

# Coercive and catalytic strategies for human rights promotion: State violence and foreign assistance

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## Abstract

There is tremendous variation in whether and how donors respond to severe human rights violations using foreign aid. Donors that respond choose between two strategic options: coercion, which uses aid and the threat of withdrawal as material leverage to influence recipient leaders’ behaviors, and catalysis, which uses aid for developing political systems in the recipient country to limit state violence from within. Once a donor decides to respond, what determines its strategic choices? I argue that two factors help to answer this question: how exposed the donor’s interests are to problems stemming from human rights violations, and how costly each strategy would be to the donor. I use Tobit models to estimate how donor interests moderate the relationship between state violence and aid to economic and governance sectors from all OECD donors to all eligible recipients from 2003-2018. I find that donors typically prioritize catalytic strategies during this time period, but substitute coercive strategies when political liberalization would be difficult to achieve or undesirable from the donor’s perspective.

**Keywords**— foreign aid, political economy, legal institutions, international linkages to development, human rights, state violence

# 1 Introduction

Donors have at least two strategic options for addressing state violence problems in aid recipient countries: donors can decrease aid that would benefit the leaders responsible for violence or increase aid to projects that could improve the domestic political environment for human rights. There is evidence that donors use both of these strategies. For example, when violence escalated in Ethiopia after the 2005 election, donors drastically decreased aid to economic sector projects and programs that would have benefited leaders or elites. In contrast, when violence escalated in Kenya after the 2007 presidential election, donors increased aid to governance sector projects that aimed to develop the rule of law and checks and balances in parliament. Unlike in the Ethiopian case, most donors chose not to punish Kenyan leaders and kept economic sector aid in place. In both cases, violence levels have remained high and donors' strategies have been consistent. When confronted with state violence problems in developing countries, why do donors sometimes choose to decrease aid that would benefit leaders and sometimes increase aid to change the domestic environment for human rights?<sup>1</sup>

To help answer this question, I examine how donors choose between coercive and catalytic strategies to promote human rights. Donors using coercive strategy manipulate aid to create a system of external rewards and punishments that incentivize compliance with human rights norms. Applicable types of aid to coercive strategy are the types that provide the strongest benefits to elites and leaders, either because the aid is highly fungible or because it broadly benefits members of society rather than the poorest members of society. In contrast, donors using catalytic strategy increase aid to projects that address underlying causes of human rights violations. This not only includes projects that directly target human rights improvements, but also projects that build democratic, legislative, and judicial institutional capacity to increase checks and balances over executives, projects that promote civilian control over law enforcement and military, projects that address sources of domestic conflict, and similar. To understand why donors choose one strategy over another, I examine how exposed donors' interests are to costs from human rights violations

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1. This article focuses on state violence, a set of human rights violations that includes extrajudicial killings, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances perpetrated by state actors against civilians. Throughout, "human rights" refers narrowly to the freedom from such violations and "abuses" or "violations" refer to these problems.

and how exposed donors' interests would be to the costs of their policy response. My argument is that donors choose between coercive and catalytic strategies to minimize their overall costs.

This article contributes to a long-standing debate about the relationship between foreign aid and human rights. A large set of extant literature is subsumed into each strategic category. Coercive strategy relates to research covering political conditionalities and coercive influence in international relations. Catalytic strategy relates to research on foreign aid for democracy assistance, capacity building, judicial reforms, civil society support, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding. Additionally, this article draws upon insights from the literature on the determinants of state violence. This article brings this diverse literature into dialogue and fills an important gap by evaluating how donors choose between strategies for promoting human rights.

Research related to coercive strategy investigates donors' willingness to reward respect for human rights by increasing aid and to punish violations by decreasing aid. Studies have found variously that donors provide less aid to countries that violate human rights (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe 1992; Apodaca and Stohl 1999), that donors provide more aid to countries that violate human rights (Carleton and Stohl 1985; Stohl and Lopez 1984), and no particularly strong relationship (Neumayer 2003a, 2003b). More recent research has helped to reconcile this debate by investigating aid disaggregations and conditional relationships between aid and human rights. There is evidence that donors cut aid to the economic sectors that benefit elites while leaving aid to other sectors that benefit vulnerable populations in place, but that donors tend to withhold less aid from violent recipients as the benefits of aid to the donor increase (Nielsen 2013; Esarey and DeMeritt 2017; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Long 2018).

This echoes broader scholarship on the political economy of foreign aid that argues donors use aid as material leverage to influence recipient leaders into making policy concessions (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2007; Morgenthau 1962). I characterize these donor behaviors as "coercive strategy," since the donor is using the promise of increased aid commitments and the threat or imposition of decreased aid to promote compliance with its demands in a manner that is consistent with economic coercion (Baldwin 1985). Coercion requires increases in aid to benefit and decreases in aid to hurt decision makers in the recipient country. As such, donors use highly fungible and broadly beneficial aid as leverage over leaders. This includes direct budget support, business devel-

opment and trade funds, and large infrastructure projects. This strategy is particularly vulnerable to problems of donor credibility: donors cannot credibly commit to decrease aid where it would harm their strategic interests to do so, resulting in donors failing to punish rights violations committed by recipients with close ties to the donor or those of high geopolitical importance (Nielsen 2013).

Previous research has identified several attributes of recipient countries that correlate with state violence levels: democracy (Conrad and Moore 2010; Davenport 1999, 2004, 2007; Poe et al. 1994), legal protections such as judicial autonomy, rule of law, and constitutions (Cross 1999; Davenport 1996; Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009); protest, dissent, and civil conflict (Bell and Murdie 2018; Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005; Davenport 2007). Hill and Jones (2014) investigate the ability of a large set of recipient attributes to predict state violence and find that the most powerful predictors are those related to conflict, dissent, judicial independence, and executive constraints. In addition to domestic constraints, there is a body of literature that investigates the role of “naming and shaming” campaigns by non-governmental and international organizations in constraining leaders and promoting international responses to violence (Dietrich and Murdie 2017; Esarey and DeMeritt 2017; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hendrix and Wong 2013; Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Meernik et al. 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012).

Research that focuses on coercive strategies alone overlooks developmental approaches for promoting human rights that began in the 1990s. This shift toward using aid to support democracy, human rights, good governance, and civil society projects created a strategic alternative to coercion. Instead of using aid for influence, donors use aid to target the underlying problems that contribute to state violence. I characterize this as “catalytic strategy,” as the donor is using aid to support changes to the domestic political environment for human rights in recipient countries. To this end, donors provide technical and material support to democratic and judicial institutions, promote civilian control over military and law enforcement, support civil society organizations, engage in conflict prevention and peacebuilding projects, and similar activities. By the early 2000s, this type of aid made up a substantial portion of donors’ aid portfolios.

Research related to catalytic strategy examines how donors use aid to address the domestic problems that contribute to state violence. There is evidence that using aid to support democratic

transitions decreases the risk of civil conflict and violent repression (Savun and Tirone 2011). Democracy aid can promote democratic consolidation and improve electoral systems (Dietrich and Wright 2015). Increasingly, donors are emphasising support for judicial autonomy, which can help recipients with weak state capacity to achieve reforms that would not have been possible without external help (Ariotti, Dietrich, and Wright 2021).

Catalytic strategy has different scope conditions and limitations than coercive strategy. Catalytic strategy relies more heavily on cooperative partnerships between donor and recipient states than coercive strategy (in which donors can unilaterally impose punishments). Although donors have made peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities, the ability of foreign aid to prevent or ease civil conflicts, violent protest, and terrorism remains unclear (Findley 2018). Donors use milder forms of democracy promotion toward more autocratic states where securing approval for more ambitious reforms would be difficult (Bush 2015). Leaders in recipient countries can impede the activities of the civil society organizations that often play instrumental roles in changing the domestic environment for human rights (Chaudhry 2022; DeMattee 2019). Recipient characteristics can limit the feasibility of catalytic strategy.

In sum, prior research suggests that coercive and catalytic strategies have different costs to donors and are applicable in different recipient contexts. By examining these strategies in isolation, the prior literature leaves an important question unanswered: Once a donor chooses to respond to state violence, what determines its strategic choices? In answering this question, this article contributes to the literature by examining donors' strategic choices under a single framework.

I use Tobit models to examine foreign aid commitments to economic and governance sectors from all OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donor countries to all eligible recipients from 2003-2018. I examine whether and how a series of variables moderate the relationship between state violence and aid to these sectors. I find evidence that donors prioritize catalytic strategy during the study period. Although there is not consistent, unconditional evidence that donors use coercive strategy, there is evidence that donors sometimes substitute coercive strategy in the place of catalytic strategy. Donors substitute coercive strategy where there are substantial barriers and high costs associated with reforms. Furthermore, donors substitute coercive strategy where state violence harms security interests, but

where political liberalization would be undesirable. Donors exhibit stronger catalytic responses when they have stronger interests in promoting human rights abroad and when barriers to political liberalization are lower. These results are consistent with donors responding to state violence according to their political, bureaucratic, and security interests.

The results demonstrate that donors strategically respond to human rights violations, and donors are more responsive than studies that investigate either catalytic or coercive strategy in isolation would suggest. This has implications for studying the efficacy of aid in addressing state violence, since heterogeneity in donor interests alters donors' responses. Furthermore, these findings have important implications for understanding what facilitates or impedes collective action between development practitioners: donors' interests drive variation between coercive and catalytic responses.

Section 2 presents a theoretical overview of coercive and catalytic strategies and my argument that after decades of emphasis on coercive strategy, donors' primary response to state violence has shifted to catalytic strategies. This does not mean that coercive strategy has become irrelevant. Donors substitute coercive strategy when their costs associated with political liberalization are highest. After defining and characterizing coercive and catalytic strategies, I examine the literature on aid, donor interests, and state violence to identify a set of theoretically-relevant variables that might plausibly shape coercive and catalytic strategies. Section 3 describes the data, estimators, and models used to test the theory. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 discusses and concludes.

## 2 Theory

A few of the most influential findings in the political economy of foreign aid literature are that donors prioritize their strategic, political, and economic interests over the policy performance of recipient countries when deciding where to send foreign aid, and donors pursue their interests abroad by exchanging foreign aid for policy concessions (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2007). However, donor interests are not necessarily separate from, or in opposition to, the development needs of recipient states. In an examination of development goals more broadly,

Bermeo (2018) argues that the relationship between donor interests and foreign aid has changed over time. The importance of geopolitical influence declined after the Cold War, and since the early 2000s donors have targeted development aid to limit negative spillovers. As globalization and transnational terrorism have left donor interests more exposed to problems stemming from instability and poverty in low-income countries, donors have adapted their foreign aid strategies to more genuinely address problems in recipient countries that harm their interests.

Research that has examined whether and how donor countries respond to human rights conditions in recipient countries using bilateral foreign assistance to date, has often examined donors' willingness to reward adequate human rights performance by increasing aid or to punish repressive recipient leaders by decreasing aid (Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Carleton and Stohl 1985; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Neumayer 2003a; Nielsen 2013; Poe 1992). A consistent finding is that donors prioritize their interests above human rights promotion when allocating aid.

This is puzzling, because, as Bermeo has demonstrated, donors' interests have become increasingly exposed to negative externalities from state violence. State violence intensifies conflicts and drives instability, creating negative externalities for donors. Public opinion in donor countries views close ties with violent regimes unfavorably (Heinrich and Kobayashi 2020) and the cycle of political violence between government and dissidents can increase the threat of terrorism (Karstedt-Henke 1980). Taking these factors into account, the targeted development theory would predict that stronger donor interests in aid recipient countries should drive stronger donor responses to state violence.

Why, then, have so many studies found that donor interests undermine human rights promotion? These studies focus on coercive strategies, and many examine earlier periods when most donor policies for responding to state violence centered on actions that would fall under coercive strategy. My argument is that in the post-2000 period donors typically prioritize catalytic strategy over coercive strategy, and donors substitute one for the other according to their interests.

In this section, I introduce a classification of foreign aid that distinguishes between coercive and catalytic strategy based on the underlying mechanisms through which donors intend to influence respect for human rights. First, I define catalytic and coercive strategies and discuss their origins, human rights mechanisms, and measurement. I then turn to how the vulnerability of donor interests

to negative externalities from state violence, foreign aid cuts, and the probability of project success shapes the relationship between state violence and donor strategy. I advance hypotheses relevant to these theoretical expectations and discuss the observable implications of the theory.

