukewarm support for the junta. The junta has reversed its early anti-China stance and has increased its support for Chinese economic interests in return.³³

Western governance aid has continued to flow into the country, but there are important differences between the governance support that the United States prioritized after the coup. The United States passed the BURMA Act on Decem-

³¹Zhang Yanling, Wei Jing and Liu Hongqing. (2021, 07 March). Wang Yi talks about the situation in Myanmar: China is willing to play a constructive role in easing tension. *China Net* http://www.china.com.cn/lianghui/news/2021-03/07/content_77281702.shtml

³²Battersby, Amanda. (2021, 10 March) Myanmar’s Chinese-operated pipelines threatened amid fresh coup protests. *Upstream*. <https://www.upstreamonline.com/politics/myanmars-chinese-operated-pipelines-threatened-amid-fresh-coup-protests/2-1-977472>

³³Myanmar Junta Approves 15 Investments, Including US\$2.5-Billion Power Project. (2021, 08 May). *The Irrawaddy*. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/162007.html>

ber 15 2022. Two related bills were introduced in the House and Senate as independent pieces of legislation. Neither advanced to a vote. Instead, the BURMA Act was passed as a component of the National Defense Authorization Act. The BURMA Act authorized and secured funding for the United States Agency for International Development, National Endowment for Democracy, and State Department to support federalism in ethnic states within Burma, to support civil society groups to investigate human rights violations and help victims, and included additional authorizations to provide technical assistance to document war crimes and human rights abuses.³⁴ These are normal governance sector projects for a country that has descended into civil war.

One part of the foreign assistance sections in the Act stands out, however: the Act authorizes “non-lethal assistance” to pro-democracy movement organizations, which specifically include Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs).³⁵ Some of the groups that this assistance could reach are currently fighting the junta. The United States is using civil society organization and democracy assistance to support armed groups that are fighting the Chinese-supported junta. To complicate matters, several EAOs are members of the National Unity Government (NUG), which is operating as a pro-democratic shadow government in exile.

³⁴H.R.7776 - James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023

³⁵Section 5575 (3) authorizes the use of funds under the Foreign Assistance Act for “technical support and non-lethal assistance for Burma’s Ethnic Armed Organizations, People’s Defense Forces, and pro-democracy movement organizations to strengthen communications and command and control, and coordination of international relief and other operations between and among such entities.”

On December 29th, shortly after the United States passed the Burma Act, China's special envoy began meeting with several of the most powerful EAOs in an apparent bid to hedge against the junta and limit the United States' influence over the EAOs. China's special envoy then also met with the coup leader, presumably in a bid to improve ties with both sets of actors while attempting to decrease tensions and instability on its border.³⁶

China has clearly demonstrated that it prefers stability and support for its interests rather than any particular regime type or human rights performance. The coup was a nightmare for Chinese interests. China had strong ties with the ousted civilian government, the military had a long history of opposing Chinese projects, and the coup's aftermath included attacks on Chinese companies and infrastructure. After the coup, China hedged by not immediately picking a side but has provided lukewarm support for the junta ever since pro-democracy supporters attacked BRI projects, the West backed pro-democracy forces, and the junta agreed to new Chinese development partnerships.³⁷

The United States has demonstrated its support for the civilian government and pro-democracy groups. Governance aid from the United States is being allocated to the armed groups that are fighting the junta, which Congress views as being supported by China. The Burmese National Unity Government opened

³⁶China's new Special Envoy to Myanmar Meets Ethnic Armed Organizations. (2022, 29 Dec). *The Irrawaddy*. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/chinese-envoys-visits-signal-growing-tensions-with-us-over-myanmar.html>

³⁷Myers, Lucas. (2021, 10 Sept) China Is Hedging Its Bets in Myanmar. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/10/china-myanmar-coup-national-league-for-democracy/>

an office in Washington D.C. in February, and has met with senior members of the Department of State to deepen ties with the United States.

The Myanmar case doesn't echo Cold War dynamics, but it rhymes. These dynamics suggest a strong potential for great power politics between the United States and China to have a destabilizing effect on third states. Both the United States and China appear to be using development assistance as a means of countering the other's influence. However, there are important differences in the dynamics between these tensions in great power politics and those in the Cold War. The United States is focusing its efforts in increasing its democracy and human rights assistance to nominally pro-democracy groups. Neither the United States nor China has signaled unwavering support for the junta. China is backing whatever side it thinks will win, and China is hedging its bets every time uncertainty increases. This suggests that there is a much larger acceptable bargaining range between the United States and China than would have been possible between the United States and Soviet Union.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

In this dissertation, I proposed and developed a conceptual distinction between coercive and catalytic strategies for human rights promotion. In Chapter 2, I argued that catalytic strategy has become donors' preferred strategy for human rights promotion and provided evidence of this preference that included policy prescriptions from international organizations, donors' aid policies, and agreements between donor and recipient countries. I discussed the strategic mechanisms, constraints, and limitations of coercive and catalytic strategies. Coercive strategy is particularly vulnerable to collective action problems that stem from preference heterogeneity between donors. When donors can successfully coordinate their rewards and punishments, coercive strategy can create a meaningful system of rewards and punishments. However, if another development financier is willing to offset others' aid withdrawal in order to seize influence, then coercive punishments lose their bite.

Catalytic strategy is more resilient to coordination and cooperation failures between donors but is also vulnerable to problems stemming from overreach. Catalytic strategy relies on partnerships between donors' implementing

partners and recipient leaders. When donors use catalytic strategies to pursue human rights improvements in contentious circumstances, this can backfire and worsen the domestic environment for human rights.

In Chapter 3, I investigated how donors choose between coercive and catalytic strategies during the period from 2003-2018, which primarily consisted of low geopolitical competition in foreign aid. The majority of important donors had shared preferences in promoting human rights and democracy. Although donors during this period have been criticized for their coordination failures, these problems were more like donors tripping over each other (and sometimes tripping over their own feet) than intentionally throwing each other under busses. Bargaining between donors and reaching general agreements on the goals of foreign aid were, at least comparatively, easy.

I found that, on average, OECD donors responded to state violence during this period primarily by using catalytic strategies. I did not find evidence that these donors gave preferential treatment to recipient states with high state violence that were strong trading partners or who voted with the donor in the United Nations. Either would have suggested that donors were altering their responses to state violence based on pure self-interest in maintaining economic and political ties over the human rights performance and stability of recipient states. That I did not find evidence of this suggests that donors' interests in prioritizing human rights as a strategic end have increased over time, since studies that investigated earlier periods found that similar factors undermined human rights promotion (Nielsen 2013).

Donors' responses to state violence during this period are more consistent with "targeted development" and bureaucratic incentive explanations of foreign aid strategy (Bermeo 2018; Dietrich 2021; Swedlund 2017a). Donors respond to state violence by choosing between coercive and catalytic strategies according to their interests in the recipient state. The results suggest that when donors are more sensitive to reputational benefits from promoting human rights and combating state violence, donors increase their catalytic responses to state violence. The results also suggest that donors substitute coercive for catalytic strategy where catalytic strategy would be too costly. Donors rely more on catalytic strategy where recipient countries are more democratic, have stronger state capacity, and where terrorism is low. Donors substitute coercive strategy where recipient countries are more autocratic, have weaker state capacity, and where terrorism is high. This suggests that donors shift to coercive strategy when pushing democratic reforms could further increase state violence, when major improvements in state capacity would be necessary to achieve results, and when increasing the political rights of the victims of state violence are more likely to harm donors' security interests than improve them.

In short, Chapter 3 examined donors' strategies for promoting human rights during a period of low geopolitical contestation. The findings suggested that donors optimize their strategies according to the costs and benefits to the donors' interests, while taking into account the probability of successful catalytic strategy. Although donors use both coercive and catalytic strategies to promote human rights, coercive strategy is less prevalent than catalytic strategy. When it

is feasible to do so, donors would prefer to use foreign aid to help recipients improve human rights through developmental means rather than by using aid cuts to punish leaders for non-compliance, which can lead to considerable collateral damage in local economies and cause further harm to the victims of human rights abuses.

Chapter 4 examined donor strategy with the return of great power politics. When the ability of coercive punishments to harm recipient leaders is undermined by external actors, such as China, donors double down on catalytic strategy. Catalytic strategy substitutes for coercion where punishments are unlikely to have an effect. The findings with respect to coercive strategy have important implications for current human rights promotion strategies. Although there are several potential avenues through which the rise of China may harm respect for human rights, Western donors engaging in Cold War-style geostrategic competition by providing large quantities of highly-fungible aid to human rights abusers does not appear to be one of them.

In sum, this dissertation and its findings paint a more sanguine picture for the future of human rights promotion than studies that focus only on coercive strategies could. Donors prioritize catalytic strategy for promoting human rights and substitute coercive strategy when achieving political liberalization would be too costly to the donor. However, catalytic strategy cannot be effective without buy-in from recipient country leaders, and donors appear to support catalytic strategy projects where there is enough state capacity to act as a foundation for governance reforms.

With the rise of Chinese development cooperation providing recipient leaders with options to bypass Western economic aid, this suggests that foreign aid has become a weaker tool for addressing a key subset of rights violations: where leaders engage in opportunistic acts of violent repression to suppress opposition groups. It also means that at least one group is being left behind by donors: recipient states with violence problems that occur in the context of weak state capacity. These are the cases in which monumental changes would be required to improve the domestic institutions linked to human rights, and donors appear to prioritize their efforts elsewhere.

Finally, the finding that donors increase their catalytic responses to state violence as geopolitical contestation increases and coercive strategy is no longer a feasible option has important implications. On the one hand, this finding is promising because it indicates that donors are continuing to prioritize human rights using foreign aid. On the other hand, it is troubling because it suggests that donors may be applying catalytic strategy in less and less appropriate contexts, which can have the unintended consequences of fueling instability, conflict, and state violence.

5.1 Opportunities for future research

This speaks to the larger unanswered question of whether coercive or catalytic strategies are effective in promoting human rights and under what circumstances. The results point to several ways in which donors' catalytic strategy might

improve rights outcomes in the long run. However, the finding that donors respond to state violence with more intense punishments and less support for states with weak state capacity demonstrates that donors' actions may harm human rights in some cases. Donors are responding to state violence in a manner that could intensify human rights violations by further destabilizing governance in fragile states.

The distinction between coercive and catalytic strategy highlights the importance of considering how countries choose between alternative foreign policy strategies in pursuit of their national interest abroad. Countries are not limited to using foreign aid. Donors use other types of economic coercion in response to state violence. This includes financial and economic sanctions, as well as disqualifying recipient states from preferential trade agreements. They also use diplomatic strategies and, on rare occasions, peacekeeping and military interventions. This research points to a broader question of how foreign aid is used for responding to human rights violations relative to these other foreign policy options.

Appendix

A.1 Country lists

A.1.1 List of OECD DAC donors

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

A.1.2 List of non-DAC donors

Bulgaria, China, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Cyprus, Estonia, Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates.