## 2.1 Defining and Measuring Coercive Strategy

Coercive strategy uses aid as a material inducement or punishment to influence the behaviors of another state. This includes using positive and negative conditionalities to influence respect for human rights in a potential aid recipient state. I adopt the Molenaers, Dellepiane, and Faust (2015, p. 2) definition of political conditionalities: “Political conditionality refers to the allocation and use of financial resources to sanction or reward recipients in order to promote democratic governance and human rights.” The decision to focus on coercive strategy rather than political conditionality, carrots and sticks, or rewards and sanctions is almost entirely semantic except that I am interested in the strategic behavior of donors and thus rely heavily on the theoretical insights from the literature on coercion.

Coercion is a tactic that senders use to influence targets’ behaviors by manipulating the target’s perceptions about the threat of future costs that the sender could impose if its demands are not met. The target must anticipate the imposition of costs and the target must be able to avoid the imposition of costs by accommodating the sender’s demands (Schelling 1966, 2). In economic coercion, a sender uses its economic power to influence the perceived costs and benefits to a target of a given behavior (Baldwin 1985, p. 38). When donors use aid commitments and the threat or imposition of withdrawal as material leverage to promote respect for human rights in a recipient country, the donor is engaging in coercive strategy.

There are legal rules and policy statements that guide donors to respond to state violence using coercive strategy. One prominent example is the 1971 amendment to the United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which reads:

No assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,



prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.<sup>2</sup>

This law requires policymakers to consider human rights when allocating aid, but also contains an escape clause that allows aid to continue despite abuses. The extent to which such continued support is intended to “directly benefit the needy people” in a country, or as window dressing to allow a donor to continue channeling aid to repressive but important recipients, is an open question (Schoultz 1981). The immediate inclusion of this exemption into the United States Foreign Assistance Act belies one of the most significant problems with coercive strategies for promoting human rights. If donors care about the victims of state violence, they also probably care about their broader well-being. Braaten (2017) sums up the difficulties that donors face when balancing coercive punishment strategies that harm recipient country leaders with attempts to limit collateral damage to the victims of human rights abuses: “there are two components of US foreign policy working at cross-purposes here. On one hand is the notion of promoting human rights and sanctioning governments, which violate those rights, and on the other hand is ensuring that needy people are not denied assistance, which can also play into the promotion of human rights” (p. 65). Major European donor countries, including the United Kingdom, have established human rights-based foreign aid policies, and there are several multilateral agreements that incorporate human rights provisions into foreign aid.<sup>3</sup> The majority of these policies include some form of political conditionalities.

Donors manipulate foreign aid that benefits the leaders of recipient states to generate both benefits for compliance with human rights norms and costs for non-compliance. To identify types of aid that are relevant to coercive strategy, I follow the logic in Nielsen (2013), which investigates selective economic sector aid withdrawal in response to state violence. This fits with coercive strategy, since donors manipulate the types of aid that benefit leaders if they are allocated and harms leaders if they are withheld.

Aid to economic sectors, large infrastructure projects, and direct budget support are all relatively-

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2. United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended (P.L. 87–195), Sec 116.

3. See OECD (2013) *Integrating Human Rights Into Development* 5-6 for a list of human rights and development policies.

fungible forms of development assistance that provide stronger benefits to leaders and elites. Direct budgetary support is exceptionally fungible, and other economic sector projects can supplant government spending when they are similar enough to projects that the government would have pursued anyway (Winters and Martinez 2015). These fungible aid types free up government funds to use in other areas and can provide benefits to recipient governments (Bermeo 2016).<sup>4</sup>

Table 1 lists project types related to coercive and catalytic strategy, and detailed OECD descriptions of these project and program designations are available in the appendix.

Table 1: OECD CRS sector categories related to coercive and catalytic strategies

Coercive strategy-relevant sectors	Catalytic strategy-relevant sectors
transportation	governance
storage	civil society
communications	conflict*
energy	peace*
banking	security*
financial	human rights
business	democratic participation
industry	legal and judicial development
mining	
construction	
trade	
tourism	
import support	
action relating to debt	
general budget support	

\* These categories *do not* include any projects that would directly increase the repressive capacity of law enforcement and military officers.

## 2.2 Defining and Measuring Catalytic Strategy

Donors use catalytic strategy to promote, enable, or speed up processes that would, if successful, improve the domestic environment for human rights in the recipient country. These projects aim to do so either by changing the target state’s institutions or altering relationships between the

4. Note that the categories that I code as “economic sector” projects in this study differ somewhat from the sets used in other research. For example, Dietrich (2021, p. 145) includes aid to food security, agricultural projects, and multi-sector projects in the economic sector. I do not. The reason for this coding decision is that cuts to food or agricultural projects are likely to do disproportionate harm to poor and food-insecure individuals in a target country, which would prevent donors from using this aid as strategic leverage over leaders. I exclude multi-sectoral projects due to their strategic ambiguity.

government and its citizens. For example, when donors use aid projects to improve domestic institutions linked to human rights accountability in recipient states, the donor is engaging in catalytic strategy. This includes support for good governance, civil society inclusion, peace processes, and judicial oversight. To the extent that higher levels of state violence increase the salience and urgency of governance problems to donors, we should expect donors to devote more governance aid to recipients with higher levels of state violence. Just as catalytic strategy is closely related to political conditionality, there is substantial overlap between catalytic strategy and literature on democracy promotion and capacity building. Because I am interested in donors' strategic attempts to facilitate changes in the domestic political environment for human rights of aid recipient countries, I use the term catalytic strategy.

Since the late 1990s, there have been several policy shifts that would move donors' human rights promotion strategies away from coercion and towards catalysis when possible. More recent policy prescriptions by working groups on human rights and development advise donors to cut off aid only as a last resort. For example, an OECD working group issued the following recommendation regarding human rights conditionality in foreign aid in 1997:

Development cooperation stresses positive measures for the promotion of participatory development and good governance. The withholding of assistance should be reserved for cases where persistent violations of men's, women's and children's basic rights are not being addressed by the government and *no adequate basis of shared values and interests exists to permit a real partnership*.<sup>5</sup>

This prioritizes supportive rather than punitive measures to combat state violence toward recipients that are receptive to donor influence and that have stronger shared interests with donors. The emphasized text prescribes using aid withdrawal only as a last resort where other efforts have either failed or have no reasonable expectation of success. The report provides a series of best practices for promoting respect for human rights using foreign aid. It recommends that donors prioritize policy dialogue, assistance to critical institutions with an emphasis on judicial systems, and support for civil society organizations linked to human rights.

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5. OECD. 1997. *Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance*: 3.

Catalytic strategy emerged as a component of broader democracy promotion efforts by powerful western countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 2000, the European Union (EU) and European member states signed the Cotonou Agreement with 79 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries.<sup>6</sup> The Cotonou Agreement contains elements of both coercive and catalytic strategy. Key elements of coercive strategy changed with the Cotonou Agreement. The Agreement marked a shift from EU donors using negative conditionality to promote human rights and democracy toward using positive conditionalities. The EU began using the promise of increased aid as a reward for meeting human rights and democracy norms rather than merely withholding aid to punish violations (Crawford 2001; Börzel and Risse 2009).

The major innovation of Cotonou, however, was that it moved beyond donors promoting human rights by using aid as a material reward and punishment. It also specifically shifted aid toward capacity-building partnerships with recipient governments and non-state actors for “promoting institutional reforms and development, strengthening the institutions necessary for the consolidation of democracy, good governance and for efficient and competitive market economies; and building capacity for development and partnership.”<sup>7</sup> The Agreement emphasized using aid to support political reforms and institutional developments to create long-term constitutive changes in states. In doing so, the agreement marked a major shift toward using catalytic strategies for human rights promotion.

Article 33 focuses on cooperative institutional development and capacity building with the ACP, specifying the following approach (emphasis added):

1. Cooperation shall pay systematic attention to institutional aspects and in this context, shall *support the efforts of the ACP States to develop and strengthen structures, institutions and procedures* that help to:
  - (a) promote and sustain democracy, human dignity, social justice and pluralism, with full respect for diversity within and among societies;

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6. Partnership agreement 2000/483/EC between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, pp. 3-353).

7. 2000/483/EC Article 20

- (b) promote and sustain universal and full respect for and observance and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- (c) develop and strengthen the rule of law; and improve access to justice, while guaranteeing the professionalism and independence of the judicial systems; and
- (d) ensure transparent and accountable governance and administration in all public institutions.<sup>8</sup>

Cotonou laid out a specific framework that made human rights a cornerstone of EU-ACP development cooperation and emphasized a developmental, capacity building, and cooperative approach that viewed respect for human rights as a vital component of economic development efforts and nested human rights and economic development within a good governance framework. This shift toward catalytic strategy is notable in that human rights promotion is less unilaterally imposed by the global north and is viewed as a cooperative endeavor in which the governments and civil society organizations of recipient states play an important role.

Since Cotonou, several OECD DAC countries have established internal human rights-based foreign aid policies that require compliance, and there are several multilateral agreements that incorporate human rights provisions into foreign aid.<sup>9</sup> Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have all established explicit human rights policies over their foreign aid agencies. Australia and the United States incorporate human rights into their foreign assistance policies but have weaker formal requirements for compliance.

Figure 9 compares the composition of foreign assistance between donors in the 2000-2009 and 2010-2019 time periods. The figure reports the percentage of aid a donor committed over the decade to each of several categories: governance, economic, social, food and agricultural, emergency, and other.<sup>10</sup> There are a few patterns that emerge regarding governance sector aid. First, the number of

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
8. 2000/483/EC Article 33.

9. See OECD (2013) *Integrating Human Rights Into Development* 5-6 for a list of human rights and development policies.

10. Calculations by author using OECD CRS data. The reported percentages are based on ten year aggregations of official development assistance, sorted by the primary purpose code that the donors reported to the OECD. The first column of Table 1 provides a summary of the types included in the economic sector, the second column indicates project types included in the governance sector. The social sector category

donors increases between the two periods. This is largely driven by the emergence of new European donors. Within Europe, these newer donors devote more of their aid to governance than the more established donors. Many of these new donors are Eastern and Central European countries that received substantial democracy assistance after the Cold War. Second, the Scandinavian countries, known for their early and consistent human rights promotion efforts, spend relatively more on governance aid. Finally, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, relatively powerful states in their regions, devote above average percentages of aid to governance projects.

Figure 1: Composition of foreign aid between donor countries



Catalytic strategy aligns with the OECD’s prescription by promoting political liberalization and strengthening domestic sources of accountability that would limit state violence when possible. Projects to improve democratic governance, judicial systems, state capacity, transparency, accountability, and civil society inclusion are most applicable to catalytic strategy. These projects aim to build responsive and open political institutions, rule of law, access to information and freedom of expression for civil society, free and fair elections, and political participation. Because democratic and legal institutions are among the best predictors for human rights performance (Hill and Jones 2014), aid allocation targeting projects in related sectors are more likely to be used in a manner that is consistent with catalytic strategy. As shown in Figure 2, aid to support good governance, consists primarily of education and health projects. Food and agriculture is limited to food security and agricultural sector aid. Emergency aid includes disaster response, refugee costs, and similar. Other consists of multi-sectoral and unclassified aid. All categories sum to 100%.

judicial reforms, and civil society inclusion increased rapidly in the early 2000s and has remained at a similar level since.




Figure 2: Time series plot of the average percent of foreign aid committed to governance, judicial institution, and civil society projects by OECD DAC donors.

There is evidence that foreign aid can improve democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights (Carnegie and Marinov 2017). Strong legal systems, constitutional provisions, and independent judiciaries constrain leaders from using state violence (Davenport 1996; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009; Powell and Staton 2009), and these domestic institutions are more strongly associated with human rights than international sources of influence (Hill and Jones 2014). Slough and Fariss (2021) examine a randomized free legal assistance project in Haiti that decreased the duration of illegal pretrial imprisonment. They find that access to legal representation helped to clear a set of bureaucratic hurdles that were leading to human rights abuses. This not only demonstrates that catalytic strategy can improve legal protections for citizens of countries with high levels of state violence, but also demonstrates that leaders do not always control human rights outcomes. These human rights issues in Haiti were related to state capacity and bureaucratic inefficiencies that legal assistance helped to resolve. Furthermore, Ariotti, Dietrich, and Wright (2021) find that donors can improve judicial independence by facilitating reforms in low-capacity settings where leaders are willing, but lack the means, to enact reforms.