A.1.3 List of recipient countries

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, People's Republic of China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos,

Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

A.2 Variable descriptive statistics and descriptions

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N	% Zero
Ln Economic Aid	1.28	2.44	0	13	52,950	71.66
Ln Governance Aid	1.54	2.38	0	13	52,950	62.15
State Violence	-0.00	1.14	-4	3	52,950	
Donor Rights	0.00	0.99	-2	3	52,950	
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.00	0.68	-2	3	52,950	
Ln Exports	0.00	3.06	-17	10	52,950	
Executive Constraints	-0.00	0.54	-1	1	52,950	
State Capacity	0.00	0.64	-2	2	52,950	
Ln Terror Events	-0.00	1.47	-1	7	52,950	
Ln GDP	-0.00	1.86	-5	6	52,950	
Ln Population	0.00	1.71	-5	5	52,950	
Aid Concentration	-0.00	0.17	-0	1	52,950	
High Dissent	0.30	0.46	0	1	52,950	
Conflict	0.15	0.36	0	1	52,950	
Statist Donor	0.44	0.50	0	1	52,950	


Table A.2: Variable list

Variable	Unit of Measure	Description	Source
Ln Governance Aid	Dyad-Year	Natural log of 1 + governance sector aid per 1000 population	OECD CRS, World Bank WDI
Ln Economic Aid	Dyad-Year	Natural log of 1 + economic sector aid per 1000 population	OECD CRS
State Violence (SV)	Recipient-Year	Inverted dynamic latent human rights score	Fariss, Kenwick, and Reuning (2020)
Donor Rights	Donor-Year	Dynamic latent human rights score	Fariss, Kenwick, and Reuning (2020)
UN Ideal Point Distance	Dyad-Year	Similarity of United Nations voting record	Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017)
Ln Terror Events	Recipient-Year	Natural log of 1 plus the count of terrorist events within a country	ICEWS
Ln Exports	Dyad-Year	Natural log of 1 + exports from donor to recipient	World Bank WDI
State Capacity	Recipient-Year	Government Effectiveness Estimate	World Bank WGI
Executive Constraints	Recipient-Year	Sum of the legislative and judicial constraints on the executive indices	VDEM
UN Shaming	Recipient-Year	Count of physical integrity shaming in UNCHR and UNHRC	Demeritt and Conrad (2019)
Military Alliance	Dyad-Year	1 if formal military alliance between donor and recipient	Gibler (2008)
Ln Population	Recipient-Year	Natural log of the recipient country's population	World Bank WDI
Ln GDP	Recipient-Year	Natural log of the recipient country's GDP in 2018 constant USD	World Bank WDI
Aid Concentration	Recipient-Year	Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculation of the concentration of aid	AidData and OECD CRS
Conflict	Recipient-Year	1 if intrastate or interstate conflict within country	UCDP/PRIO (2021)
High Dissent	Recipient-Year	1 if in the top quartile by count of peaceful protests	ICEWS
Statist Donor	Donor	1 if statist/traditional public sector donor political economy	Dietrich (2021)

A.3 Dependent variable distributions

Figure A.1: Distributions of dependent variables.

(a) Governance Aid DV



(b) Positive Values of Governance Aid DV






Figure A.2: Distributions of dependent variables.

(a) Economic Aid DV



(b) Positive Values of Economic Aid DV



A.4 OECD CRS project and program descriptions

A.4.1 Governance sector project and program designations

Sector and purpose descriptions included in the governance aid dependent variable:¹

- **150 & 151:** *Government & Civil Society*
- **15110:** *Public sector policy and administrative management*
- **15112:** *Decentralisation and support to subnational government*
- **15113:** *Anti-corruption organisations and institutions*
- **15114:** *Domestic revenue mobilisation*
- **15125:** *Public Procurement*
- **15130** *Legal and judicial development*
- **15150:** *Democratic participation and civil society*
- **15151:** *Elections*
- **15152:** *Legislatures and political parties*
- **15153:** *Media and free flow of information*

¹Codes and descriptions from the OECD DAC list of CRS purpose codes and voluntary budget identifier codes, available here: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC-CRS-CODES.xls>

- **15160:** *Human rights*
- **15170:** *Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions*
- **15180:** *Ending violence against women and girls*
- **15190:** *Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility*
- **152:** *Conflict, Peace & Security*
- **15220:** *Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution*
- **15230:** *Participation in international peacekeeping operations*
- **15240:** *Reintegration and SALW control*
- **15250:** *Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war*
- **15261:** *Child soldiers (prevention and demobilisation)*

A.4.2 Economic sector project and program designations

Sector and purpose descriptions included in the economic aid dependent variable:²

²Codes and descriptions from the OECD DAC list of CRS purpose codes and voluntary budget identifier codes, available here: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC-CRS-CODES.xls>


- **210:** *Transport & Storage*
- **220:** *Communications*
- **230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236:** *Energy*
- **240:** *Banking & financial services*
- **250:** *Business & other services*
- **312, 313:** *Forestry, Fishing*
- **320, 321, 322, 333:** *Industry, Mining, Construction*
- **330, 331:** *Trade Policies & Regulations*
- **332:** *Tourism*
- **510:** *General budget support-related aid*
- **530:** *Other Commodity Assistance*
- **600:** *Action relating to debt*

A.5 Robustness checks

A.5.1 Small donors omitted

There is considerable variation between OECD donors in the total amount of aid and the sectoral composition of aid. Figure A.3 visualizes the total amount


Figure A.3: Donor total contributions by sector 2003-2018



of ODA (in constant 2018 USD) that each OECD donor provided during the 2003-2018 period, split between economic and governance sectors. To ensure that the results are not driven by the actions of relatively unimportant donors, this robustness check drops the smallest donors from the analysis: Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, several of which allocate large percentages of their foreign aid to the governance sector (see figure A.4). It is also worth noting that Japan and Korea provide an exceptional percentage of their foreign aid to economic sector projects.

Figure A.4: Composition of foreign aid between donor countries

(a) 2000-2009



(b) 2010-2019




Table A.3: Economic aid DV with small donors omitted

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence (SV)	-0.0862 (0.0962)	-0.0846 (0.0978)	-0.0869 (0.0959)	-0.0801 (0.0990)	-0.200** (0.0958)	-0.0223 (0.0926)	-0.166* (0.0918)	0.0657 (0.0948)
Donor Rights	0.207 (0.784)	0.204 (0.781)	0.207 (0.784)	0.205 (0.784)	0.208 (0.781)	0.207 (0.780)	0.208 (0.784)	0.786 (0.881)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.394 (0.242)	-0.394 (0.242)	-0.396* (0.235)	-0.376 (0.238)	-0.400* (0.242)	-0.392 (0.242)	-0.364 (0.238)	-0.508** (0.228)
Ln Exports	1.072*** (0.182)	1.072*** (0.182)	1.072*** (0.183)	1.064*** (0.186)	1.063*** (0.185)	1.061*** (0.181)	1.067*** (0.182)	1.051*** (0.193)
Exec Const	1.152*** (0.149)	1.152*** (0.149)	1.151*** (0.148)	1.165*** (0.149)	1.038*** (0.150)	1.171*** (0.147)	1.210*** (0.150)	1.172*** (0.173)
State Capacity	0.0679 (0.226)	0.0668 (0.225)	0.0659 (0.227)	0.0551 (0.225)	0.102 (0.229)	0.141 (0.224)	0.0279 (0.225)	0.418* (0.234)
Ln Terror	-0.100 (0.0652)	-0.101 (0.0655)	-0.0996 (0.0622)	-0.0891 (0.0680)	-0.117* (0.0662)	-0.0988 (0.0659)	0.0752 (0.0801)	-0.214** (0.0886)
UN Shaming								-3.398*** (1.253)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0248 (0.0775)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			-0.0166 (0.105)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0279 (0.0229)				
Exec Const x SV					0.686*** (0.112)			
State Capacity x SV						0.474*** (0.0681)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.155*** (0.0466)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.093 (0.871)
High Dissent	-0.170 (0.133)	-0.169 (0.133)	-0.168 (0.130)	-0.145 (0.137)	-0.164 (0.133)	-0.213 (0.132)	-0.173 (0.133)	0.0682 (0.186)
Ln GDP	-2.259*** (0.222)	-2.258*** (0.222)	-2.257*** (0.221)	-2.250*** (0.223)	-2.254*** (0.223)	-2.196*** (0.220)	-2.258*** (0.221)	-2.321*** (0.243)
Ln Population	1.814*** (0.184)	1.814*** (0.184)	1.812*** (0.184)	1.818*** (0.185)	1.792*** (0.182)	1.685*** (0.184)	1.802*** (0.183)	1.672*** (0.201)
Conflict	-0.477*** (0.119)	-0.478*** (0.119)	-0.475*** (0.122)	-0.480*** (0.121)	-0.388*** (0.117)	-0.317** (0.125)	-0.362*** (0.103)	-0.648*** (0.143)
Aid Concentration	-0.776 (0.623)	-0.777 (0.624)	-0.786 (0.635)	-0.687 (0.579)	-0.881 (0.630)	-1.149* (0.632)	-0.736 (0.616)	-2.190*** (0.646)
Statist Donor	2.116* (1.170)	2.112* (1.167)	2.116* (1.170)	2.112* (1.171)	2.101* (1.164)	2.164* (1.164)	2.109* (1.170)	3.361** (1.403)
Constant	-5.429*** (0.794)	-5.426*** (0.792)	-5.426*** (0.793)	-5.423*** (0.794)	-5.304*** (0.782)	-5.331*** (0.784)	-5.287*** (0.796)	-6.316*** (1.016)
Sigma	4.576*** (0.258)	4.576*** (0.259)	4.576*** (0.258)	4.576*** (0.258)	4.562*** (0.259)	4.561*** (0.258)	4.574*** (0.258)	4.400*** (0.275)
Observations	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	21,128

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table A.4: Governance aid DV with small donors omitted

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence (SV)	0.341*** (0.0874)	0.342*** (0.0875)	0.347*** (0.0870)	0.343*** (0.0890)	0.282*** (0.0820)	0.373*** (0.0842)	0.198** (0.0832)	0.473*** (0.0881)
Donor Rights	0.129 (0.370)	0.102 (0.367)	0.130 (0.371)	0.116 (0.370)	0.130 (0.370)	0.129 (0.370)	0.131 (0.369)	0.361 (0.473)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.746*** (0.166)	-0.748*** (0.165)	-0.731*** (0.164)	-0.670*** (0.163)	-0.742*** (0.165)	-0.745*** (0.166)	-0.692*** (0.163)	-0.763*** (0.192)
Ln Exports	0.787*** (0.132)	0.785*** (0.132)	0.786*** (0.131)	0.758*** (0.133)	0.782*** (0.134)	0.784*** (0.132)	0.778*** (0.133)	0.802*** (0.153)
Exec Const	0.818*** (0.141)	0.818*** (0.141)	0.820*** (0.141)	0.878*** (0.141)	0.750*** (0.145)	0.829*** (0.141)	0.935*** (0.139)	0.881*** (0.163)
State Capacity	-0.646*** (0.153)	-0.647*** (0.154)	-0.630*** (0.157)	-0.693*** (0.155)	-0.630*** (0.155)	-0.623*** (0.151)	-0.726*** (0.152)	-0.302* (0.174)
Ln Terror	0.0845* (0.0468)	0.0820* (0.0472)	0.0810* (0.0454)	0.131*** (0.0467)	0.0708 (0.0478)	0.0843* (0.0467)	0.415*** (0.0564)	0.00707 (0.0646)
UN Shaming								-2.396*** (0.615)
Donor Rights x SV		0.156 (0.103)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.129* (0.0770)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.115*** (0.0157)				
Exec Const x SV					0.389*** (0.0959)			
State Capacity x SV						0.197*** (0.0444)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.287*** (0.0331)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.752*** (0.381)
High Dissent	0.222** (0.112)	0.224** (0.111)	0.209* (0.110)	0.324*** (0.110)	0.232** (0.112)	0.205* (0.112)	0.212* (0.111)	0.371*** (0.135)
Ln GDP	-1.661*** (0.156)	-1.659*** (0.156)	-1.673*** (0.155)	-1.621*** (0.155)	-1.659*** (0.158)	-1.636*** (0.155)	-1.656*** (0.157)	-1.669*** (0.161)
Ln Population	0.877*** (0.119)	0.878*** (0.119)	0.889*** (0.119)	0.886*** (0.119)	0.863*** (0.117)	0.823*** (0.117)	0.849*** (0.118)	0.673*** (0.135)
Conflict	0.142 (0.132)	0.134 (0.131)	0.119 (0.135)	0.121 (0.132)	0.212* (0.125)	0.217 (0.134)	0.340*** (0.131)	0.0789 (0.174)
Aid Concentration	-2.142*** (0.568)	-2.142*** (0.568)	-2.059*** (0.576)	-1.771*** (0.532)	-2.209*** (0.575)	-2.310*** (0.567)	-2.065*** (0.562)	-3.223*** (0.604)
Statist Donor	0.824 (0.551)	0.819 (0.546)	0.820 (0.552)	0.826 (0.552)	0.821 (0.551)	0.839 (0.549)	0.815 (0.550)	1.203 (0.744)
Constant	-4.269*** (0.522)	-4.261*** (0.515)	-4.280*** (0.525)	-4.253*** (0.519)	-4.205*** (0.517)	-4.230*** (0.522)	-4.003*** (0.513)	-4.370*** (0.647)
Sigma	3.655*** (0.170)	3.653*** (0.169)	3.652*** (0.171)	3.642*** (0.169)	3.648*** (0.172)	3.652*** (0.170)	3.644*** (0.170)	3.577*** (0.187)
Observations	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	21,128

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

A.5.2 United States omitted

This robustness check drops the United States from the analysis to ensure that results are not driven by the actions of a single donor with high levels of foreign aid.

Table A.5: Economic aid DV with United States omitted

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence (SV)	-0.0566 (0.0995)	-0.0596 (0.101)	-0.0603 (0.0992)	-0.0542 (0.102)	-0.168* (0.100)	0.00485 (0.0962)	-0.134 (0.0958)	0.0961 (0.105)
Donor Rights	0.472 (0.851)	0.465 (0.849)	0.472 (0.852)	0.469 (0.852)	0.473 (0.848)	0.472 (0.848)	0.473 (0.851)	1.133 (0.917)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.420** (0.212)	-0.421** (0.212)	-0.423** (0.205)	-0.402** (0.204)	-0.425** (0.211)	-0.418** (0.211)	-0.392* (0.209)	-0.477** (0.224)
Ln Exports	1.193*** (0.180)	1.193*** (0.180)	1.194*** (0.181)	1.187*** (0.183)	1.185*** (0.181)	1.184*** (0.179)	1.189*** (0.180)	1.121*** (0.197)
Exec Const	1.075*** (0.158)	1.075*** (0.158)	1.074*** (0.157)	1.087*** (0.157)	0.964*** (0.158)	1.095*** (0.157)	1.131*** (0.160)	1.152*** (0.186)
State Capacity	0.108 (0.226)	0.106 (0.225)	0.105 (0.230)	0.0947 (0.226)	0.141 (0.229)	0.177 (0.223)	0.0687 (0.225)	0.412* (0.242)
Ln Terror	-0.115* (0.0615)	-0.116* (0.0615)	-0.114* (0.0584)	-0.105 (0.0646)	-0.132** (0.0626)	-0.113* (0.0621)	0.0546 (0.0767)	-0.227** (0.0897)
UN Shaming								-4.708*** (1.013)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0500 (0.0963)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			-0.0239 (0.141)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0286 (0.0242)				
Exec Const x SV					0.685*** (0.115)			
State Capacity x SV						0.470*** (0.0719)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.151*** (0.0482)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.732* (0.921)
High Dissent	-0.134 (0.136)	-0.133 (0.136)	-0.132 (0.133)	-0.109 (0.142)	-0.131 (0.137)	-0.177 (0.136)	-0.136 (0.136)	0.145 (0.204)
Ln GDP	-2.372*** (0.226)	-2.371*** (0.226)	-2.370*** (0.227)	-2.363*** (0.227)	-2.367*** (0.226)	-2.311*** (0.224)	-2.370*** (0.226)	-2.397*** (0.246)
Ln Population	1.759*** (0.196)	1.759*** (0.196)	1.756*** (0.200)	1.763*** (0.197)	1.737*** (0.194)	1.632*** (0.196)	1.748*** (0.195)	1.647*** (0.217)
Conflict	-0.444*** (0.103)	-0.446*** (0.103)	-0.441*** (0.105)	-0.445*** (0.104)	-0.359*** (0.102)	-0.288*** (0.108)	-0.329*** (0.0883)	-0.608*** (0.140)
Aid Concentration	-0.830 (0.639)	-0.830 (0.639)	-0.845 (0.646)	-0.741 (0.593)	-0.934 (0.647)	-1.193* (0.649)	-0.790 (0.631)	-2.313*** (0.692)
Statist Donor	2.473** (1.261)	2.464* (1.258)	2.472* (1.262)	2.467* (1.262)	2.458* (1.255)	2.521** (1.257)	2.465* (1.261)	3.894*** (1.461)
Constant	-5.663*** (0.821)	-5.654*** (0.818)	-5.658*** (0.824)	-5.654*** (0.820)	-5.536*** (0.808)	-5.565*** (0.811)	-5.525*** (0.821)	-6.585*** (1.048)
Sigma	4.660*** (0.279)	4.660*** (0.279)	4.660*** (0.278)	4.660*** (0.278)	4.646*** (0.279)	4.645*** (0.278)	4.658*** (0.278)	4.466*** (0.301)
Observations	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	26,099

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table A.6: Governance aid DV with United States omitted

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence (SV)	0.362*** (0.0882)	0.336*** (0.0880)	0.389*** (0.0942)	0.345*** (0.0888)	0.308*** (0.0839)	0.390*** (0.0851)	0.230*** (0.0849)	0.518*** (0.0922)
Donor Rights	0.349 (0.427)	0.304 (0.424)	0.355 (0.429)	0.331 (0.430)	0.351 (0.427)	0.349 (0.427)	0.350 (0.426)	0.630 (0.519)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.871*** (0.171)	-0.873*** (0.170)	-0.853*** (0.168)	-0.795*** (0.168)	-0.867*** (0.170)	-0.870*** (0.171)	-0.822*** (0.169)	-0.807*** (0.202)
Ln Exports	0.883*** (0.123)	0.878*** (0.124)	0.880*** (0.123)	0.859*** (0.123)	0.878*** (0.125)	0.880*** (0.123)	0.874*** (0.124)	0.855*** (0.152)
Exec Const	0.751*** (0.136)	0.751*** (0.136)	0.754*** (0.136)	0.808*** (0.135)	0.687*** (0.139)	0.762*** (0.136)	0.861*** (0.135)	0.907*** (0.160)
State Capacity	-0.575*** (0.151)	-0.573*** (0.152)	-0.553*** (0.160)	-0.620*** (0.153)	-0.559*** (0.153)	-0.558*** (0.149)	-0.652*** (0.150)	-0.247 (0.178)
Ln Terror	0.0883* (0.0482)	0.0857* (0.0489)	0.0835* (0.0463)	0.130*** (0.0483)	0.0758 (0.0494)	0.0893* (0.0482)	0.397*** (0.0609)	-0.00579 (0.0663)
UN Shaming								-2.928*** (0.576)
Donor Rights x SV		0.222** (0.0907)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.171 (0.117)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.117*** (0.0146)				
Exec Const x SV					0.365*** (0.0955)			
State Capacity x SV						0.171*** (0.0462)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.268*** (0.0340)	
UN Shaming x SV								2.033*** (0.386)
High Dissent	0.266** (0.115)	0.270** (0.114)	0.248** (0.110)	0.366*** (0.114)	0.275** (0.115)	0.252** (0.115)	0.256** (0.114)	0.399*** (0.143)
Ln GDP	-1.763*** (0.147)	-1.759*** (0.148)	-1.777*** (0.148)	-1.724*** (0.145)	-1.762*** (0.149)	-1.742*** (0.146)	-1.757*** (0.148)	-1.743*** (0.155)
Ln Population	0.845*** (0.122)	0.846*** (0.123)	0.862*** (0.125)	0.854*** (0.123)	0.832*** (0.121)	0.798*** (0.121)	0.819*** (0.122)	0.674*** (0.142)
Conflict	0.231* (0.133)	0.223* (0.133)	0.200 (0.138)	0.209 (0.131)	0.295** (0.126)	0.295** (0.133)	0.415*** (0.132)	0.128 (0.181)
Aid Concentration	-2.103*** (0.567)	-2.093*** (0.565)	-2.001*** (0.564)	-1.731*** (0.536)	-2.164*** (0.574)	-2.246*** (0.567)	-2.028*** (0.560)	-3.262*** (0.639)
Statist Donor	1.110* (0.625)	1.091* (0.618)	1.113* (0.626)	1.095* (0.628)	1.107* (0.624)	1.123* (0.624)	1.100* (0.624)	1.614** (0.811)
Constant	-4.575*** (0.552)	-4.550*** (0.543)	-4.601*** (0.561)	-4.537*** (0.548)	-4.515*** (0.549)	-4.542*** (0.553)	-4.329*** (0.543)	-4.668*** (0.675)
Sigma	3.767*** (0.176)	3.760*** (0.176)	3.765*** (0.176)	3.752*** (0.176)	3.761*** (0.178)	3.764*** (0.176)	3.757*** (0.176)	3.675*** (0.188)
Observations	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	26,099

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

A.5.3 Recipient outliers omitted

This robustness check omits recipient country outliers, including a few of the most prevalent Global War on Terror countries and several small island countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, Palestinian Territories, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Palau, Nauru, Tuvalu, Micronesia, Cabo Verde, Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sao Tome and Principe. Small island countries, on average, have very strong respect for human rights and receive very high levels of aid per capita compared to other countries. The global war on terror countries, on average, have high state violence and receive very high levels of aid per capita. Additionally, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the West Bank and Gaza were occupied territories during this period, which makes them special cases. This ensures that results are not driven by recipient outliers.