## 2.3 Strategic Substitution between Coercive and Catalytic Strategies

When optimizing their strategic response to state violence, donors may choose to use one, neither, or both of these strategies. My argument is that in the post-2000 period, catalytic strategy has become donors' primary response to state violence problems. Even though the challenges, shortcomings, and unintended consequences of coercive strategy had been apparent for decades, donors lacked an institutionalized strategic alternative until catalytic strategy became prominent the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The OECD DAC working group's policy prescriptions in 1997 and the European Union's Cotonou Agreement in 2000 coincided with growing negative spillovers to donors from aid-eligible countries as a result of globalization and transnational terrorism. Catalytic strategy emerged as an alternative to coercive strategy as donor interests became strongly aligned with addressing the problems of state violence. Beyond policy prescriptions and international agreements, catalytic strategy is less likely than aid withdrawal to harm development goals, including but not limited to, human rights outcomes. Governance projects are tailored to developing institutions linked to both human rights improvements and broader economic growth and stability. If donors can improve these institutions, positive spillovers into other development goals are likely.

Successful coercion may require donors to leverage enough aid to meaningfully alter recipient leaders' cost-benefit analysis of repression. Furthermore, it requires recipient leaders to control human rights outcomes, which is not always the case. Coercive strategy relies on donors being able to credibly threaten to withdraw aid, but aid withdrawal can harm human rights outcomes and broader development goals. Aid volatility can harm institutional development and intensify state violence by prolonging and intensifying domestic conflicts (Iannantuoni 2022; Nielsen et al. 2011). Aid suspensions in response to rights violations may do more harm than good.

Hypothesis 1: Donors will, on average, exhibit more consistent catalytic than coercive strategic responses to state violence.

Catalytic strategy is not a panacea. Catalysis operates through a different strategic logic than coercion and is applicable under different circumstances. Coercion may be the only appropriate



policy response when there is no basis for partnership between a donor and recipient. Foreign assistance projects typically require agreements to be reached between donor and recipient leaders, and the outcomes reflect a bargaining process (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2007; Swedlund 2017b). Catalytic strategy requires donors and recipients to reach agreements on these projects and reforms. Successful catalysis may require long-term, ongoing support from a donor in coordination with a recipient. This means that catalytic strategy can have high opportunity costs for donors: aid dollars spent attempting to develop one country's domestic environment for human rights cannot be used to pursue the donor's foreign policy objectives in other sectors or in other recipient countries. In contrast, a sender using coercive strategy may unilaterally choose to decrease economic sector aid to harm a target. The cost to the donor depends on the benefits that the donor derives from economic sector aid.

Hypothesis 2: Donors will substitute coercive strategy in the place of catalytic strategy when the costs of catalytic strategy are exceptional and where there is no adequate basis for partnership between the donor and recipient government.

Both strategies are costly to donors, and donor interests shape the severity of these costs. For coercive strategy, donors must sacrifice using aid for other policy concessions. For catalytic strategy, donors must forgo other uses of aid to prioritize support for institutional reforms over a long duration. Whether and how state violence harms donor interests varies between donors and across recipients. For example, some donors face much stronger reputational harm from being associated with violent regimes, and some problems stemming from state violence create more severe security concerns for donors than others.

In the next section, I present my empirical approach for testing these overarching hypotheses. In the discussion of key independent variables, I discuss the relationship between a series of variables related to donor interests that could moderate the relationship between state violence and strategic response.

### 3 Research Design

I examine official development assistance commitments from all 29 current OECD DAC donor countries to 126 ODA-eligible recipient countries in the 2003-2018 time period.<sup>11</sup> Although early shifts toward catalytic strategy can be traced back to the late 1990s and catalytic strategies became integrated into some donor policies by 2000, the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data on commitments has complete coverage beginning in 2003.<sup>12</sup> I choose to begin the analysis in 2003 to avoid empirical problems from systematic reporting differences among donors in the prior period. The unit of analysis is the donor-recipient year.

#### 3.1 Dependent Variables

The dependent variables measure foreign aid commitments by sector. Commitments are preferable to disbursements, since commitments are more common in the prior literature, which argues that commitments more accurately capture donors' decision-making and tend to be less volatile than disbursements (see, for example, Bermeo 2017). I calculate these values using project-level aid data from the OECD CRS. To limit the influence of outliers, the dependent variables are transformed using the natural log.

The GOVERNANCE AID dependent variable is the natural log of one plus the sum of bilateral ODA projects and programs related to catalytic strategy between a donor and recipient in a given year, in constant 2018 USD, standardized per 1000 population using aid data from the OECD and population data from the World Bank. Where catalytic strategy is hypothesized, we should observe higher levels of GOVERNANCE AID in response to state violence. The ECONOMIC AID variable uses the same formula for assistance related to coercive strategy. Where coercive strategic responses are hypothesized, we should observe decreased levels of ECONOMIC AID in response to state violence. Relevant projects and programs to each dependent variable are described in Table 1 and detailed in the appendix.

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11. Country lists in appendix. Recipient inclusion is limited only by data availability.

12. For more information about coverage see the Technical Guide to the OECD CRS dataset, last accessed 23 Nov 2022 at <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/crsguide.htm>.

## 3.2 Measuring State Violence

The primary independent variable measures physical violence against civilians by state actors. This variable, STATE VIOLENCE is the recipient's inverted dynamic latent human rights score ([DATA] Fariss, Kenwick, and Reuning 2020), which estimates the frequency and severity of physical integrity rights violations including extrajudicial killings, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances. Higher values indicate more human rights violations. This is preferable to many other measures because it is continuous, standardized, and suitable for comparisons over time. Higher levels of state violence should correspond to lower economic aid if donors are engaging in coercive strategy, and higher governance aid if donors are engaging in catalytic strategy.

## 3.3 Donor Strategy Moderators

Donors may incur reputational costs at home and in the international system if they are perceived to be partnering with violent recipient leaders or are perceived to be doing nothing about state violence. Donors vary in their overall respect for human rights and in their sincerity about promoting human rights internationally and thus vary in their exposure to reputational costs. This is because donors' human rights commitments are influenced by domestic political pressures that compel donors to react in response to highly-salient events in recipient countries, but only when voters care more about human rights promotion than other foreign policy goals (Eisensee and Strömberg 2007; Nielsen 2013; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Long 2018). There is evidence that catalytic strategy is more useful for improving public opinion than coercive strategy. Heinrich and Kobayashi (2020) use a survey experiment to determine how voters evaluate aid to problematic regimes, including those with high levels of state violence. They find that donors providing support addressing problems abroad mitigates negative public opinion. However, they find no evidence that punishment strategies similarly mitigate negative public opinion. Reputation matters, and politicians are sensitive to public opinion and international reputational costs stemming from their partnerships with violent recipient governments. Matanock and Johnson (this issue) survey Members of Parliament in the United Kingdom and find that politicians adjust their foreign aid strategies primarily to protect the United Kingdom's reputation. All else equal, this evidence suggests that donors with stronger

domestic respect for human rights will be more willing to pay for catalytic responses. The variable `DONOR RIGHTS` is dynamic latent human rights score for the donor ([DATA] Fariss, Kenwick, and Reuning 2020). Higher values indicate stronger respect for physical integrity rights in the donor country. I use this as a proxy for public opinion on human rights in the donor country and the donor’s reputational stake in human rights in the international system. To the extent that this logic holds, donors with stronger domestic respect for human rights should be expected to have the strongest interest in addressing problems of state violence.

Donors may be less willing to decrease economic aid in response to violations where they enjoy political benefits and enhanced influence from their foreign aid (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2007, Wang 1999). Furthermore, donors may be more willing and able to promote domestic political reforms in recipient countries if they hold stronger influence over leaders. Both of these relate to political interest alignment between donor and recipient leaders. As a proxy for political interest alignment, I include `UN IDEAL POINT DISTANCE`, a widely-used measurement of the political distance between two states, calculated by analyzing the differences between United Nations general assembly voting records in a given year ([DATA] et al. 2017). Higher values suggest weaker shared preferences and influence between donor and recipient leaders.

Trade is particularly susceptible to costs stemming from coercive punishments. Donors often use foreign aid to promote trade deals that would increase their bilateral exports to recipient states (Cali and Te Velde 2011). The types of aid that donors withhold in coercive strategy are particularly problematic for exporters, who benefit alongside recipient leaders from aid-for-trade deals and import support. High exports from the donor to recipient should decrease the donor’s willingness to use coercive strategy. Bilateral economic interests may increase a donor’s exposure to negative spillovers from recipient state violence. Multinational firms based in donor countries that either trade with, or invest in, recipient states can incur substantial costs stemming from state violence. These include spotlight effects, diminished human capital, productivity declines, disrupted operations, and political risk linked to increased violence and decreased confidence from international financial institutions (Blanton and Blanton 2007; Jensen 2008). However, state violence is often predictable, and multinational corporations operating abroad can invest in political risk insurance, diversify supply chains, and broaden their customer bases to insulate themselves from these costs.

While economic interests should undermine coercive strategy, there is no reason to believe that it would decrease catalytic strategy. The variable LN BILATERAL EXPORTS is the natural log of exports from the donor to the recipient from the International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics data.

One of the most important donor interests in the post-2001 period has been transnational terrorism. Violent repression pushes moderate dissidents out of opposition movements and drives tit-for-tat strategies between the government and the remaining dissidents. This leads to the radicalization of remaining dissidents, the intensification of domestic conflicts, and the adoption of terrorist strategies by opposition groups (Karstedt-Henke 1980). When state violence drives terrorist attacks, donors have stronger incentives to respond to the state violence. Donors may be harmed both by negative externalities from state violence and by developing institutions that would increase the political rights and power of opposition groups vis-à-vis the government. This is especially true in the case of terrorism. Although a repression-dissent cycle leads to terrorism and donors may want to break the conflict cycle by stopping state violence, donors may not want to increase the political rights of terrorist organizations. For this reason, donors may be unwilling to support the same types of inclusive and democratic institutional development in the presence of strong and active terrorist groups than they would be willing to support in the absence of such organizations. Terrorism is expected to drive donors to substitute coercive strategies in the place of catalytic strategies. The variable LN TERRORISM EVENTS is the natural log of one plus the count of terrorist attacks, calculated using ICEWS event data.

Catalytic strategy is expensive and most reforms would require long-run partnerships to meaningfully alter the domestic environment for human rights. It stands to reason that donors will be more willing to pay for catalytic strategy where the strategy has a high probability of success and where donors would derive the strongest benefits from success. Two factors determine the cost and probability of success for catalytic strategy. First, countries with weak STATE CAPACITY may require large aid allocations to promote successful reforms. I use the World Bank's government effectiveness estimate measure from the World Governance Indicators. This measure captures the quality of government services and policies in the recipient state. Second, the level of democratization in the recipient country is likely to shape donors' estimates of the costs of promoting reforms

and the probability of successful reforms. I use the variable EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS, which measures legislative and judicial constraints on the executive using V-Dem indices. This accounts for the strength and independence of key veto players in recipient governments that may help to limit violent repression. Countries with weaker state capacity and weaker democratization may be the states most in need of governance aid to promote reforms. However, many donors focus on short-term indicators to assess the efficacy of aid (Dietrich 2021), and to the extent that donors allocate democracy aid to more autocratic states, the aid projects tend to be less ambitious (Bush 2015). Autocratic leaders are also less likely to agree to governance projects that would promote political liberalization, which may leave donors with interests in deterring state violence with no choice but to decrease economic sector aid to autocratic countries.

For the purposes of this study, the STATE CAPACITY and EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS variables are preferable to other commonly used measures of state capacity and democracy because the measures do not incorporate information related to human rights performance and have excellent coverage for low-income countries during the period of this study.

Finally, non-governmental and international organizations use “naming and shaming” campaigns that publicly disseminate information and draw negative attention to human rights abuses in an effort to increase awareness about human rights violations internationally. Substantial evidence supports the notion that these campaigns influence donors’ responses to state violence. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) argue that donors lack incentives to punish recipients through bilateral reductions in aid and that human rights violations themselves do not trigger coercive punishments. Rather, UN resolutions that draw attention to violations lead to large reductions in aid from multilateral organizations. Similarly, Dietrich and Murdie (2017) demonstrate that shaming campaigns prompt donors to change the channel of foreign aid delivery. Rather than providing government-to-government aid, donors shift to providing aid through non-governmental and international organizations.