Table A.7: Economic aid DV with recipient outliers omitted

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence (SV)	-0.0250 (0.0712)	-0.0216 (0.0715)	-0.0273 (0.0700)	-0.0667 (0.0709)	-0.0992 (0.0750)	-0.0151 (0.0738)	-0.171** (0.0768)	0.112 (0.0937)
Donor Rights	0.447 (0.779)	0.442 (0.777)	0.447 (0.779)	0.451 (0.777)	0.448 (0.775)	0.446 (0.774)	0.447 (0.778)	0.927 (0.863)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.551** (0.247)	-0.552** (0.247)	-0.557** (0.240)	-0.571** (0.243)	-0.606** (0.249)	-0.561** (0.247)	-0.508** (0.244)	-0.550** (0.244)
Ln Exports	1.049*** (0.158)	1.049*** (0.158)	1.049*** (0.159)	1.056*** (0.161)	1.034*** (0.159)	1.031*** (0.158)	1.039*** (0.156)	1.030*** (0.175)
Exec Const	0.944*** (0.140)	0.945*** (0.140)	0.944*** (0.140)	0.931*** (0.141)	0.806*** (0.139)	0.962*** (0.139)	1.036*** (0.143)	1.099*** (0.162)
State Capacity	0.277 (0.203)	0.276 (0.202)	0.275 (0.204)	0.285 (0.202)	0.372* (0.209)	0.418** (0.201)	0.256 (0.203)	0.409* (0.231)
Ln Terror	-0.246*** (0.0700)	-0.247*** (0.0700)	-0.244*** (0.0675)	-0.266*** (0.0742)	-0.271*** (0.0698)	-0.271*** (0.0705)	0.0715 (0.0801)	-0.190** (0.0922)
UN Shaming								-3.544*** (1.254)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0388 (0.0512)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			-0.0332 (0.0839)					
Ln Exports x SV				0.0497* (0.0284)				
Exec Const x SV					0.790*** (0.0922)			
State Capacity x SV						0.679*** (0.0706)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.326*** (0.0476)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.280 (0.826)
High Dissent	-0.0729 (0.134)	-0.0720 (0.134)	-0.0715 (0.133)	-0.0991 (0.137)	-0.134 (0.134)	-0.124 (0.134)	-0.0895 (0.134)	0.0754 (0.188)
Ln GDP	-2.213*** (0.187)	-2.213*** (0.187)	-2.211*** (0.187)	-2.229*** (0.190)	-2.191*** (0.187)	-2.155*** (0.187)	-2.215*** (0.186)	-2.222*** (0.220)
Ln Population	1.759*** (0.179)	1.759*** (0.179)	1.757*** (0.180)	1.756*** (0.179)	1.745*** (0.179)	1.635*** (0.176)	1.760*** (0.179)	1.551*** (0.204)
Conflict	-0.517*** (0.125)	-0.518*** (0.125)	-0.517*** (0.125)	-0.500*** (0.126)	-0.541*** (0.129)	-0.350*** (0.128)	-0.299*** (0.111)	-0.696*** (0.148)
Aid Concentration	-0.829 (0.594)	-0.831 (0.596)	-0.849 (0.598)	-0.946* (0.571)	-1.027* (0.603)	-1.230** (0.615)	-0.745 (0.589)	-2.299*** (0.619)
Statist Donor	3.193*** (1.173)	3.193*** (1.171)	3.196*** (1.172)	3.216*** (1.169)	3.217*** (1.168)	3.235*** (1.167)	3.174*** (1.173)	3.889*** (1.387)
Constant	-6.323*** (0.821)	-6.322*** (0.820)	-6.320*** (0.821)	-6.344*** (0.820)	-6.236*** (0.811)	-6.164*** (0.807)	-6.041*** (0.824)	-6.667*** (1.027)
Sigma	4.466*** (0.248)	4.466*** (0.248)	4.466*** (0.248)	4.463*** (0.248)	4.448*** (0.248)	4.436*** (0.248)	4.455*** (0.247)	4.368*** (0.271)
Observations	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	26,210

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table A.8: Governance aid DV with recipient outliers omitted

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence (SV)	0.311*** (0.0676)	0.314*** (0.0686)	0.318*** (0.0713)	0.333*** (0.0640)	0.270*** (0.0662)	0.332*** (0.0670)	0.118* (0.0701)	0.499*** (0.0976)
Donor Rights	0.319 (0.393)	0.296 (0.391)	0.319 (0.394)	0.313 (0.394)	0.318 (0.393)	0.318 (0.393)	0.317 (0.391)	0.520 (0.481)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.934*** (0.171)	-0.935*** (0.171)	-0.919*** (0.167)	-0.918*** (0.170)	-0.964*** (0.172)	-0.941*** (0.171)	-0.876*** (0.170)	-0.858*** (0.192)
Ln Exports	0.772*** (0.115)	0.770*** (0.115)	0.770*** (0.115)	0.767*** (0.115)	0.761*** (0.116)	0.760*** (0.115)	0.757*** (0.114)	0.756*** (0.136)
Exec Const	0.662*** (0.135)	0.665*** (0.136)	0.663*** (0.135)	0.675*** (0.135)	0.567*** (0.135)	0.675*** (0.134)	0.799*** (0.135)	0.870*** (0.153)
State Capacity	-0.375** (0.164)	-0.376** (0.164)	-0.368** (0.168)	-0.381** (0.165)	-0.318* (0.167)	-0.294* (0.161)	-0.408** (0.165)	-0.207 (0.185)
Ln Terror	-0.0413 (0.0545)	-0.0438 (0.0549)	-0.0457 (0.0528)	-0.0246 (0.0545)	-0.0602 (0.0547)	-0.0585 (0.0550)	0.399*** (0.0617)	0.0441 (0.0626)
UN Shaming								-2.374*** (0.606)
Donor Rights x SV		0.134* (0.0771)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.0964 (0.0732)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0392** (0.0159)				
Exec Const x SV					0.534*** (0.0755)			
State Capacity x SV						0.430*** (0.0418)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.447*** (0.0382)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.887*** (0.392)
High Dissent	0.247** (0.107)	0.250** (0.106)	0.241** (0.104)	0.270** (0.105)	0.211** (0.106)	0.211** (0.107)	0.216** (0.105)	0.301** (0.127)
Ln GDP	-1.657*** (0.129)	-1.655*** (0.129)	-1.663*** (0.129)	-1.644*** (0.130)	-1.641*** (0.130)	-1.623*** (0.130)	-1.657*** (0.129)	-1.592*** (0.142)
Ln Population	0.892*** (0.126)	0.890*** (0.126)	0.898*** (0.126)	0.893*** (0.127)	0.878*** (0.125)	0.815*** (0.124)	0.888*** (0.126)	0.617*** (0.137)
Conflict	-0.0623 (0.127)	-0.0678 (0.126)	-0.0641 (0.128)	-0.0810 (0.126)	-0.0632 (0.129)	0.0536 (0.126)	0.205 (0.132)	-0.212 (0.169)
Aid Concentration	-1.974*** (0.511)	-1.980*** (0.511)	-1.913*** (0.515)	-1.878*** (0.494)	-2.125*** (0.519)	-2.251*** (0.525)	-1.837*** (0.504)	-3.346*** (0.570)
Statist Donor	1.565*** (0.580)	1.566*** (0.575)	1.557*** (0.578)	1.545*** (0.580)	1.574*** (0.579)	1.583*** (0.578)	1.542*** (0.578)	1.537** (0.754)
Constant	-4.931*** (0.553)	-4.931*** (0.547)	-4.937*** (0.556)	-4.914*** (0.551)	-4.872*** (0.551)	-4.830*** (0.553)	-4.538*** (0.545)	-4.564*** (0.665)
Sigma	3.611*** (0.171)	3.610*** (0.170)	3.610*** (0.171)	3.611*** (0.171)	3.599*** (0.172)	3.594*** (0.172)	3.583*** (0.170)	3.520*** (0.183)
Observations	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	26,210

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

A.5.4 Ordinary Least Squares

Table A.9: Economic aid DV with OLS estimator

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence (SV)	-0.0168 (0.0354)	-0.0168 (0.0350)	-0.0155 (0.0352)	-0.0113 (0.0380)	-0.0473 (0.0336)	-0.000171 (0.0347)	-0.0352 (0.0324)	0.0219 (0.0344)
Donor Rights	0.0493 (0.223)	0.0507 (0.223)	0.0493 (0.223)	0.0499 (0.222)	0.0496 (0.222)	0.0491 (0.223)	0.0492 (0.223)	0.249 (0.276)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.0906 (0.0969)	-0.0903 (0.0969)	-0.0889 (0.0944)	-0.0951 (0.0955)	-0.0920 (0.0973)	-0.0898 (0.0970)	-0.0844 (0.0955)	-0.107 (0.102)
Ln Exports	0.259*** (0.0467)	0.260*** (0.0468)	0.259*** (0.0469)	0.262*** (0.0482)	0.256*** (0.0467)	0.258*** (0.0467)	0.258*** (0.0468)	0.252*** (0.0554)
Exec Const	0.356*** (0.0490)	0.356*** (0.0489)	0.356*** (0.0490)	0.353*** (0.0481)	0.334*** (0.0481)	0.365*** (0.0488)	0.370*** (0.0512)	0.383*** (0.0552)
State Capacity	-0.0113 (0.0694)	-0.0109 (0.0694)	-0.00973 (0.0696)	-0.00858 (0.0704)	-0.00314 (0.0708)	0.0171 (0.0707)	-0.0199 (0.0692)	0.0616 (0.0815)
Ln Terror	-0.0185 (0.0215)	-0.0182 (0.0216)	-0.0189 (0.0207)	-0.0215 (0.0231)	-0.0244 (0.0213)	-0.0192 (0.0215)	0.0218 (0.0295)	-0.0621* (0.0304)
UN Shaming								-0.638*** (0.190)
Donor Rights x SV		-0.0206 (0.0272)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.0126 (0.0390)					
Ln Exports x SV				0.00580 (0.00675)				
Exec Const x SV					0.193*** (0.0486)			
State Capacity x SV						0.143*** (0.0277)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.0357* (0.0174)	
UN Shaming x SV								0.157 (0.124)
High Dissent	-0.0853* (0.0461)	-0.0856* (0.0462)	-0.0866* (0.0449)	-0.0915* (0.0494)	-0.0820* (0.0460)	-0.0981** (0.0466)	-0.0855* (0.0461)	-0.0629 (0.0538)
Ln GDP	-0.589*** (0.0880)	-0.590*** (0.0881)	-0.590*** (0.0882)	-0.591*** (0.0889)	-0.588*** (0.0878)	-0.574*** (0.0866)	-0.589*** (0.0880)	-0.614*** (0.104)
Ln Population	0.443*** (0.0792)	0.443*** (0.0792)	0.444*** (0.0795)	0.443*** (0.0789)	0.439*** (0.0783)	0.407*** (0.0764)	0.440*** (0.0786)	0.424*** (0.0881)
Conflict	-0.189*** (0.0591)	-0.189*** (0.0590)	-0.192*** (0.0620)	-0.188*** (0.0589)	-0.159*** (0.0537)	-0.131** (0.0576)	-0.163*** (0.0505)	-0.242*** (0.0692)
Aid Concentration	-0.142 (0.176)	-0.142 (0.177)	-0.134 (0.175)	-0.161 (0.169)	-0.186 (0.178)	-0.260 (0.170)	-0.135 (0.175)	-0.585*** (0.185)
Statist Donor	0.131 (0.336)	0.133 (0.336)	0.131 (0.336)	0.130 (0.336)	0.136 (0.336)	0.133 (0.336)	0.132 (0.336)	0.526 (0.442)
Constant	0.811*** (0.255)	0.809*** (0.255)	0.809*** (0.255)	0.809*** (0.254)	0.834*** (0.253)	0.850*** (0.253)	0.841*** (0.257)	0.467 (0.296)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113
R-squared	0.328	0.328	0.328	0.328	0.330	0.330	0.328	0.345