Naming and shaming campaigns aim to increase the public’s awareness in donor countries of the state violence problems that occur abroad. Citizens of donor countries, when made aware of human rights violations, may increase pressure on donor governments to address violations. Extant literature has found that naming and shaming campaigns can shift public opinion in donor countries, but the evidence that this translates to donors decreasing aid to punish recipient leaders

is highly conditional and typically depends on the strategic relationship between the donor and recipient (Esarey and DeMeritt 2017; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Long 2018; Nielsen 2013). There is evidence, however, that improving public awareness in donor countries of rights violations in recipient countries increases constituent demand for the donor to engage more with the recipient in order to address problems (Heinrich and Kobayashi 2020). This suggests that naming and shaming campaigns would increase support for catalytic strategy. I test for these relationships using the SHAMING variable, which is the count of UNCHR or UNHRC resolutions targeting physical integrity rights violations in the recipient country (DeMeritt and Conrad 2019).<sup>13</sup>

All continuous independent variables are centered at their mean to hold variables constant at meaningful values and to decrease nonessential multicollinearity between interaction terms and their component variables (Smith and Sasaki 1979). All time-variant independent variables are lagged one year to decrease reverse causality concerns.

### 3.4 Control Variables

I include a series of control variables that are linked to aid and state violence and other controls that are common to the aid literature. High levels of peaceful dissent may draw aid and increase repression. I account for dissent using a binary variable coded as 1 if the recipient has a count of protests in the top quartile of aid-eligible countries. I include a binary variable from UNDP/PRIO for recipients that have an active intrastate or interstate conflict on their soil ([DATA] et al. 2022a, 2022b). I control for the natural log of the recipient’s population size because countries with larger populations tend to receive less aid per capita and can be more difficult to govern peacefully; for the natural log of GDP, since poorer countries receive more aid and are less capable of governing peacefully; and for aid concentration, since the share of aid per donor may affect donor strategy, and recipients with aid shared more evenly across many donors may be more difficult to deter (this measure includes aid reported to the CRS from OECD and non-OECD donors, plus AidData’s estimations of Chinese ODA-like aid ([DATA] Custer et al. 2021; [DATA] Dreher et al. 2022).

This article focuses on donor decisions about how much aid to commit to economic and gov-

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13. Because DeMeritt and Conrad’s shaming data is only available through 2011 and does not include several small recipient countries, I do not include this as a control in other models, and the number of observations drops considerably in models 8 and 16.

ernance sectors. However, there is substantial theoretical overlap with research that investigates how donors choose between channels of aid delivery. Dietrich (2021) demonstrates that a donor’s decision to allocate aid through non-governmental versus government-to-government channels depends on the donor’s domestic political economy. Dietrich argues that donors observe state capacity problems (including, but not limited to, state violence) in a recipient country and choose between channels of aid delivery. The donor’s choice in aid delivery is driven by its domestic political economy—whether it is a statist (traditional public sector) donor or a neoliberal donor. The empirical overlap between the economic sector and government-to-government channel is substantial, and the most fungible forms of economic assistance are delivered through the direct budget support programs of economic sector aid. However, large amounts of governance aid are also delivered through government-to-government channels, with a small fraction bypassing the recipient government (Dietrich and Wright 2015). I include the control `STATIST DONOR` to test whether this potential alternative explanation for donor strategy does not explain away these results.

A table of controls with technical descriptions is included in the appendix.

### 3.5 Econometric Models

Donors’ coercive responses to state violence vary between cutting economic aid entirely and decreasing the level of economic aid. Catalytic policies vary between initiating governance projects and increasing the overall level of governance aid. Because of this, there are many dyad-years in which donors chose not to allocate any new economic sector aid (72% of observations) or any new governance sector aid (62% of observations). I test the hypotheses using a Tobit estimator, which has the advantage of modeling both the non-negative nature of aid commitments and the level of positive aid commitments.

I include year fixed effects to capture any year-specific changes in global patterns of foreign aid and state violence, such as violence stemming from the Arab Spring movements and reductions across donors due to the global financial crisis. I include donor fixed effects in all models except for those testing the `DONOR RIGHTS` moderator to isolate within-donor differences and to prevent unmodeled time-invariant differences between donors from driving results. Robust standard errors are clustered on the donor.



Changes in state violence typically occur slowly over time, while large and rapid changes are comparatively rare. I prioritize modeling the more typical case, in which there are large differences in the level of state violence between states and less change within states over time. Several of the explanatory variables of interest also change slowly over time (and, within some recipient countries, exhibit no variation at all). Respect for human rights within donor countries, judicial and legal constraints on the executive (as with other measures of democracy), state capacity, and terrorism all typically exhibit slow within-country change. For many recipient countries, there were no terrorist attacks over the time period examined, resulting in no within-country change. For these reasons, and because much of the theory focuses on differences between recipients, I follow similar research designs, including Bermeo (2018) and Nielsen (2013), in not including recipient fixed effects in the primary results.

### **3.6 Robustness Checks**

I include a series of robustness checks in the supplemental appendix. To ensure that the results are not driven by outliers, I include a series of robustness checks that omit (1) recipient outliers, such as the “war on terror” states and small island countries, (2) small donors, and (3) the United States (as a donor with outsized influence). I include a replication of the primary results using OLS. The results are generally robust to these alternative models.

I did not include recipient fixed effects in the primary results, since they can eliminate theoretically-important information about differences between recipients for variables that do not change or change slowly over time (Beck and Katz 2001; Beck 2001; Bell and Jones 2015; Plümper and Troeger 2007). However, there can be substantial differences between models depending on which types of fixed effects are included (Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp 2014), and including recipient fixed effects can control for time-invariant omitted variables that could lead to biased results. To this end, I include robustness checks with a variety of donor, recipient, region, and year fixed effects. The core results are consistent across the various fixed effects models: the relationship between state violence and governance aid remains positive and significant, and there are no substantial differences for the economic aid dependent variable. Of the moderating variables, the effect of executive constraints is robust across models. The state capacity and terrorism moderators are

consistent between the donor and region fixed effects models for both dependent variables, but lose significance for the governance aid dependent variable when fixed effects are included. The interaction term for UN shaming is positive throughout, but its significance varies between several of the models. The interaction term for donor rights loses significance when donor fixed effects are introduced.

## 4 Results and Discussion

Tables 2 and 3 report the results for the economic and governance sector aid dependent variables, respectively. The negative coefficient for state violence in the economic sector base model (1) in Table 2 suggests that donors provide less economic aid where state violence is higher, but this is not statistically significant at conventional levels and the coefficient is quite small, suggesting little substantive relationship. The positive coefficient in the governance sector base model (9) in Table 3 demonstrates that donors provide more governance aid where state violence is higher, with strong statistical significance. This result is consistent across models and robustness checks. There is strong quantitative evidence that donors provide higher levels of governance aid where state violence is higher.


These results suggest that donors do not primarily rely on coercive strategy for responding to state violence in the post-2001 period: the coefficient is in the expected direction, but is not significant at conventional levels and has low substantive importance. Donors do not appear to strongly decrease economic sector aid where state violence is higher on average across recipient countries during the 2003-2018 period. This does not, however, mean that donors are ignoring state violence. The governance aid results suggest that donors consistently use catalytic strategy to address state violence. Substantively, donors' catalytic response appears to be important. A one standard deviation higher state violence score corresponds to an expected sixteen percent increase in governance sector aid. Furthermore, there is evidence that donors use coercive strategy as a substitute when pursuing or achieving political liberalization would be costly to donors.

## 4.1 How Donor Interests Moderate Coercive Strategy

Models 2-8 in Table 2 include interactions with theoretically-important donor interest moderators for the relationship between state violence and economic aid. Figures 3 and 4 present these results visually. For the continuous by continuous interactions, the lines represent the predictive margins at the mean and at plus and minus one standard deviation for each moderator.

Figure 3 visualizes the interactions between state violence and (a) donor rights, (b) ideal point distance, (c) exports, and (d) shaming with respect to the economic aid dependent variable. None of these results are consistent with these aspects of donor interests altering coercive strategy. There is no evidence that donors with strong domestic respect for human rights have stronger coercive responses to state violence than donors with weaker human rights performance, and there is no indication that political alignment or export relationships with recipients undermine coercive strategy. There is no indication that the political and economic ties that are often associated with preferential foreign aid undermine coercive strategy. Furthermore, there is no indication that naming and shaming by the UNCHR alters donors' coercive strategic response.

Figure 3: Predictive Margins for Economic Aid Dependent Variable




There is evidence, presented in Figure 4, that three factors moderate the relationship between state violence and economic aid. Donors exhibit stronger coercive responses to state violence if recipient countries have weaker democratization, weaker state capacity, or more severe problems with terrorism. The results in subfigure (a) are consistent with donors opting to punish more autocratic leaders for state violence by decreasing economic aid. Subfigure (b) shows that donors exhibit much stronger coercive punishments toward recipient countries that have weak state capacity. This result is somewhat paradoxical in that recipients with weaker government effectiveness may be less capable of peacefully maintaining control, and leaders may have weaker control over law enforcement and military officers. However, donors may fear that providing relatively fungible forms of aid in these circumstances could translate to relatively large increases in the repressive


capacity of leaders. Subfigure (c) provides evidence that donors punish leaders more severely for violence that exacerbates domestic conflicts, drives extremism, and creates terrorist threats.

Figure 4: Predictive Margins for Economic Aid Dependent Variable

(a) Executive Constraints



(b) State Capacity



(c) Terrorism




Table 2: Economic Aid Dependent Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
State Violence (SV)	-0.0439 (0.0933)	-0.0289 (0.0994)	-0.0433 (0.0920)	-0.0279 (0.0950)	-0.177* (0.0930)	0.0129 (0.0900)	-0.127 (0.0889)	0.101 (0.0969)
Donor Rights	0.410 (0.775)	0.397 (0.627)	0.410 (0.775)	0.408 (0.776)	0.410 (0.772)	0.409 (0.772)	0.410 (0.775)	0.916 (0.863)
UN Ideal Point Dist	-0.547** (0.232)	0.578 (0.384)	-0.549** (0.236)	-0.531** (0.228)	-0.552** (0.231)	-0.546** (0.231)	-0.517** (0.228)	-0.568** (0.223)
Ln Exports	1.144*** (0.170)	1.670*** (0.164)	1.144*** (0.171)	1.144*** (0.170)	1.135*** (0.173)	1.134*** (0.170)	1.140*** (0.170)	1.092*** (0.185)
Executive Constraints	1.047*** (0.143)	1.470*** (0.184)	1.047*** (0.143)	1.059*** (0.143)	0.783*** (0.154)	1.067*** (0.142)	1.108*** (0.144)	1.134*** (0.169)
State Capacity	0.102 (0.208)	-0.0892 (0.198)	0.105 (0.210)	0.0894 (0.208)	0.136 (0.212)	0.0694 (0.205)	0.0596 (0.208)	0.426* (0.223)
Ln Terror Events	-0.0855 (0.0636)	-0.175*** (0.0525)	-0.0867 (0.0609)	-0.0754 (0.0659)	-0.101 (0.0647)	-0.0827 (0.0643)	0.132 (0.0875)	-0.189** (0.0902)
UN Shaming								-3.726*** (1.399)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0318 (0.0747)						
UN Ideal Point Dist. x SV			0.0287 (0.0993)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0266 (0.0218)				
Exec. Constraints x SV					0.694*** (0.107)			
State Capacity						0.464*** (0.0659)		
Ln Terror Events							-0.162*** (0.0456)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.192 (0.865)
High Dissent	-0.120 (0.128)	-0.151 (0.142)	-0.122 (0.125)	-0.0971 (0.132)	-0.117 (0.128)	-0.162 (0.127)	-0.123 (0.127)	0.119 (0.188)
Ln GDP	-2.307*** (0.213)	-2.775*** (0.196)	-2.309*** (0.213)	-2.299*** (0.214)	-2.301*** (0.214)	-2.246*** (0.212)	-2.306*** (0.213)	-2.330*** (0.234)
Ln Population	1.738*** (0.179)	1.716*** (0.173)	1.741*** (0.180)	1.741*** (0.180)	1.715*** (0.178)	1.612*** (0.179)	1.725*** (0.178)	1.595*** (0.204)
Conflict	-0.505*** (0.114)	-0.370*** (0.0907)	-0.509*** (0.117)	-0.508*** (0.115)	-0.421*** (0.114)	-0.353*** (0.120)	-0.382*** (0.0976)	-0.661*** (0.140)
Aid Concentration	-0.779 (0.588)	-0.632 (0.617)	-0.761 (0.596)	-0.696 (0.546)	-0.885 (0.595)	-1.138* (0.596)	-0.736 (0.581)	-2.228*** (0.629)
Statist Donor	2.373** (1.149)	1.039 (0.955)	2.372** (1.150)	2.369** (1.150)	2.357** (1.144)	2.421** (1.145)	2.364** (1.150)	3.551*** (1.375)
Constant	-5.889*** (0.729)	-3.710*** (0.780)	-5.894*** (0.729)	-5.886*** (0.728)	-5.720*** (0.713)	-5.778*** (0.719)	-5.714*** (0.727)	-6.591*** (0.929)
Sigma	4.590*** (0.254)	5.196*** (0.214)	4.590*** (0.254)	4.590*** (0.254)	4.575*** (0.255)	4.575*** (0.254)	4.588*** (0.254)	4.413*** (0.272)
Donor Fixed Effects	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* <0.1. Tobit estimation with standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

## 4.2 How Donor Interests Moderate Catalytic Strategy

Models 9-16 in Table 3, visualized in Figures 5 and 6, present the results for the same set of theoretically-important donor interest moderators, but test how these moderators shape catalytic strategy.

The coefficient for the interaction of donor rights and state violence on governance sector aid, reported in model 7 and visualized in Figure 5(a), is positive and strongly significant. The visualization shows that donors with stronger domestic respect for human rights exhibit stronger catalytic responses than donors with weaker human rights records. While donors with high and low human rights scores provide similar amounts of governance sector aid to recipients with strong human rights records, as state violence increases, donors' responses diverge. The donors that ostensibly have the strongest interest in supporting human rights abroad are more willing to commit higher levels of aid to governance projects when using foreign aid to address state violence.

Figure 5(b) suggests that donors provide less governance aid to recipients who hold more distant UN ideal points when the recipient has a strong human rights record, but this relationship disappears as state violence increases. Similarly, Figure 5(c) demonstrates that donors provide more governance aid to export partners with strong respect for human rights, but this separation between types of export partners diminishes as state violence increases. Thus, the significant coefficients in Table 3 reflect the importance of policy alignment and economic benefits to donors when recipients have strong human rights records rather than a separation between these types when state violence is a problem.

Figure 5(d) is consistent with expectations drawn from a variety of prior research that has found that naming and shaming campaigns increase donors' responses to state violence (Dietrich and Murdie 2017; Lebovic and Voeten 2009). The cross-over effects demonstrate that naming and shaming campaigns increase donors' catalytic responses to state violence. This result is strongly consistent with Heinrich and Kobayashi's (2020) survey experiment results demonstrating constituent preferences for increased engagement to address the problems associated with "nasty regimes."

Figure 5: Predictive Margins for Governance Aid Dependent Variable





Figure 6(a) demonstrates that donors provide more governance sector aid to recipients with high levels of state violence if the recipient has stronger executive constraints. This provides evidence that donors are unwilling or unable to use aid to pursue political liberalization in more autocratic countries, which is consistent with the expectations drawn from Bush (2015). It is also consistent with donors hesitating to promote political liberalization where increased political competition could exacerbate state violence. Figure 6(b) demonstrates that donors provide more governance aid to recipients with weaker state capacity if the recipient has a strong human rights record, but this relationship diminishes as state violence increases. Bureaucratic incentives to demonstrate results and concerns about the cost effectiveness of development projects may be preventing donors from responding more strongly to state violence in low capacity contexts using governance aid.



Finally, Figure 6(c) provides evidence that donors resist promoting political liberalization where the recipient state government faces terrorist threats. Although donors have strong incentives to address state violence that leads to terrorism, political liberalization efforts would increase the political power of extremist groups vis-a-vis the government. These results suggest that donors are less willing to pursue strategies related to political liberalization, civilian control over law enforcement and military, or judicial reforms where terrorist groups are active.

Figure 6: Predictive Margins for Governance Aid Dependent Variable



Thus far, I have discussed the results of the economic and governance aid dependent variables separately. To understand strategic substitution, the results need to be compared. When taken together, Figures 4 and 6 provide evidence in support of the second hypothesis. Donors substitute coercive strategy in the place of catalytic strategy when recipient countries have weaker executive

constraints, weaker state capacity, and higher levels of state violence. These are the situations in which donors should expect the highest costs of achieving the reforms necessary to improve respect for human rights and, in the case of terrorism, in which donors would not benefit from successful reforms that would increase the political power of the victims of state violence. The (a) subgraphs show that donors prioritize coercive strategy in the place of catalytic strategy toward recipients with high levels of state violence and weaker democratization. Subgraphs (b) show that donors substitute coercive strategy in the place of catalytic strategy toward recipients with weaker state capacity. Subgraphs (c) demonstrate that donors substitute coercive strategy for catalytic strategy where donors would be harmed by increasing the political rights of the targets of state violence vis-à-vis the recipient government, but also where donors may be harmed by negative externalities from state violence that radicalizes dissidents.

Table 3: Governance Aid Dependent Variable

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
State Violence (SV)	0.363*** (0.0829)	0.367*** (0.0816)	0.368*** (0.0835)	0.403*** (0.0825)	0.296*** (0.0777)	0.390*** (0.0800)	0.229*** (0.0796)	0.493*** (0.0879)
Donor Rights	0.341 (0.400)	0.588 (0.502)	0.341 (0.401)	0.329 (0.402)	0.341 (0.400)	0.340 (0.400)	0.340 (0.399)	0.569 (0.480)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.888*** (0.161)	0.369 (0.386)	-0.905*** (0.164)	-0.821*** (0.160)	-0.883*** (0.161)	-0.886*** (0.161)	-0.837*** (0.159)	-0.799*** (0.188)
Ln Exports	0.848*** (0.120)	1.336*** (0.139)	0.845*** (0.119)	0.851*** (0.119)	0.842*** (0.122)	0.845*** (0.119)	0.839*** (0.120)	0.827*** (0.144)
Executive Constraints	0.685*** (0.141)	1.132*** (0.145)	0.688*** (0.141)	0.738*** (0.142)	0.534*** (0.153)	0.695*** (0.141)	0.798*** (0.139)	0.838*** (0.160)
State Capacity	-0.591*** (0.141)	-0.779*** (0.134)	-0.567*** (0.145)	-0.635*** (0.143)	-0.574*** (0.143)	-0.610*** (0.141)	-0.669*** (0.140)	-0.276* (0.167)
Ln Terror Events	0.0915** (0.0451)	-0.00520 (0.0469)	0.0870** (0.0440)	0.132*** (0.0450)	0.0784* (0.0461)	0.0924** (0.0451)	0.467*** (0.0613)	0.00775 (0.0626)
UN Shaming								-2.857*** (0.681)
Donor Rights x SV		0.147* (0.0875)						
UN Ideal Point Dist x SV			0.175** (0.0764)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.109*** (0.0154)				
Exec Constraints x SV					0.385*** (0.0921)			
State Capacity x SV						0.173*** (0.0431)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.274*** (0.0320)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.802*** (0.383)
High Dissent	0.281*** (0.108)	0.234** (0.114)	0.262** (0.105)	0.374*** (0.106)	0.289*** (0.108)	0.266** (0.108)	0.271** (0.108)	0.416*** (0.134)
Ln GDP	-1.705*** (0.147)	-2.146*** (0.160)	-1.719*** (0.147)	-1.670*** (0.144)	-1.703*** (0.148)	-1.683*** (0.146)	-1.700*** (0.147)	-1.680*** (0.154)
Ln Population	0.823*** (0.115)	0.807*** (0.120)	0.840*** (0.116)	0.831*** (0.116)	0.809*** (0.114)	0.775*** (0.113)	0.796*** (0.114)	0.634*** (0.136)
Conflict	0.194 (0.130)	0.277** (0.113)	0.165 (0.131)	0.170 (0.128)	0.261** (0.123)	0.259** (0.129)	0.383*** (0.127)	0.115 (0.171)
Aid Concentration	-1.976*** (0.536)	-1.871*** (0.524)	-1.865*** (0.542)	-1.635*** (0.503)	-2.040*** (0.542)	-2.120*** (0.535)	-1.899*** (0.530)	-3.172*** (0.586)
Statist Donor	1.095* (0.585)	-0.876 (0.748)	1.090* (0.585)	1.090* (0.587)	1.092* (0.585)	1.109* (0.584)	1.084* (0.584)	1.508** (0.752)
Constant	-4.550*** (0.503)	-1.167* (0.663)	-4.564*** (0.507)	-4.535*** (0.497)	-4.464*** (0.498)	-4.512*** (0.504)	-4.251*** (0.492)	-4.519*** (0.623)
Sigma	3.696*** (0.170)	4.241*** (0.212)	3.691*** (0.171)	3.683*** (0.169)	3.689*** (0.172)	3.693*** (0.170)	3.685*** (0.170)	3.587*** (0.185)
Donor Fixed Effects	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* <0.1. Tobit estimation with standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

## 5 Discussion and Conclusions

This article examined how donors optimize their use of coercive and catalytic foreign aid strategies to promote human rights. I argued that catalytic strategy became donors' preferred strategy for addressing state violence problems by the early 2000s, marking a paradigm shift in the relationship

between aid and human rights. I provided evidence that donors prioritized catalytic strategy during the 2003-2018 period, including donors' agreements with recipient countries, policy prescriptions from international organizations, and quantitative analyses of aid commitments. This is an important finding, since catalytic strategy involves donors increasing aid to governance sector projects when the donor could have otherwise used aid to pursue different foreign policy interests. Donors face an opportunity cost by using governance sector aid to address state violence. Furthermore, catalytic strategy is an important strategic innovation for responding to state violence. Donors now have a developmental approach to address state violence, which has fewer threats to credibility than coercive strategy.

The results provide no evidence that donors consistently use coercive strategy in response to state violence during the period of this study. However, there is evidence that donors use coercive strategy as a substitute when dealing with recipients with high levels of state violence in the context of weaker democratic institutions, weaker state capacity, and more terrorist attacks. Coercive strategy has not become irrelevant. Donors substitute coercion when the costs of successfully achieving political liberalization are highest.

This article contributes to the literature by elucidating how donors determine whether to use coercive or catalytic strategies for addressing state violence problems. The theory and findings have implications for the study of human rights and foreign aid. That we do not consistently observe donors decreasing economic sector aid in response to state violence does not mean that donors are not using foreign aid to address state violence. Donor strategies have evolved to prioritize catalytic over coercive strategy in most circumstances, which means that a large set of influential literature on foreign aid and human rights is focused on what has become a secondary type of strategy. This is not a flaw with the prior literature: catalytic strategy did not exist for much of the period that this early literature studied, and did not become formally integrated into most donors' policies until the early 2000s. This has important implications for future studies of human rights and foreign aid. Donors strategically choose between coercive and catalytic strategies, and donors generally prioritize catalytic strategy.

The theory and results call into question a common implicit assumption in the extant literature: that donor interests are separate from and compete with donors' human rights commitments.

Donors' interests and human rights commitments are interdependent. Stronger donor interests in recipient countries can increase donors' responsiveness to state violence and influence donors' decisions about what strategy to use.

This research opens opportunities and has implications for future studies. This article, which was motivated by OECD DAC prescriptions for human rights and development policy, limited complexity by examining the behaviors of OECD DAC donors as a group rather than by examining differences between donors. By focusing primarily on within-donor variation as driven by bilateral relationships and recipient characteristics, this study leaves donor-centric explanations to future research. As demonstrated in Figure 9, there is significant variation between donors in how much aid they provide to economic and governance sectors. As discussed in section 2.2, there is substantial variation among donors' internal human rights-based foreign aid policies. This suggests that there is important variation at the donor level that may drive coercive and catalytic strategy. Studies like Dietrich (2021), Swedlund (2017), and Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp (2014) have demonstrated the importance of considering donor-centric explanations of policy.

Additionally, data limitations prevented this article from examining these relationships prior to 2003. Qualitative research and research on donors with adequate earlier data availability could examine these relationships prior to this study period. Finally, an important empirical implication is that donors strategically select coercive or catalytic strategies for promoting human rights. Research on aid effectiveness for promoting human rights should consider this source of selection bias.

The findings have implications for development practitioners: Donor interests shape the prospects for cooperation between donors on both coercive and catalytic strategies. Coercion can require substantial coordination between donors to create a meaningful system of rewards and punishments. The rise of catalytic strategy and the proliferation of an increasingly diverse set of donors suggests that political conditionalities face more challenges than ever to promote policy changes in recipient countries.

The biggest takeaway is that just because we do not consistently observe donors withholding or suspending foreign aid in response to state violence, this does not mean that donors are failing to use foreign aid to promote human rights. Donors prioritize catalytic strategy for human rights promotion. However, coercive strategy is not obsolete. It is a secondary, strategic substitute for

catalytic strategies that donors use when they face high costs of promoting change.