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

OLS model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table A.10: Governance aid DV with OLS estimator

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence (SV)	0.133** (0.0487)	0.133** (0.0486)	0.145*** (0.0474)	0.114** (0.0515)	0.108** (0.0431)	0.141*** (0.0478)	0.0773* (0.0428)	0.171*** (0.0423)
Donor Rights	0.135 (0.141)	0.132 (0.139)	0.135 (0.141)	0.133 (0.141)	0.135 (0.141)	0.135 (0.141)	0.135 (0.141)	0.179 (0.171)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.315*** (0.0906)	-0.316*** (0.0905)	-0.300*** (0.0883)	-0.299*** (0.0904)	-0.316*** (0.0912)	-0.315*** (0.0907)	-0.296*** (0.0882)	-0.255** (0.0997)
Ln Exports	0.258*** (0.0456)	0.258*** (0.0455)	0.257*** (0.0459)	0.251*** (0.0443)	0.256*** (0.0458)	0.258*** (0.0455)	0.255*** (0.0457)	0.245*** (0.0527)
Exec Const	0.324*** (0.0543)	0.325*** (0.0545)	0.323*** (0.0547)	0.335*** (0.0557)	0.306*** (0.0547)	0.328*** (0.0543)	0.367*** (0.0550)	0.385*** (0.0620)
State Capacity	-0.252*** (0.0674)	-0.253*** (0.0671)	-0.238*** (0.0684)	-0.261*** (0.0679)	-0.245*** (0.0677)	-0.239*** (0.0647)	-0.278*** (0.0680)	-0.145* (0.0738)
Ln Terror	0.0600** (0.0230)	0.0593** (0.0231)	0.0567** (0.0221)	0.0703*** (0.0235)	0.0551** (0.0230)	0.0597** (0.0230)	0.182*** (0.0335)	0.00729 (0.0268)
UN Shaming								-0.683*** (0.127)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0438 (0.0566)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.116** (0.0511)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0203** (0.00779)				
Exec Const x SV					0.162*** (0.0492)			
State Capacity x SV						0.0634*** (0.0203)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.108*** (0.0205)	
UN Shaming x SV								0.441*** (0.104)
High Dissent	0.0754* (0.0421)	0.0760* (0.0419)	0.0637 (0.0396)	0.0974** (0.0420)	0.0782* (0.0422)	0.0697 (0.0421)	0.0747* (0.0421)	0.120** (0.0550)
Ln GDP	-0.605*** (0.0730)	-0.604*** (0.0730)	-0.614*** (0.0735)	-0.598*** (0.0718)	-0.603*** (0.0729)	-0.598*** (0.0725)	-0.603*** (0.0731)	-0.577*** (0.0814)
Ln Population	0.254*** (0.0505)	0.254*** (0.0505)	0.264*** (0.0505)	0.256*** (0.0510)	0.250*** (0.0498)	0.238*** (0.0509)	0.243*** (0.0495)	0.171*** (0.0588)
Conflict	0.0374 (0.0551)	0.0370 (0.0550)	0.0176 (0.0590)	0.0340 (0.0551)	0.0626 (0.0503)	0.0632 (0.0556)	0.118** (0.0523)	0.0192 (0.0709)
Aid Concentration	-0.770*** (0.219)	-0.771*** (0.220)	-0.698*** (0.224)	-0.703*** (0.211)	-0.807*** (0.227)	-0.823*** (0.216)	-0.748*** (0.218)	-1.188*** (0.250)
Statist Donor	0.0647 (0.223)	0.0605 (0.222)	0.0646 (0.224)	0.0672 (0.223)	0.0686 (0.223)	0.0653 (0.223)	0.0665 (0.223)	0.166 (0.276)
Constant	0.504** (0.194)	0.509** (0.194)	0.488** (0.197)	0.509** (0.194)	0.524** (0.192)	0.522** (0.196)	0.596*** (0.190)	0.433** (0.201)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113
R-squared	0.348	0.348	0.349	0.349	0.349	0.348	0.350	0.367

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

OLS model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

A.5.5 Variations of donor, region, and recipient fixed effects

Fixed effects control for any time-invariant attributes of an individual unit. The problem with fixed effects is that they can control away important information about differences between units for variables that do not change over time or change slowly or rarely (Beck and Katz (2001); Beck (2001); Bell and Jones (2015); Plümper and Troeger (2007)). In these cases, fixed effects filter out the between-unit effects of important explanatory variables. The benefit of fixed effects is that they can eliminate omitted variable bias that is caused by unobserved time-invariant confounds.

All models in the manuscript include donor and year fixed effects (except for models 2 and 10, which investigate donor rights as a moderator and prioritize between-donor comparisons). Including donor fixed effects focuses on within-donor changes by controlling for unobserved sources of between-donor heterogeneity. Leaving recipient fixed effects out of these models prioritizes capturing how differences between recipients drive donor strategy.

As shown in time series plots below, some of the theoretically-important recipient attributes investigated in this study are time-invariant within several recipient states and are slowly-changing in others. Throughout, differences between recipients tend to be much stronger than differences within. That being said, an important element of development research is understanding how changes *within* recipient countries affect outcomes. Including recipient fixed effects shifts the focus to within-recipient variation and assuages concerns that omitted vari-

ables are driving results.

Nielsen (2013) offers a middle ground between including and not including recipient fixed effects by including region fixed effects. This controls for region-specific attributes, capturing some potential sources of omitted variable bias, while allowing for variation between recipients.

I present robustness checks with region-year fixed effects, recipient-year fixed effects, donor-region-year fixed effects, and donor-recipient-year fixed effects below. The core results are consistent: coercive strategy is highly condition and catalytic strategy is positive and significant across models. There is some variation in the interaction: Exec Const are consistent throughout, and the results for state capacity and terrorist event moderators are consistent with donor and region fixed effects, but fall out of significance for the governance DV when recipient fixed effects are included.

Figure A.5: Time series comparison of donor rights



Figure A.6: Time series comparison of recipient state violence



Figure A.7: Time series comparison of recipient executive constraints




Figure A.8: Time series comparison of recipient state capacity





Figure A.9: Time series comparison of recipient In terrorism events



A.5.5.1 Region Fixed Effects

Table A.11: Economic aid DV with region-year fixed effects

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence	0.178** (0.0697)	0.182** (0.0714)	0.179** (0.0714)	0.170** (0.0682)	0.0808 (0.0693)	0.219*** (0.0712)	0.0595 (0.0739)	0.209** (0.0933)
Donor Rights	0.557 (0.639)	0.555 (0.638)	0.560 (0.639)	0.557 (0.639)	0.560 (0.639)	0.565 (0.640)	0.565 (0.640)	0.715 (0.605)
Ideal Pt Dist	1.211** (0.591)	1.210** (0.591)	1.222** (0.589)	1.196** (0.594)	1.238** (0.590)	1.251** (0.592)	1.250** (0.596)	1.215* (0.672)
Ln Exports	1.655*** (0.164)	1.655*** (0.164)	1.654*** (0.164)	1.658*** (0.166)	1.647*** (0.165)	1.646*** (0.164)	1.650*** (0.164)	1.698*** (0.159)
Exec Const	1.688*** (0.267)	1.688*** (0.267)	1.695*** (0.266)	1.670*** (0.272)	1.565*** (0.264)	1.702*** (0.266)	1.779*** (0.281)	1.651*** (0.291)
State Capacity	-0.0807 (0.179)	-0.0816 (0.178)	-0.0873 (0.178)	-0.0560 (0.181)	-0.0327 (0.183)	-0.00885 (0.177)	-0.147 (0.178)	0.250 (0.197)
Ln Terror	-0.125*** (0.0370)	-0.125*** (0.0371)	-0.124*** (0.0369)	-0.139*** (0.0374)	-0.135*** (0.0382)	-0.124*** (0.0365)	0.140** (0.0547)	-0.267*** (0.0516)
UN Shaming								-4.295*** (1.096)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0381 (0.0741)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			-0.0831 (0.0949)					
Ln Exports x SV				0.0363 (0.0261)				
Exec Const x SV					0.629*** (0.0992)			
State Capacity x SV						0.425*** (0.0668)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.237*** (0.0550)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.273 (0.943)
High Dissent	-0.373*** (0.111)	-0.373*** (0.111)	-0.370*** (0.111)	-0.402*** (0.118)	-0.364*** (0.112)	-0.403*** (0.111)	-0.379*** (0.111)	-0.178 (0.171)
Ln GDP	-2.981*** (0.214)	-2.981*** (0.214)	-2.974*** (0.213)	-3.001*** (0.218)	-2.969*** (0.212)	-2.928*** (0.212)	-2.978*** (0.214)	-3.005*** (0.216)
Ln Population	1.778*** (0.200)	1.778*** (0.200)	1.772*** (0.199)	1.788*** (0.198)	1.751*** (0.195)	1.674*** (0.195)	1.756*** (0.198)	1.556*** (0.214)
Conflict	-0.620*** (0.127)	-0.622*** (0.126)	-0.614*** (0.128)	-0.616*** (0.126)	-0.550*** (0.126)	-0.482*** (0.121)	-0.437*** (0.110)	-0.657*** (0.162)
Aid Concentration	-0.564 (0.525)	-0.564 (0.525)	-0.609 (0.535)	-0.642 (0.500)	-0.688 (0.527)	-0.826 (0.536)	-0.514 (0.519)	-1.966*** (0.585)
Statist Donor	1.350 (0.917)	1.351 (0.917)	1.355 (0.917)	1.335 (0.913)	1.374 (0.919)	1.377 (0.918)	1.373 (0.917)	1.603* (0.878)
Constant	-4.748*** (0.946)	-4.745*** (0.947)	-4.727*** (0.943)	-4.760*** (0.948)	-4.663*** (0.943)	-4.710*** (0.946)	-4.702*** (0.943)	-4.671*** (1.086)
Sigma	5.133*** (0.212)	5.133*** (0.212)	5.133*** (0.212)	5.132*** (0.213)	5.123*** (0.212)	5.123*** (0.212)	5.129*** (0.211)	4.935*** (0.245)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with region and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table A.12: Governance aid DV with region-year fixed effects