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## **A Country Lists**

### **A.1 Recipient List**

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

### **A.2 Donor List**

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.

## **B Variable Descriptions and Descriptive Statistics**

Table 4: Variable List

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Unit of Measure</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Source</b>
Ln Governance Aid	Dyad-Year	Natural log of 1 + governance sector aid per 1000 population	OECD CRS, World Bank WDI
Ln Economic Aid	Dyad-Year	Natural log of 1 + economic sector aid per 1000 population	OECD CRS
State Violence (SV)	Recipient-Year	Inverted dynamic latent human rights score	Fariss, Kenwick, and Reuning (2020)
Donor Rights	Donor-Year	Dynamic latent human rights score	Fariss, Kenwick, and Reuning (2020)
UN Ideal Point Distance	Dyad-Year	Similarity of United Nations voting record	Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017)
Ln Terror Events	Recipient-Year	Natural log of 1 plus the count of terrorist events within a country	ICEWS
Ln Exports	Dyad-Year	Natural log of 1 + exports from donor to recipient	World Bank WDI
State Capacity	Recipient-Year	Government Effectiveness Estimate	World Bank WGI
Executive Constraints	Recipient-Year	Sum of the legislative and judicial constraints on the executive indices	VDEM
UN Shaming	Recipient-Year	Count of physical integrity shaming in UNCHR and UNHRC	Demeritt and Conrad (2019)
Military Alliance	Dyad-Year	1 if formal military alliance between donor and recipient	Gibler (2008)
Ln Population	Recipient-Year	Natural log of the recipient country's population	World Bank WDI
Ln GDP	Recipient-Year	Natural log of the recipient country's GDP in 2018 constant USD	World Bank WDI
Aid Concentration	Recipient-Year	Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculation of the concentration of aid	AidData and OECD CRS
Conflict	Recipient-Year	1 if intrastate or interstate conflict within country	UCDP/PRIO (2021)
High Dissent	Recipient-Year	1 if in the top quartile by count of peaceful protests	ICEWS
Statist Donor	Donor	1 if statist/traditional public sector donor political economy	Dietrich (2021)




Table 5: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N	% Zero
Ln Economic Aid	1.28	2.44	0	13	52,950	71.66
Ln Governance Aid	1.54	2.38	0	13	52,950	62.15
State Violence	-0.00	1.14	-4	3	52,950	
Donor Rights	0.00	0.99	-2	3	52,950	
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.00	0.68	-2	3	52,950	
Ln Exports	0.00	3.06	-17	10	52,950	
Executive Constraints	-0.00	0.54	-1	1	52,950	
State Capacity	0.00	0.64	-2	2	52,950	
Ln Terror Events	-0.00	1.47	-1	7	52,950	
Ln GDP	-0.00	1.86	-5	6	52,950	
Ln Population	0.00	1.71	-5	5	52,950	
Aid Concentration	-0.00	0.17	-0	1	52,950	
High Dissent	0.30	0.46	0	1	52,950	
Conflict	0.15	0.36	0	1	52,950	
Statist Donor	0.44	0.50	0	1	52,950	

## C Dependent Variable Distributions

Figure 7: Distributions of dependent variables.



## D OECD CRS Project and Program Descriptions

### D.1 Governance Sector Project and Program Designations

Sector and purpose descriptions included in “governance aid”.<sup>14</sup>

- **150 & 151:** *Government & Civil Society*
- **15110:** *Public sector policy and administrative management:* “Institution-building assistance to strengthen core public sector management systems and capacities. This includes general public policy management, co-ordination, planning and reform; human resource management; organisational development; civil service reform; e-government; development planning, monitoring and evaluation; support to ministries involved in aid co-ordination; other ministries and government departments when sector cannot be specified.”
- **15112:** *Decentralisation and support to subnational government:* “Decentralisation processes (including political, administrative and fiscal dimensions); intergovernmental relations and federalism; strengthening departments of regional and local government, regional and local authorities and their national associations.”
- **15113:** *Anti-corruption organisations and institutions:* “Specialised organisations, institutions and frameworks for the prevention of and combat against corruption, bribery, money-laundering and other aspects of organised crime, with or without law enforcement powers, e.g. anti-corruption commissions and monitoring bodies, special investigation services, institutions and initiatives of integrity and ethics oversight, specialised NGOs, other civil society and citizens’ organisations directly concerned with corruption.”
- **15114:** *Domestic revenue mobilisation:* “Support to domestic revenue mobilisation/tax policy, analysis and administration as well as non-tax public revenue, which includes work with ministries of finance, line ministries, revenue authorities or other local, regional or national public bodies.”

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14. Codes and descriptions from the OECD DAC list of CRS purpose codes and voluntary budget identifier codes, available here: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC-CRS-CODES.xls>

- **15125:** *Public Procurement:* “Support to public procurement, including to create and evaluate legal frameworks; advice in establishing strategic orientation of public procurement policies and reforms; advice in designing public procurement systems and processes; support to public procurement institutions (including electronic procurement) as well as structures or initiatives to assess public procurement systems; and development of professional capacity of public procurement bodies and staff.”
- **15130** *Legal and judicial development:* “Support to institutions, systems and procedures of the justice sector, both formal and informal; support to ministries of justice, the interior and home affairs; judges and courts; legal drafting services; bar and lawyers associations; professional legal education; maintenance of law and order and public safety; border management; law enforcement agencies, police, prisons and their supervision; ombudsmen; alternative dispute resolution, arbitration and mediation; legal aid and counsel; traditional, indigenous and paralegal practices that fall outside the formal legal system. Measures that support the improvement of legal frameworks, constitutions, laws and regulations; legislative and constitutional drafting and review; legal reform; integration of formal and informal systems of law. Public legal education; dissemination of information on entitlements and remedies for injustice; awareness campaigns.”
- **15150:** *Democratic participation and civil society:* “Support to the exercise of democracy and diverse forms of participation of citizens beyond elections (15151); direct democracy instruments such as referenda and citizens’ initiatives; support to organisations to represent and advocate for their members, to monitor, engage and hold governments to account, and to help citizens learn to act in the public sphere; curricula and teaching for civic education at various levels. (This purpose code is restricted to activities targeting governance issues. When assistance to civil society is for non-governance purposes use other appropriate purpose codes.)”
- **15151:** *Elections:* “Electoral management bodies and processes, election observation, voters’ education.”
- **15152:** *Legislatures and political parties:* “Assistance to strengthen key functions of leg-

islatures/ parliaments including subnational assemblies and councils (representation; oversight; legislation), such as improving the capacity of legislative bodies, improving legislatures' committees and administrative procedures,; research and information management systems; providing training programmes for legislators and support personnel. Assistance to political parties and strengthening of party systems.”

- **15153:** *Media and free flow of information:* “Activities that support free and uncensored flow of information on public issues; activities that increase the editorial and technical skills and the integrity of the print and broadcast media, e.g. training of journalists. (Use codes 22010-22040 for provision of equipment and capital assistance to media.)”
- **15160:** *Human rights:* “Measures to support specialised official human rights institutions and mechanisms at universal, regional, national and local levels in their statutory roles to promote and protect civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights as defined in international conventions and covenants; translation of international human rights commitments into national legislation; reporting and follow-up; human rights dialogue. Human rights defenders and human rights NGOs; human rights advocacy, activism, mobilisation; awareness raising and public human rights education. Human rights programming targeting specific groups, e.g. children, persons with disabilities, migrants, ethnic, religious, linguistic and sexual minorities, indigenous people and those suffering from caste discrimination, victims of trafficking, victims of torture. (Use code 15230 when in the context of a peacekeeping operation and code 15180 for ending violence against women and girls. Use code 15190 for human rights programming for refugees or migrants, including when they are victims of trafficking. Use code 16070 for Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, i.e. Child Labour, Forced Labour, Non-discrimination in employment and occupation, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining.)”
- **15170:** *Women’s rights organisations and movements, and government institutions:* “Support for feminist, women-led and women’s rights organisations and movements, and institutions (governmental and non-governmental) at all levels to enhance their effectiveness, influence and sustainability (activities and core-funding). These organisations exist to bring

about transformative change for gender equality and/or the rights of women and girls in developing countries. Their activities include agenda-setting, advocacy, policy dialogue, capacity development, awareness raising and prevention, service provision, conflict-prevention and peacebuilding, research, organising, and alliance and network building.”

- **15180:** *Ending violence against women and girls:* “Support to programmes designed to prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls/gender-based violence. This encompasses a broad range of forms of physical, sexual and psychological violence including but not limited to: intimate partner violence (domestic violence); sexual violence; female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C); child, early and forced marriage; acid throwing; honour killings; and trafficking of women and girls. Prevention activities may include efforts to empower women and girls; change attitudes, norms and behaviour; adopt and enact legal reforms; and strengthen implementation of laws and policies on ending violence against women and girls, including through strengthening institutional capacity. Interventions to respond to violence against women and girls/gender-based violence may include expanding access to services including legal assistance, psychosocial counselling and health care; training personnel to respond more effectively to the needs of survivors; and ensuring investigation, prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of violence.”
- **15190:** *Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility:* “Assistance to developing countries that facilitates the orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people. This includes: Capacity building in migration and mobility policy, analysis, planning and management. This includes support to facilitate safe and regular migration and address irregular migration, engagement with diaspora and programmes enhancing the development impact of remittances and/or their use for developmental projects in developing countries. Measures to improve migrant labour recruitment systems in developing countries. Capacity building for strategy and policy development as well as legal and judicial development (including border management) in developing countries. This includes support to address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration, and strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants and preventing and combating trafficking in human beings.

Support to effective strategies to ensure international protection and the right to asylum. Support to effective strategies to ensure access to justice and assistance for displaced persons. Assistance to migrants for their safe, dignified, informed and voluntary return to their country of origin (covers only returns from another developing country; assistance to forced returns is excluded from ODA). Assistance to migrants for their sustainable reintegration in their country of origin (use code 93010 for pre-departure assistance provided in donor countries in the context of voluntary returns). Activities that pursue first and foremost providers' interest are excluded from ODA. Activities addressing the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration should not be coded here, but under their relevant sector of intervention. In addition, use code 15136 for support to countries' authorities for immigration affairs and services (optional), code 24050 for programmes aiming at reducing the sending costs of remittances, code 72010 for humanitarian aspects of assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) such as delivery of emergency services and humanitarian protection. Use code 93010 when expenditure is for the temporary sustenance of refugees in the donor country, including for their voluntary return and for their reintegration when support is provided in a donor country in connection with the return from that donor country (i.e. pre-departure assistance), or voluntary resettlement in a third developed country."

- **152:** *Conflict, Peace & Security:* "Further notes on ODA eligibility (and exclusions) of conflict, peace and security related activities are given in paragraphs 76-81 of the Directives."
- **15210:** *Security system management and reform:* "Technical co-operation provided to parliament, government ministries, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist review and reform of the security system to improve democratic governance and civilian control; technical co-operation provided to government to improve civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure, including military budgets, as part of a public expenditure management programme; assistance to civil society to enhance its competence and capacity to scrutinise the security system so that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance."

- **15220:** *Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution:* “Support for civilian activities related to peace building, conflict prevention and resolution, including capacity building, monitoring, dialogue and information exchange. Bilateral participation in international civilian peace missions such as those conducted by the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) or the European Union (European Security and Defence Policy), and contributions to civilian peace funds or commissions (e.g. Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding thematic window of the MDG achievement fund etc.). The contributions can take the form of financing or provision of equipment or civilian or military personnel (e.g. for training civilians).”
- **15230:** *Participation in international peacekeeping operations:* “Bilateral participation in peacekeeping operations mandated or authorised by the United Nations (UN) through Security Council resolutions, and conducted by international organisations, e.g. UN, NATO, the European Union (Security and Defence Policy security-related operations), or regional groupings of developing countries. Direct contributions to the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) budget are excluded from bilateral ODA (they are reportable in part as multilateral ODA, see Annex 9). The activities that can be reported as bilateral ODA under this code are limited to: human rights and election monitoring; reintegration of demobilised soldiers; rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure; monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police forces; security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities; training in customs and border control procedures; advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilisation policy; repatriation and demobilisation of armed factions, and disposal of their weapons; explosive mine removal. The enforcement aspects of international peacekeeping operations are not reportable as ODA. ODA-eligible bilateral participation in peacekeeping operations can take the form of financing or provision of equipment or military or civilian personnel (e.g. police officers). The reportable cost is calculated as the excess over what the personnel and equipment would have cost to maintain had they not been assigned to take part in a peace operation. Costs for military contingents participating in UNDPKO peacekeeping operations are not reportable as ODA. International peacekeeping operations may include humanitarian-type activities (contributions to the form of equipment or person-

nel), as described in codes 7xxxx. These should be included under code 15230 if they are an integrated part of the activities above, otherwise they should be reported as humanitarian aid. NB: When using this code, indicate the name of the operation in the short description of the activity reported.”

- **15240:** *Reintegration and SALW control:* “Reintegration of demobilised military personnel into the economy; conversion of production facilities from military to civilian outputs; technical co-operation to control, prevent and/or reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) – see para. 80 of the Directives for definition of SALW activities covered. [Other than in the context of an international peacekeeping operation (15230) or child soldiers (15261)].”
- **15250:** *Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war:* “All activities related to land mines and explosive remnants of war which have benefits to developing countries as their main objective, including removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war, and stockpile destruction for developmental purposes [other than in the context of an international peacekeeping operation (15230)]; risk education and awareness raising; rehabilitation, reintegration and assistance to victims, and research and development on demining and clearance. Only activities for civilian purposes are ODA-eligible.”
- **15261:** *Child soldiers (prevention and demobilisation):* “Technical co-operation provided to government – and assistance to civil society organisations – to support and apply legislation designed to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, and to demobilise, disarm, reintegrate, repatriate and resettle (DDR) child soldiers.”

## D.2 Economic Sector Project and Program Designations

Sector and purpose descriptions included in “economic aid”.<sup>15</sup>

- **210:** *Transport & Storage:* “Transport policy and administrative management, Transport

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15. Codes and descriptions from the OECD DAC list of CRS purpose codes and voluntary budget identifier codes, available here: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC-CRS-CODES.xls>



policy, planning and administration, Public transport services, Transport regulation, Road transport, Feeder road construction, Feeder road maintenance, National road construction, National road maintenance, Rail transport, Water transport, Air transport, Storage, Education and training in transport and storage.”

- **220:** *Communications:* “Communications policy and administrative management, Communications policy, planning and administration, Postal services, Information services, Telecommunications, Radio/television/print media, Information and communication technology (ICT).”
- **230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236:** *Energy:* “Energy Policy, Energy generation (renewable and non-renewable resources), Hybrid energy plants, Nuclear energy plants, Energy distribution.”
- **240:** *Banking & financial services:* “Financial policy and administrative management, Monetary institutions, Formal sector financial intermediaries, Informal/semi-formal financial intermediaries, Remittance facilitation, promotion and optimisation, Education/training in banking and financial services.”
- **250:** *Business & other services:* “Business policy and administration, Privatisation, Business development services, Responsible business conduct”
- **312, 313:** *Forestry, Fishing:* “Forestry policy and administrative management, Forestry development, Fuelwood/charcoal, Forestry education/training, Forestry research, Forestry services, Fishing policy and administrative management, Fishery development, Fishery education/training, Fishery research, Fishery services.”
- **320, 321, 322, 333:** *Industry, Mining, Construction:* “Industrial policy and administrative management, Industrial development, Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) development, Cottage industries and handicraft, Agro-industries, Forest industries, Textiles, leather and substitutes, Chemicals, Fertilizer plants, Cement/lime/plaster, Energy manufacturing (fossil fuels), Pharmaceutical production, Basic metal industries, Non-ferrous metal industries, Engineering, Transport equipment industry, Modern biofuels manufacturing, Clean cooking appliances manufacturing, Technological research and development, Mineral/mining

policy and administrative management, Mineral prospection and exploration, Coal, Oil and gas (upstream), Ferrous metals, Nonferrous metals, Precious metals/materials, Industrial minerals, Fertilizer minerals, Offshore minerals, Construction policy and administrative management.”

- **330, 331:** *Trade Policies & Regulations:* “Trade policy and administrative management, trade facilitation, regional trade agreements (RTAs), multilateral trade negotiations, trade-related adjustment, trade education/training.”
- **332:** *Tourism:* “tourism, tourism policy and administrative management.”
- **510:** *General budget support-related aid:* “Unearmarked contributions to the government budget; support for the implementation of macroeconomic reforms (structural adjustment programmes, poverty reduction strategies); general programme assistance (when not allocable by sector).”
- **530:** *Other Commodity Assistance:* “Import support (capital goods) Capital goods and services; lines of credit. Import support (commodities) Commodities, general goods and services, oil imports.”
- **600:** *Action relating to debt:* “Debt forgiveness, Relief of multilateral debt, Rescheduling and refinancing, Debt for development swap, Other debt swap, Debt buy-back.”

## E Robustness Checks

### E.1 Small Donors Omitted

There is considerable variation between OECD donors in the total amount of aid and the sectoral composition of aid. Figure 8 visualizes the total amount of ODA (in constant 2018 USD) that each OECD donor provided during the 2003-2018 period, split between economic and governance sectors. To ensure that the results are not driven by the actions of relatively unimportant donors, this robustness check drops the smallest donors from the analysis: Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, several of which allocate large





Figure 8: Donor Total Contributions by Sector 2003-2018

percentages of their foreign aid to the governance sector (see figure 9). It is also worth noting that Japan and Korea provide an exceptional percentage of their foreign aid to economic sector projects.

Figure 9: Composition of foreign aid between donor countries

(a) 2000-2009



(b) 2010-2019




Table 6: Economic Aid DV with Small Donors Omitted

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence	-0.0862 (0.0962)	-0.0846 (0.0978)	-0.0869 (0.0959)	-0.0801 (0.0990)	-0.200** (0.0958)	-0.0223 (0.0926)	-0.166* (0.0918)	0.0657 (0.0948)
Donor Rights	0.207 (0.784)	0.204 (0.781)	0.207 (0.784)	0.205 (0.784)	0.208 (0.781)	0.207 (0.780)	0.208 (0.784)	0.786 (0.881)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.394 (0.242)	-0.394 (0.242)	-0.396* (0.235)	-0.376 (0.238)	-0.400* (0.242)	-0.392 (0.242)	-0.364 (0.238)	-0.508** (0.228)
Ln Exports	1.072*** (0.182)	1.072*** (0.182)	1.072*** (0.183)	1.064*** (0.186)	1.063*** (0.185)	1.061*** (0.181)	1.067*** (0.182)	1.051*** (0.193)
Executive Constraints	1.152*** (0.149)	1.152*** (0.149)	1.151*** (0.148)	1.165*** (0.149)	1.038*** (0.150)	1.171*** (0.147)	1.210*** (0.150)	1.172*** (0.173)
State Capacity	0.0679 (0.226)	0.0668 (0.225)	0.0659 (0.227)	0.0551 (0.225)	0.102 (0.229)	0.141 (0.224)	0.0279 (0.225)	0.418* (0.234)
Ln Terror Events	-0.100 (0.0652)	-0.101 (0.0655)	-0.0996 (0.0622)	-0.0891 (0.0680)	-0.117* (0.0662)	-0.0988 (0.0659)	0.0752 (0.0801)	-0.214** (0.0886)
UN Shaming								-3.398*** (1.253)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0248 (0.0775)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			-0.0166 (0.105)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0279 (0.0229)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.686*** (0.112)			
State Capacity x SV						0.474*** (0.0681)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.155*** (0.0466)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.093 (0.871)
High Dissent	-0.170 (0.133)	-0.169 (0.133)	-0.168 (0.130)	-0.145 (0.137)	-0.164 (0.133)	-0.213 (0.132)	-0.173 (0.133)	0.0682 (0.186)
Ln GDP	-2.259*** (0.222)	-2.258*** (0.222)	-2.257*** (0.221)	-2.250*** (0.223)	-2.254*** (0.223)	-2.196*** (0.220)	-2.258*** (0.221)	-2.321*** (0.243)
Ln Population	1.814*** (0.184)	1.814*** (0.184)	1.812*** (0.184)	1.818*** (0.185)	1.792*** (0.182)	1.685*** (0.184)	1.802*** (0.183)	1.672*** (0.201)
Conflict	-0.477*** (0.119)	-0.478*** (0.119)	-0.475*** (0.122)	-0.480*** (0.121)	-0.388*** (0.117)	-0.317** (0.125)	-0.362*** (0.103)	-0.648*** (0.143)
Aid Concentration	-0.776 (0.623)	-0.777 (0.624)	-0.786 (0.635)	-0.687 (0.579)	-0.881 (0.630)	-1.149* (0.632)	-0.736 (0.616)	-2.190*** (0.646)
Statist Donor	2.116* (1.170)	2.112* (1.167)	2.116* (1.170)	2.112* (1.171)	2.101* (1.164)	2.164* (1.164)	2.109* (1.170)	3.361** (1.403)
Constant	-5.429*** (0.794)	-5.426*** (0.792)	-5.426*** (0.793)	-5.423*** (0.794)	-5.304*** (0.782)	-5.331*** (0.784)	-5.287*** (0.796)	-6.316*** (1.016)
Sigma	4.576*** (0.258)	4.576*** (0.259)	4.576*** (0.258)	4.576*** (0.258)	4.562*** (0.259)	4.561*** (0.258)	4.574*** (0.258)	4.400*** (0.275)
Observations	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	21,128

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table 7: Governance Aid DV with Small Donors Omitted

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.341*** (0.0874)	0.342*** (0.0875)	0.347*** (0.0870)	0.343*** (0.0890)	0.282*** (0.0820)	0.373*** (0.0842)	0.198** (0.0832)	0.473*** (0.0881)
Donor Rights	0.129 (0.370)	0.102 (0.367)	0.130 (0.371)	0.116 (0.370)	0.130 (0.370)	0.129 (0.370)	0.131 (0.369)	0.361 (0.473)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.746*** (0.166)	-0.748*** (0.165)	-0.731*** (0.164)	-0.670*** (0.163)	-0.742*** (0.165)	-0.745*** (0.166)	-0.692*** (0.163)	-0.763*** (0.192)
Ln Exports	0.787*** (0.132)	0.785*** (0.132)	0.786*** (0.131)	0.758*** (0.133)	0.782*** (0.134)	0.784*** (0.132)	0.778*** (0.133)	0.802*** (0.153)
Executive Constraints	0.818*** (0.141)	0.818*** (0.141)	0.820*** (0.141)	0.878*** (0.141)	0.750*** (0.145)	0.829*** (0.141)	0.935*** (0.139)	0.881*** (0.163)
State Capacity	-0.646*** (0.153)	-0.647*** (0.154)	-0.630*** (0.157)	-0.693*** (0.155)	-0.630*** (0.155)	-0.623*** (0.151)	-0.726*** (0.152)	-0.302* (0.174)
Ln Terror Events	0.0845* (0.0468)	0.0820* (0.0472)	0.0810* (0.0454)	0.131*** (0.0467)	0.0708 (0.0478)	0.0843* (0.0467)	0.415*** (0.0564)	0.00707 (0.0646)
UN Shaming								-2.396*** (0.615)
Donor Rights x SV		0.156 (0.103)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			0.129* (0.0770)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.115*** (0.0157)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.389*** (0.0959)			
State Capacity x SV						0.197*** (0.0444)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.287*** (0.0331)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.752*** (0.381)
High Dissent	0.222** (0.112)	0.224** (0.111)	0.209* (0.110)	0.324*** (0.110)	0.232** (0.112)	0.205* (0.112)	0.212* (0.111)	0.371*** (0.135)
Ln GDP	-1.661*** (0.156)	-1.659*** (0.156)	-1.673*** (0.155)	-1.621*** (0.155)	-1.659*** (0.158)	-1.636*** (0.155)	-1.656*** (0.157)	-1.669*** (0.161)
Ln Population	0.877*** (0.119)	0.878*** (0.119)	0.889*** (0.119)	0.886*** (0.119)	0.863*** (0.117)	0.823*** (0.117)	0.849*** (0.118)	0.673*** (0.135)
Conflict	0.142 (0.132)	0.134 (0.131)	0.119 (0.135)	0.121 (0.132)	0.212* (0.125)	0.217 (0.134)	0.340*** (0.131)	0.0789 (0.174)
Aid Concentration	-2.142*** (0.568)	-2.142*** (0.568)	-2.059*** (0.576)	-1.771*** (0.532)	-2.209*** (0.575)	-2.310*** (0.567)	-2.065*** (0.562)	-3.223*** (0.604)
Statist Donor	0.824 (0.551)	0.819 (0.546)	0.820 (0.552)	0.826 (0.552)	0.821 (0.551)	0.839 (0.549)	0.815 (0.550)	1.203 (0.744)
Constant	-4.269*** (0.522)	-4.261*** (0.515)	-4.280*** (0.525)	-4.253*** (0.519)	-4.205*** (0.517)	-4.230*** (0.522)	-4.003*** (0.513)	-4.370*** (0.647)
Sigma	3.655*** (0.170)	3.653*** (0.169)	3.652*** (0.171)	3.642*** (0.169)	3.648*** (0.172)	3.652*** (0.170)	3.644*** (0.170)	3.577*** (0.187)
Observations	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	41,209	21,128

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

## E.2 United States Omitted

This robustness check drops the United States from the analysis to ensure that results are not driven by the actions of a single donor with high levels of foreign aid.