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.617*** (0.0873)	0.622*** (0.0840)	0.616*** (0.0869)	0.615*** (0.0851)	0.575*** (0.0851)	0.635*** (0.0877)	0.451*** (0.0857)	0.647*** (0.0973)
Donor Rights	0.808* (0.482)	0.792* (0.478)	0.808* (0.483)	0.810* (0.482)	0.810* (0.482)	0.810* (0.482)	0.819* (0.481)	0.886* (0.463)
Ideal Pt Dist	1.186** (0.530)	1.181** (0.531)	1.181** (0.529)	1.201** (0.528)	1.205** (0.532)	1.198** (0.532)	1.242** (0.529)	1.129* (0.649)
Ln Exports	1.290*** (0.130)	1.288*** (0.130)	1.290*** (0.130)	1.288*** (0.131)	1.285*** (0.131)	1.287*** (0.130)	1.283*** (0.130)	1.363*** (0.132)
Exec Const	1.391*** (0.191)	1.390*** (0.191)	1.388*** (0.190)	1.411*** (0.189)	1.325*** (0.187)	1.399*** (0.191)	1.534*** (0.197)	1.276*** (0.210)
State Capacity	-0.636*** (0.141)	-0.634*** (0.142)	-0.633*** (0.142)	-0.661*** (0.145)	-0.613*** (0.142)	-0.620*** (0.139)	-0.746*** (0.142)	-0.250 (0.159)
Ln Terror	-0.0168 (0.0301)	-0.0191 (0.0298)	-0.0166 (0.0301)	-0.00152 (0.0341)	-0.0256 (0.0316)	-0.0163 (0.0300)	0.379*** (0.0431)	-0.112*** (0.0389)
UN Shaming								-3.488*** (0.602)
Donor Rights x SV		0.152* (0.0879)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.0275 (0.0640)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0406** (0.0193)				
Exec Const x SV					0.320*** (0.0925)			
State Capacity x SV						0.138** (0.0565)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.343*** (0.0353)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.939*** (0.378)
High Dissent	-0.0141 (0.0857)	-0.0138 (0.0852)	-0.0155 (0.0865)	0.0180 (0.0848)	-0.00447 (0.0854)	-0.0236 (0.0857)	-0.0281 (0.0843)	0.0584 (0.106)
Ln GDP	-2.560*** (0.171)	-2.561*** (0.171)	-2.562*** (0.171)	-2.537*** (0.175)	-2.557*** (0.171)	-2.543*** (0.173)	-2.551*** (0.172)	-2.520*** (0.167)
Ln Population	1.097*** (0.158)	1.099*** (0.158)	1.099*** (0.157)	1.085*** (0.157)	1.085*** (0.156)	1.062*** (0.157)	1.057*** (0.157)	0.851*** (0.171)
Conflict	0.111 (0.151)	0.103 (0.150)	0.108 (0.151)	0.0994 (0.150)	0.159 (0.143)	0.160 (0.142)	0.354** (0.143)	0.0947 (0.182)
Aid Concentration	-1.447*** (0.448)	-1.448*** (0.446)	-1.432*** (0.453)	-1.360*** (0.441)	-1.511*** (0.449)	-1.540*** (0.446)	-1.372*** (0.444)	-2.684*** (0.503)
Statist Donor	-0.488 (0.718)	-0.484 (0.718)	-0.490 (0.718)	-0.474 (0.720)	-0.473 (0.719)	-0.479 (0.718)	-0.458 (0.718)	-0.496 (0.726)
Constant	-2.486*** (0.817)	-2.476*** (0.818)	-2.490*** (0.817)	-2.472*** (0.819)	-2.461*** (0.817)	-2.472*** (0.819)	-2.419*** (0.816)	-3.267*** (0.886)
Sigma	4.122*** (0.204)	4.120*** (0.203)	4.122*** (0.204)	4.121*** (0.204)	4.118*** (0.205)	4.121*** (0.204)	4.107*** (0.203)	4.094*** (0.219)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with region and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

A.5.5.2 Recipient fixed effects

Table A.13: Economic aid DV with recipient-year fixed effects

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence (SV)	0.0332 (0.0872)	0.0476 (0.0888)	0.0179 (0.0930)	-0.0120 (0.0973)	0.0303 (0.0887)	0.152 (0.109)	0.0227 (0.0869)	-0.0563 (0.143)
Donor Rights	0.593 (0.659)	0.572 (0.657)	0.592 (0.659)	0.593 (0.659)	0.595 (0.659)	0.600 (0.661)	0.593 (0.659)	0.860 (0.661)
Ideal Pt Dist	1.377 (0.876)	1.378 (0.876)	1.347 (0.892)	1.354 (0.876)	1.385 (0.877)	1.395 (0.879)	1.379 (0.876)	1.740* (0.955)
Ln Exports	1.738*** (0.171)	1.738*** (0.171)	1.737*** (0.171)	1.728*** (0.169)	1.736*** (0.171)	1.736*** (0.171)	1.738*** (0.171)	1.756*** (0.177)
Exec Const	1.597*** (0.423)	1.595*** (0.423)	1.591*** (0.427)	1.587*** (0.422)	1.398*** (0.408)	1.655*** (0.432)	1.581*** (0.420)	1.168** (0.585)
State Capacity	-0.0758 (0.218)	-0.0766 (0.218)	-0.0877 (0.214)	-0.0779 (0.216)	-0.103 (0.220)	-0.259 (0.256)	-0.0732 (0.217)	-0.394 (0.295)
Ln Terror	0.0696* (0.0370)	0.0684* (0.0369)	0.0714* (0.0369)	0.0621 (0.0388)	0.0590* (0.0354)	0.0740* (0.0380)	0.130** (0.0565)	-0.0469 (0.0472)
UN Shaming								-3.152*** (0.996)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0701 (0.0687)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.0983 (0.111)					
Ln Exports x SV				0.0738* (0.0408)				
Exec Const x SV					0.467*** (0.146)			
State Capacity x SV						0.592*** (0.200)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.0568* (0.0324)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.290** (0.501)
High Dissent	-0.192* (0.106)	-0.191* (0.105)	-0.191* (0.105)	-0.192* (0.106)	-0.191* (0.106)	-0.165 (0.111)	-0.195* (0.105)	-0.115 (0.128)
Ln GDP	-3.058*** (0.875)	-3.054*** (0.874)	-3.052*** (0.876)	-3.069*** (0.876)	-3.020*** (0.872)	-3.002*** (0.864)	-3.081*** (0.879)	-2.121** (0.944)
Ln Population	-4.127*** (1.147)	-4.154*** (1.152)	-4.139*** (1.150)	-4.170*** (1.152)	-4.138*** (1.156)	-4.435*** (1.153)	-4.049*** (1.145)	-3.095 (1.971)
Conflict	-0.222 (0.143)	-0.224 (0.143)	-0.224 (0.142)	-0.237* (0.140)	-0.255* (0.149)	-0.204 (0.137)	-0.177 (0.133)	-0.373** (0.185)
Aid Concentration	0.862*** (0.298)	0.866*** (0.298)	0.860*** (0.299)	0.869*** (0.298)	0.818*** (0.295)	0.892*** (0.301)	0.865*** (0.297)	0.283 (0.415)
Statist Donor	1.343 (0.914)	1.346 (0.914)	1.341 (0.913)	1.317 (0.911)	1.349 (0.915)	1.352 (0.914)	1.344 (0.914)	1.757** (0.886)
Constant	11.74*** (4.096)	11.80*** (4.105)	11.86*** (4.103)	11.55*** (4.086)	11.63*** (4.118)	11.76*** (4.103)	11.63*** (4.069)	6.439 (5.688)
Sigma	4.803*** (0.208)	4.803*** (0.209)	4.802*** (0.209)	4.801*** (0.210)	4.802*** (0.208)	4.800*** (0.209)	4.802*** (0.208)	4.589*** (0.235)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with recipient and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table A.14: Governance aid DV with recipient-year fixed effects

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.330*** (0.0872)	0.355*** (0.0918)	0.343*** (0.0921)	0.329*** (0.0862)	0.330*** (0.0868)	0.348*** (0.0889)	0.327*** (0.0851)	0.249*** (0.0834)
Donor Rights	0.920* (0.484)	0.858* (0.481)	0.922* (0.485)	0.920* (0.484)	0.921* (0.484)	0.921* (0.485)	0.920* (0.484)	1.044** (0.487)
Ideal Pt Dist	1.667** (0.721)	1.665** (0.721)	1.696** (0.709)	1.666** (0.719)	1.672** (0.722)	1.669** (0.722)	1.668** (0.721)	1.822** (0.812)
Ln Exports	1.315*** (0.126)	1.312*** (0.126)	1.315*** (0.126)	1.313*** (0.124)	1.314*** (0.126)	1.314*** (0.126)	1.315*** (0.126)	1.365*** (0.139)
Exec Const	1.798*** (0.277)	1.791*** (0.278)	1.803*** (0.274)	1.796*** (0.275)	1.669*** (0.268)	1.807*** (0.279)	1.793*** (0.276)	0.919*** (0.286)
State Capacity	-0.690*** (0.217)	-0.689*** (0.217)	-0.678*** (0.216)	-0.690*** (0.217)	-0.701*** (0.218)	-0.717*** (0.229)	-0.690*** (0.217)	-1.025*** (0.274)
Ln Terror	0.110*** (0.0278)	0.107*** (0.0279)	0.108*** (0.0281)	0.109*** (0.0289)	0.104*** (0.0275)	0.111*** (0.0279)	0.130*** (0.0399)	0.0420 (0.0305)
UN Shaming								-1.780*** (0.676)
Donor Rights x SV		0.181** (0.0863)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV x SV			-0.0835 (0.133)					
Ln Exports x SV				0.00586 (0.0366)				
Exec Const x SV x SV					0.268*** (0.0789)			
State Capacity x SV						0.0800 (0.101)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.0187 (0.0218)	
UN Shaming x SV								0.515 (0.330)
High Dissent	0.106* (0.0634)	0.108* (0.0634)	0.105* (0.0636)	0.106* (0.0634)	0.107* (0.0634)	0.109* (0.0642)	0.106* (0.0634)	-0.00660 (0.0675)
Ln GDP	-2.497*** (0.541)	-2.476*** (0.541)	-2.502*** (0.542)	-2.498*** (0.542)	-2.483*** (0.541)	-2.494*** (0.539)	-2.505*** (0.543)	-1.544** (0.669)
Ln Population	-0.699 (0.812)	-0.782 (0.826)	-0.688 (0.810)	-0.701 (0.812)	-0.692 (0.815)	-0.731 (0.816)	-0.673 (0.806)	0.729 (0.961)
Conflict	0.134 (0.103)	0.132 (0.103)	0.135 (0.103)	0.134 (0.102)	0.116 (0.103)	0.138 (0.101)	0.147 (0.0999)	-0.195 (0.121)
Aid Concentration	0.192 (0.212)	0.201 (0.208)	0.192 (0.211)	0.193 (0.214)	0.161 (0.211)	0.195 (0.212)	0.194 (0.211)	0.00378 (0.281)
Statist Donor	-0.360 (0.755)	-0.351 (0.755)	-0.358 (0.754)	-0.362 (0.753)	-0.356 (0.755)	-0.359 (0.755)	-0.360 (0.755)	-0.272 (0.772)
Constant	4.786* (2.754)	4.917* (2.759)	4.683* (2.728)	4.771* (2.743)	4.726* (2.754)	4.778* (2.749)	4.751* (2.740)	-1.925 (3.484)
Sigma	3.738*** (0.196)	3.735*** (0.195)	3.739*** (0.196)	3.738*** (0.196)	3.738*** (0.196)	3.738*** (0.196)	3.738*** (0.196)	3.700*** (0.204)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with recipient and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

A.5.5.3 Donor-region-year fixed effects

Table A.15: Economic aid DV with donor-region-year fixed effects

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence	0.111 (0.0704)	0.112 (0.0706)	0.111 (0.0709)	0.117* (0.0705)	0.00214 (0.0684)	0.156** (0.0722)	0.00573 (0.0709)	0.122 (0.0903)
Donor Rights	0.390 (0.772)	0.388 (0.769)	0.390 (0.771)	0.389 (0.772)	0.390 (0.768)	0.390 (0.769)	0.390 (0.771)	0.918 (0.860)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.0311 (0.200)	-0.0312 (0.200)	-0.0258 (0.208)	-0.0256 (0.201)	0.00152 (0.202)	0.0284 (0.203)	0.0287 (0.202)	-0.562*** (0.196)
Ln Exports	1.181*** (0.182)	1.181*** (0.182)	1.181*** (0.182)	1.176*** (0.184)	1.172*** (0.183)	1.173*** (0.181)	1.180*** (0.181)	1.154*** (0.197)
Exec Const	1.330*** (0.168)	1.330*** (0.168)	1.333*** (0.168)	1.340*** (0.171)	1.200*** (0.162)	1.352*** (0.167)	1.417*** (0.174)	1.245*** (0.192)
State Capacity	0.0197 (0.184)	0.0192 (0.183)	0.0178 (0.183)	0.00559 (0.185)	0.0735 (0.189)	0.101 (0.184)	-0.0394 (0.183)	0.295 (0.203)
Ln Terror	-0.0776** (0.0366)	-0.0778** (0.0367)	-0.0775** (0.0363)	-0.0692* (0.0376)	-0.0870** (0.0377)	-0.0763** (0.0362)	0.156*** (0.0515)	-0.178*** (0.0433)
UN Shaming								-3.150*** (1.149)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0174 (0.0766)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			-0.0248 (0.0927)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0217 (0.0224)				
Exec Const x SV					0.675*** (0.106)			
State Capacity x SV						0.451*** (0.0659)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.210*** (0.0432)	
UN Shaming x SV								0.935 (0.909)
High Dissent	-0.304*** (0.107)	-0.304*** (0.107)	-0.304*** (0.107)	-0.285** (0.112)	-0.299*** (0.107)	-0.344*** (0.108)	-0.309*** (0.107)	-0.0364 (0.174)
Ln GDP	-2.540*** (0.239)	-2.540*** (0.239)	-2.539*** (0.238)	-2.525*** (0.242)	-2.525*** (0.237)	-2.484*** (0.236)	-2.540*** (0.239)	-2.465*** (0.251)
Ln Population	1.792*** (0.193)	1.792*** (0.193)	1.790*** (0.192)	1.786*** (0.193)	1.763*** (0.189)	1.679*** (0.189)	1.771*** (0.191)	1.568*** (0.201)
Conflict	-0.690*** (0.119)	-0.691*** (0.119)	-0.688*** (0.120)	-0.693*** (0.120)	-0.617*** (0.120)	-0.545*** (0.116)	-0.529*** (0.108)	-0.729*** (0.149)
Aid Concentration	-0.573 (0.500)	-0.573 (0.501)	-0.587 (0.512)	-0.524 (0.481)	-0.720 (0.503)	-0.873* (0.513)	-0.533 (0.495)	-2.048*** (0.608)
Statist Donor	2.309** (1.131)	2.307** (1.129)	2.308** (1.131)	2.314** (1.132)	2.299** (1.126)	2.297** (1.127)	2.299** (1.131)	3.611** (1.412)
Constant	-5.461*** (0.952)	-5.457*** (0.949)	-5.453*** (0.948)	-5.458*** (0.952)	-5.350*** (0.946)	-5.385*** (0.948)	-5.403*** (0.951)	-5.677*** (1.172)
Sigma	4.553*** (0.257)	4.553*** (0.257)	4.553*** (0.257)	4.553*** (0.257)	4.540*** (0.257)	4.541*** (0.257)	4.550*** (0.257)	4.377*** (0.275)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with donor, region, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table A.16: Governance aid DV with donor-region-year fixed effects

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.557*** (0.0877)	0.560*** (0.0815)	0.555*** (0.0882)	0.561*** (0.0812)	0.509*** (0.0847)	0.577*** (0.0881)	0.405*** (0.0868)	0.573*** (0.101)
Donor Rights	0.319 (0.396)	0.296 (0.393)	0.320 (0.396)	0.309 (0.398)	0.319 (0.395)	0.319 (0.395)	0.317 (0.395)	0.581 (0.479)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.234* (0.141)	-0.234* (0.141)	-0.258* (0.139)	-0.207 (0.141)	-0.206 (0.141)	-0.213 (0.140)	-0.147 (0.141)	-0.578*** (0.196)
Ln Exports	0.871*** (0.129)	0.869*** (0.129)	0.870*** (0.128)	0.851*** (0.127)	0.865*** (0.130)	0.868*** (0.129)	0.867*** (0.129)	0.883*** (0.156)
Exec Const	0.981*** (0.145)	0.981*** (0.145)	0.969*** (0.145)	1.026*** (0.145)	0.913*** (0.145)	0.993*** (0.145)	1.122*** (0.147)	0.861*** (0.154)
State Capacity	-0.548*** (0.152)	-0.547*** (0.153)	-0.539*** (0.153)	-0.603*** (0.155)	-0.522*** (0.154)	-0.528*** (0.151)	-0.648*** (0.151)	-0.226 (0.180)
Ln Terror	0.0279 (0.0250)	0.0260 (0.0248)	0.0286 (0.0249)	0.0651** (0.0265)	0.0191 (0.0266)	0.0286 (0.0248)	0.387*** (0.0384)	-0.0248 (0.0299)
UN Shaming								-2.415*** (0.583)
Donor Rights x SV		0.135 (0.0968)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.0952 (0.0649)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0963*** (0.0160)				
Exec Const x SV					0.348*** (0.0907)			
State Capacity x SV						0.153*** (0.0441)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.313*** (0.0298)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.635*** (0.347)
High Dissent	0.0792 (0.0872)	0.0803 (0.0867)	0.0747 (0.0875)	0.164* (0.0859)	0.0883 (0.0868)	0.0661 (0.0872)	0.0682 (0.0863)	0.232** (0.112)
Ln GDP	-2.150*** (0.178)	-2.150*** (0.177)	-2.157*** (0.178)	-2.083*** (0.172)	-2.146*** (0.178)	-2.131*** (0.179)	-2.145*** (0.178)	-2.019*** (0.182)
Ln Population	1.102*** (0.155)	1.103*** (0.155)	1.109*** (0.155)	1.074*** (0.154)	1.088*** (0.153)	1.063*** (0.154)	1.064*** (0.154)	0.837*** (0.169)
Conflict	0.117 (0.143)	0.110 (0.142)	0.109 (0.143)	0.0873 (0.140)	0.170 (0.136)	0.172 (0.138)	0.338** (0.141)	0.0802 (0.182)
Aid Concentration	-1.420*** (0.449)	-1.420*** (0.448)	-1.365*** (0.454)	-1.205*** (0.438)	-1.498*** (0.451)	-1.529*** (0.453)	-1.356*** (0.445)	-2.701*** (0.525)
Statist Donor	0.993* (0.558)	0.989* (0.554)	0.996* (0.559)	1.015* (0.559)	0.990* (0.558)	0.991* (0.558)	0.978* (0.557)	1.544** (0.757)
Constant	-4.314*** (0.553)	-4.302*** (0.545)	-4.333*** (0.555)	-4.310*** (0.549)	-4.276*** (0.553)	-4.288*** (0.552)	-4.230*** (0.550)	-4.759*** (0.684)
Sigma	3.626*** (0.165)	3.624*** (0.164)	3.624*** (0.166)	3.616*** (0.164)	3.620*** (0.167)	3.624*** (0.166)	3.611*** (0.165)	3.548*** (0.183)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with donor, region, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

A.5.5.4 Donor-recipient-year fixed effects

Table A.17: Economic aid DV with donor-recipient-year fixed effects

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence	-0.0934 (0.0786)	-0.0916 (0.0799)	-0.116 (0.0851)	-0.0806 (0.0774)	-0.0834 (0.0795)	-0.0350 (0.0836)	-0.0977 (0.0795)	-0.191 (0.136)
Donor Rights	0.375 (0.747)	0.370 (0.745)	0.375 (0.748)	0.372 (0.748)	0.373 (0.747)	0.373 (0.747)	0.375 (0.747)	0.923 (0.830)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.155 (0.207)	-0.154 (0.206)	-0.188 (0.201)	-0.159 (0.207)	-0.143 (0.207)	-0.142 (0.207)	-0.154 (0.207)	-0.233 (0.225)
Ln Exports	1.313*** (0.199)	1.313*** (0.199)	1.311*** (0.199)	1.302*** (0.200)	1.312*** (0.199)	1.313*** (0.199)	1.313*** (0.199)	1.314*** (0.218)
Exec Const	1.312*** (0.213)	1.311*** (0.214)	1.295*** (0.217)	1.314*** (0.213)	1.228*** (0.208)	1.336*** (0.215)	1.305*** (0.213)	0.623 (0.498)
State Capacity	-0.00185 (0.209)	-0.00237 (0.209)	-0.0249 (0.205)	0.00464 (0.211)	-0.0257 (0.209)	-0.0189 (0.212)	-5.10e-06 (0.208)	-0.310 (0.278)
Ln Terror	0.0374 (0.0249)	0.0369 (0.0249)	0.0407 (0.0250)	0.0415 (0.0260)	0.0285 (0.0238)	0.0401 (0.0254)	0.0573* (0.0339)	-0.0429 (0.0421)
UN Shaming								-2.652*** (0.898)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0343 (0.0728)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.161 (0.108)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0463 (0.0404)				
Exec Const x SV					0.422*** (0.129)			
State Capacity x SV						0.255* (0.132)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.0240 (0.0287)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.157** (0.493)
High Dissent	-0.245*** (0.0724)	-0.244*** (0.0725)	-0.243*** (0.0726)	-0.247*** (0.0723)	-0.242*** (0.0727)	-0.232*** (0.0751)	-0.247*** (0.0721)	-0.133 (0.127)
Ln GDP	-0.267 (0.484)	-0.275 (0.486)	-0.240 (0.486)	-0.235 (0.481)	-0.295 (0.484)	-0.353 (0.470)	-0.283 (0.482)	-0.462 (0.638)
Ln Population	-2.550* (1.316)	-2.573* (1.314)	-2.575* (1.316)	-2.496* (1.331)	-2.652** (1.309)	-2.817** (1.261)	-2.524* (1.319)	-4.297** (1.864)
Conflict	-0.0470 (0.0869)	-0.0489 (0.0859)	-0.0505 (0.0865)	-0.0340 (0.0867)	-0.0831 (0.0887)	-0.0483 (0.0871)	-0.0284 (0.0878)	-0.258* (0.151)
Aid Concentration	0.938*** (0.281)	0.939*** (0.282)	0.932*** (0.282)	0.939*** (0.282)	0.892*** (0.277)	0.940*** (0.283)	0.939*** (0.281)	0.262 (0.407)
Statist Donor	2.056* (1.096)	2.050* (1.093)	2.064* (1.097)	2.073* (1.098)	2.053* (1.096)	2.050* (1.095)	2.055* (1.096)	3.421** (1.366)
Constant	-4.888* (2.638)	-4.804* (2.632)	-4.765* (2.660)	-4.907* (2.646)	-4.601* (2.608)	-4.319* (2.490)	-4.884* (2.637)	-1.093 (3.688)
Sigma	4.186*** (0.247)	4.186*** (0.247)	4.184*** (0.247)	4.185*** (0.247)	4.185*** (0.247)	4.185*** (0.247)	4.186*** (0.247)	4.047*** (0.257)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with donor, recipient, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table A.18: Governance aid DV with donor-recipient-year fixed effects

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.267*** (0.0845)	0.265*** (0.0875)	0.265*** (0.0895)	0.270*** (0.0837)	0.275*** (0.0837)	0.263*** (0.0813)	0.265*** (0.0831)	0.120 (0.0846)
Donor Rights	0.295 (0.380)	0.263 (0.377)	0.295 (0.380)	0.286 (0.381)	0.294 (0.380)	0.295 (0.380)	0.295 (0.380)	0.564 (0.459)
Ideal Pt Dist	-0.253** (0.115)	-0.247** (0.113)	-0.257** (0.120)	-0.266** (0.115)	-0.242** (0.114)	-0.253** (0.116)	-0.252** (0.115)	-0.166 (0.158)
Ln Exports	0.962*** (0.137)	0.959*** (0.137)	0.962*** (0.137)	0.943*** (0.132)	0.961*** (0.137)	0.962*** (0.137)	0.962*** (0.137)	0.986*** (0.171)
Exec Const	1.362*** (0.143)	1.356*** (0.143)	1.360*** (0.142)	1.380*** (0.142)	1.288*** (0.138)	1.360*** (0.144)	1.359*** (0.142)	0.490** (0.193)
State Capacity	-0.405** (0.187)	-0.403** (0.187)	-0.407** (0.185)	-0.387** (0.187)	-0.413** (0.187)	-0.403** (0.189)	-0.404** (0.187)	-0.851*** (0.231)
Ln Terror	0.0828*** (0.0228)	0.0806*** (0.0227)	0.0832*** (0.0231)	0.0927*** (0.0232)	0.0767*** (0.0227)	0.0826*** (0.0226)	0.0919*** (0.0255)	0.0364 (0.0303)
UN Shaming								-1.544** (0.642)
Donor Rights x SV		0.156 (0.0966)						
Ideal Pt Dist x SV			0.0158 (0.114)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.102*** (0.0338)				
Exec Const x SV					0.290*** (0.0737)			
State Capacity x SV						-0.0157 (0.0776)		
Ln Terror x SV							-0.0107 (0.0189)	
UN Shaming x SV								0.490 (0.345)
High Dissent	0.0174 (0.0474)	0.0202 (0.0481)	0.0175 (0.0472)	0.0151 (0.0481)	0.0196 (0.0475)	0.0167 (0.0471)	0.0171 (0.0475)	-0.0505 (0.0742)
Ln GDP	-1.520*** (0.342)	-1.537*** (0.344)	-1.518*** (0.348)	-1.423*** (0.333)	-1.552*** (0.345)	-1.513*** (0.337)	-1.528*** (0.343)	-0.620* (0.355)
Ln Population	-0.583 (0.877)	-0.700 (0.887)	-0.586 (0.878)	-0.462 (0.889)	-0.635 (0.878)	-0.566 (0.868)	-0.573 (0.880)	-0.731 (1.422)
Conflict	0.262*** (0.0899)	0.256*** (0.0896)	0.261*** (0.0901)	0.283*** (0.0870)	0.238*** (0.0865)	0.261*** (0.0898)	0.269*** (0.0914)	-0.0717 (0.114)
Aid Concentration	0.344 (0.211)	0.349* (0.209)	0.344 (0.211)	0.340 (0.213)	0.306 (0.211)	0.344 (0.211)	0.345 (0.211)	-0.0187 (0.218)
Statist Donor	0.729 (0.543)	0.719 (0.539)	0.730 (0.543)	0.765 (0.544)	0.728 (0.543)	0.729 (0.543)	0.729 (0.543)	1.296* (0.722)
Constant	-3.176** (1.441)	-2.864* (1.475)	-3.163** (1.430)	-3.318** (1.455)	-2.968** (1.464)	-3.217** (1.414)	-3.168** (1.437)	-4.897** (2.435)
Sigma	3.216*** (0.156)	3.213*** (0.154)	3.216*** (0.156)	3.211*** (0.154)	3.215*** (0.156)	3.216*** (0.156)	3.216*** (0.156)	3.164*** (0.166)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tobit model with donor, recipient, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

A.6 Replication materials for chapter 3

Corwin, Hillary, 2023, "Replication Data for: "Coercive and Catalytic Strategies for Human Rights Promotion"", <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S9H0VI>, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:hxWDrk8kaT1S5LoTlek7cA== [fileUNF]

A.7 Difference-in-difference diagnostic tests

Difference-in-difference with multiple time periods

Outcome model : least squares

Treatment model: inverse probability

Control: Never Treated

Pretrend Test: H0 All Pre-treatment are equal to 0

Table A.19: Diagnostic tests and results for CS-DID

	Economic Aid Commitments			Governance Aid Commitments		
	All	Low SV	High SV	All	Low SV	High SV
Pretrend test						
Chi2	9.7432	6.8483	5.0195	15.4562	7.3916	2.5809
p-value	0.4633	0.7397	0.212	0.1163	0.688	0.9786
ATT						
Coefficient	0.0145	0.0832	-0.0934	0.0902	0.0645	0.2205
Std Error	(.0532)	(.0865)	(0.775)	(.0396)	(.0725)	(.0753)
p-value	0.786	0.336	0.212	0.023	0.373	0.003
Obs	17,278	9,766	7,477	17,278	9,766	7,477

A.8 Event study graphs for low and high state violence subgroups (economic aid DV)

Figure A.10: ATT of signing BRI agreement on OECD economic aid commitments to recipients with low state violence






Figure A.11: ATT of signing BRI agreement on OECD economic aid commitments to recipients with high state violence



Attempting to drop outliers beyond Afghanistan and Venezuela in the high state violence set resulted in those models failing the pretrend tests. Going back to the full dataset and extending the pre-treatment period allowed for a larger matching pool and passed pretrend tests. This allowed me to drop Afghanistan, Venezuela, and Iraq as recipients and to drop the United States as a donor. The results with these outliers removed are similar to the full models, which are reported in the manuscript. For this model, the p-value for the pretrend test was 0.5081, indicating that we can fail to reject the null hypothesis that all pre-treatment are equal to zero. Figure A.12 shows the event study plot. The pre-treatment

point estimates hover near zero. The ATT with these outliers removed is 0.0955 with a p-value of 0.025. The ATT of the full set is 0.0902 with a p-value of 0.023. Omitting these outliers did not significantly change the results.

Figure A.12: ATT of signing BRI agreement on OECD governance aid commitments to recipients. Donor and recipient outliers omitted: United States, Afghanistan, Venezuela, Iraq



A.9 Belt and Road Initiative agreement recipient-years

Belt and Road Initiative agreements, as reported by the Chinese government. <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/>

Table A.20: Year of BRI agreements

Country	Agreement Signed	State Violence	ODA Eligible
Belarus	2013	Low	Y
Moldova	2013	Low	Y
North Macedonia	2013	Low	Y
Afghanistan	2013	High	Y
Pakistan	2013	High	Y
Mongolia	2013	Low	Y
Cambodia	2013	High	Y
Thailand	2014	High	Y
Poland	2015	N/A	N
Czech Republic	2015	N/A	N
Slovakia	2015	N/A	N
Serbia	2015	Low	Y
Romania	2015	N/A	N
Bulgaria	2015	N/A	N
Turkey	2015	High	Y
Armenia	2015	Low	Y
Azerbaijan	2015	High	Y
Kazakhstan	2015	High	Y
Uzbekistan	2015	High	Y
Indonesia	2015	High	Y
Iraq	2015	High	Y
Somalia	2015	High	Y
Cameroon	2015	High	Y
South Africa	2015	High	Y
Latvia	2016	N/A	N
Georgia	2016	Low	Y
Myanmar	2016	High	Y
Papua New Guinea	2016	Low	Y
Egypt	2016	High	Y

Country	Agreement Signed	State Violence	ODA Eligible
Panama	2017	Low	Y
Russia	2017	N/A	N
Estonia	2017	N/A	N
Lithuania	2017	N/A	N
Ukraine	2017	High	Y
Slovenia	2017	N/A	N
Croatia	2017	Low	Y
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2017	Low	Y
Montenegro	2017	Low	Y
Albania	2017	Low	Y
Lebanon	2017	Low	Y
Nepal	2017	Low	Y
Sri Lanka	2017	High	Y
Malaysia	2017	Low	Y
Viet Nam	2017	High	Y
Philippines	2017	High	Y
New Zealand	2017	N/A	N
Yemen	2017	High	Y
Madagascar	2017	High	Y
Morocco	2017	Low	Y
Côte d'Ivoire	2017	High	Y
Kenya	2017	High	Y
Dominican Republic	2018	High	Y
Costa Rica	2018	Low	Y
El Salvador	2018	Low	Y
Venezuela	2018	High	Y
Guyana	2018	Low	Y
Suriname	2018	Low	Y
Ecuador	2018	Low	Y
Bolivia	2018	Low	Y
Chile	2018	Low	Y
Uruguay	2018	Low	Y
Portugal	2018	N/A	N
Austria	2018	N/A	N

Country	Agreement Signed	State Violence	ODA Eligible
Greece	2018	N/A	N
Iran	2018	High	Y
South Korea	2018	N/A	N
Laos	2018	Low	Y
Vanuatu	2018	Low	Y
Fiji	2018	Low	Y
United Arab Emirates	2018	N/A	N
Saudi Arabia	2018	Low	Y
Oman	2018	Low	Y
Algeria	2018	Low	Y
Tunisia	2018	Low	Y
Libya	2018	High	Y
Djibouti	2018	Low	Y
Mauritania	2018	Low	Y
Chad	2018	High	Y
Sudan	2018	High	Y
Ethiopia	2018	High	Y
South Sudan	2018	High	Y
Nigeria	2018	High	Y
Togo	2018	Low	Y
Ghana	2018	Low	Y
Sierra Leone	2018	Low	Y
Guinea	2018	Low	Y
Senegal	2018	Low	Y
Gabon	2018	Low	Y
Congo	2018	High	Y
Angola	2018	High	Y
Namibia	2018	Low	Y
Mozambique	2018	Low	Y

Country	Agreement Signed	State Violence	ODA Eligible
Zimbabwe	2018	High	Y
Zambia	2018	Low	Y
Tanzania	2018	Low	Y
Uganda	2018	High	Y
Samoa	2018	N/A	N
Cuba	2019	High	Y
Jamaica	2019	High	Y
Peru	2019	Low	Y
Italy	2019	N/A	N
Bangladesh	2019	High	Y
Solomon Islands	2019	Low	Y
Qatar	2019	N/A	N
Mali	2019	High	Y
Benin	2019	Low	Y
Liberia	2019	Low	Y
Equatorial Guinea	2019	Low	Y
Lesotho	2019	Low	Y
Eritrea	2021	High	Y
Central African Republic	2021	High	Y
Burkina Faso	2021	Low	Y
Guinea-Bissau	2021	Low	Y
DR Congo	2021	High	Y
Botswana	2021	Low	Y

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