Table 8: Economic Aid DV with United States Omitted

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence	-0.0566 (0.0995)	-0.0596 (0.101)	-0.0603 (0.0992)	-0.0542 (0.102)	-0.168* (0.100)	0.00485 (0.0962)	-0.134 (0.0958)	0.0961 (0.105)
Donor Rights	0.472 (0.851)	0.465 (0.849)	0.472 (0.852)	0.469 (0.852)	0.473 (0.848)	0.472 (0.848)	0.473 (0.851)	1.133 (0.917)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.420** (0.212)	-0.421** (0.212)	-0.423** (0.205)	-0.402** (0.204)	-0.425** (0.211)	-0.418** (0.211)	-0.392* (0.209)	-0.477** (0.224)
Ln Exports	1.193*** (0.180)	1.193*** (0.180)	1.194*** (0.181)	1.187*** (0.183)	1.185*** (0.181)	1.184*** (0.179)	1.189*** (0.180)	1.121*** (0.197)
Executive Constraints	1.075*** (0.158)	1.075*** (0.158)	1.074*** (0.157)	1.087*** (0.157)	0.964*** (0.158)	1.095*** (0.157)	1.131*** (0.160)	1.152*** (0.186)
State Capacity	0.108 (0.226)	0.106 (0.225)	0.105 (0.230)	0.0947 (0.226)	0.141 (0.229)	0.177 (0.223)	0.0687 (0.225)	0.412* (0.242)
Ln Terror Events	-0.115* (0.0615)	-0.116* (0.0615)	-0.114* (0.0584)	-0.105 (0.0646)	-0.132** (0.0626)	-0.113* (0.0621)	0.0546 (0.0767)	-0.227** (0.0897)
UN Shaming								-4.708*** (1.013)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0500 (0.0963)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			-0.0239 (0.141)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0286 (0.0242)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.685*** (0.115)			
State Capacity x SV						0.470*** (0.0719)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.151*** (0.0482)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.732* (0.921)
High Dissent	-0.134 (0.136)	-0.133 (0.136)	-0.132 (0.133)	-0.109 (0.142)	-0.131 (0.137)	-0.177 (0.136)	-0.136 (0.136)	0.145 (0.204)
Ln GDP	-2.372*** (0.226)	-2.371*** (0.226)	-2.370*** (0.227)	-2.363*** (0.227)	-2.367*** (0.226)	-2.311*** (0.224)	-2.370*** (0.226)	-2.397*** (0.246)
Ln Population	1.759*** (0.196)	1.759*** (0.196)	1.756*** (0.200)	1.763*** (0.197)	1.737*** (0.194)	1.632*** (0.196)	1.748*** (0.195)	1.647*** (0.217)
Conflict	-0.444*** (0.103)	-0.446*** (0.103)	-0.441*** (0.105)	-0.445*** (0.104)	-0.359*** (0.102)	-0.288*** (0.108)	-0.329*** (0.0883)	-0.608*** (0.140)
Aid Concentration	-0.830 (0.639)	-0.830 (0.639)	-0.845 (0.646)	-0.741 (0.593)	-0.934 (0.647)	-1.193* (0.649)	-0.790 (0.631)	-2.313*** (0.692)
Statist Donor	2.473** (1.261)	2.464* (1.258)	2.472* (1.262)	2.467* (1.262)	2.458* (1.255)	2.521** (1.257)	2.465* (1.261)	3.894*** (1.461)
Constant	-5.663*** (0.821)	-5.654*** (0.818)	-5.658*** (0.824)	-5.654*** (0.820)	-5.536*** (0.808)	-5.565*** (0.811)	-5.525*** (0.821)	-6.585*** (1.048)
Sigma	4.660*** (0.279)	4.660*** (0.279)	4.660*** (0.278)	4.660*** (0.278)	4.646*** (0.279)	4.645*** (0.278)	4.658*** (0.278)	4.466*** (0.301)
Observations	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	26,099

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table 9: Governance Aid DV with United States Omitted

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.362*** (0.0882)	0.336*** (0.0880)	0.389*** (0.0942)	0.345*** (0.0888)	0.308*** (0.0839)	0.390*** (0.0851)	0.230*** (0.0849)	0.518*** (0.0922)
Donor Rights	0.349 (0.427)	0.304 (0.424)	0.355 (0.429)	0.331 (0.430)	0.351 (0.427)	0.349 (0.427)	0.350 (0.426)	0.630 (0.519)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.871*** (0.171)	-0.873*** (0.170)	-0.853*** (0.168)	-0.795*** (0.168)	-0.867*** (0.170)	-0.870*** (0.171)	-0.822*** (0.169)	-0.807*** (0.202)
Ln Exports	0.883*** (0.123)	0.878*** (0.124)	0.880*** (0.123)	0.859*** (0.123)	0.878*** (0.125)	0.880*** (0.123)	0.874*** (0.124)	0.855*** (0.152)
Executive Constraints	0.751*** (0.136)	0.751*** (0.136)	0.754*** (0.136)	0.808*** (0.135)	0.687*** (0.139)	0.762*** (0.136)	0.861*** (0.135)	0.907*** (0.160)
State Capacity	-0.575*** (0.151)	-0.573*** (0.152)	-0.553*** (0.160)	-0.620*** (0.153)	-0.559*** (0.149)	-0.558*** (0.153)	-0.652*** (0.150)	-0.247 (0.178)
Ln Terror Events	0.0883* (0.0482)	0.0857* (0.0489)	0.0835* (0.0463)	0.130*** (0.0483)	0.0758 (0.0494)	0.0893* (0.0482)	0.397*** (0.0609)	-0.00579 (0.0663)
UN Shaming								-2.928*** (0.576)
Donor Rights x SV		0.222** (0.0907)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			0.171 (0.117)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.117*** (0.0146)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.365*** (0.0955)			
State Capacity x SV						0.171*** (0.0462)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.268*** (0.0340)	
UN Shaming x SV								2.033*** (0.386)
High Dissent	0.266** (0.115)	0.270** (0.114)	0.248** (0.110)	0.366*** (0.114)	0.275** (0.115)	0.252** (0.115)	0.256** (0.114)	0.399*** (0.143)
Ln GDP	-1.763*** (0.147)	-1.759*** (0.148)	-1.777*** (0.148)	-1.724*** (0.145)	-1.762*** (0.149)	-1.742*** (0.146)	-1.757*** (0.148)	-1.743*** (0.155)
Ln Population	0.845*** (0.122)	0.846*** (0.123)	0.862*** (0.125)	0.854*** (0.123)	0.832*** (0.121)	0.798*** (0.121)	0.819*** (0.122)	0.674*** (0.142)
Conflict	0.231* (0.133)	0.223* (0.133)	0.200 (0.138)	0.209 (0.131)	0.295** (0.126)	0.295** (0.133)	0.415*** (0.132)	0.128 (0.181)
Aid Concentration	-2.103*** (0.567)	-2.093*** (0.565)	-2.001*** (0.564)	-1.731*** (0.536)	-2.164*** (0.574)	-2.246*** (0.567)	-2.028*** (0.560)	-3.262*** (0.639)
Statist Donor	1.110* (0.625)	1.091* (0.618)	1.113* (0.626)	1.095* (0.628)	1.107* (0.624)	1.123* (0.624)	1.100* (0.624)	1.614** (0.811)
Constant	-4.575*** (0.552)	-4.550*** (0.543)	-4.601*** (0.561)	-4.537*** (0.548)	-4.515*** (0.549)	-4.542*** (0.553)	-4.329*** (0.543)	-4.668*** (0.675)
Sigma	3.767*** (0.176)	3.760*** (0.176)	3.765*** (0.176)	3.752*** (0.176)	3.761*** (0.178)	3.764*** (0.176)	3.757*** (0.176)	3.675*** (0.188)
Observations	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	50,976	26,099

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

### E.3 Recipient Outliers Omitted

This robustness check omits recipient country outliers, including a few of the most prevalent Global War on Terror countries and several small island countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, Palestinian Territories, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Palau, Nauru, Tuvalu, Micronesia, Cabo Verde, Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sao Tome and Principe. Small island countries, on



average, have very strong respect for human rights and receive very high levels of aid per capita compared to other countries. The global war on terror countries, on average, have high state violence and receive very high levels of aid per capita. Additionally, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the West Bank and Gaza were occupied territories during this period, which makes them special cases. This ensures that results are not driven by recipient outliers.

Table 10: Economic Aid DV with Recipient Outliers Omitted

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence	-0.0250 (0.0712)	-0.0216 (0.0715)	-0.0273 (0.0700)	-0.0667 (0.0709)	-0.0992 (0.0750)	-0.0151 (0.0738)	-0.171** (0.0768)	0.112 (0.0937)
Donor Rights	0.447 (0.779)	0.442 (0.777)	0.447 (0.779)	0.451 (0.777)	0.448 (0.775)	0.446 (0.774)	0.447 (0.778)	0.927 (0.863)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.551** (0.247)	-0.552** (0.247)	-0.557** (0.240)	-0.571** (0.243)	-0.606** (0.249)	-0.561** (0.247)	-0.508** (0.244)	-0.550** (0.244)
Ln Exports	1.049*** (0.158)	1.049*** (0.158)	1.049*** (0.159)	1.056*** (0.161)	1.034*** (0.159)	1.031*** (0.158)	1.039*** (0.156)	1.030*** (0.175)
Executive Constraints	0.944*** (0.140)	0.945*** (0.140)	0.944*** (0.140)	0.931*** (0.141)	0.806*** (0.139)	0.962*** (0.139)	1.036*** (0.143)	1.099*** (0.162)
State Capacity	0.277 (0.203)	0.276 (0.202)	0.275 (0.204)	0.285 (0.202)	0.372* (0.209)	0.418** (0.201)	0.256 (0.203)	0.409* (0.231)
Ln Terror Events	-0.246*** (0.0700)	-0.247*** (0.0700)	-0.244*** (0.0675)	-0.266*** (0.0742)	-0.271*** (0.0698)	-0.271*** (0.0705)	0.0715 (0.0801)	-0.190** (0.0922)
UN Shaming								-3.544*** (1.254)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0388 (0.0512)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			-0.0332 (0.0839)					
Ln Exports x SV				0.0497* (0.0284)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.790*** (0.0922)			
State Capacity x SV						0.679*** (0.0706)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.326*** (0.0476)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.280 (0.826)
High Dissent	-0.0729 (0.134)	-0.0720 (0.134)	-0.0715 (0.133)	-0.0991 (0.137)	-0.134 (0.134)	-0.124 (0.134)	-0.0895 (0.134)	0.0754 (0.188)
Ln GDP	-2.213*** (0.187)	-2.213*** (0.187)	-2.211*** (0.187)	-2.229*** (0.190)	-2.191*** (0.187)	-2.155*** (0.187)	-2.215*** (0.186)	-2.222*** (0.220)
Ln Population	1.759*** (0.179)	1.759*** (0.179)	1.757*** (0.180)	1.756*** (0.179)	1.745*** (0.179)	1.635*** (0.176)	1.760*** (0.179)	1.551*** (0.204)
Conflict	-0.517*** (0.125)	-0.518*** (0.125)	-0.517*** (0.125)	-0.500*** (0.126)	-0.541*** (0.129)	-0.350*** (0.128)	-0.299*** (0.111)	-0.696*** (0.148)
Aid Concentration	-0.829 (0.594)	-0.831 (0.596)	-0.849 (0.598)	-0.946* (0.571)	-1.027* (0.603)	-1.230** (0.615)	-0.745 (0.589)	-2.299*** (0.619)
Statist Donor	3.193*** (1.173)	3.193*** (1.171)	3.196*** (1.172)	3.216*** (1.169)	3.217*** (1.168)	3.235*** (1.167)	3.174*** (1.173)	3.889*** (1.387)
Constant	-6.323*** (0.821)	-6.322*** (0.820)	-6.320*** (0.821)	-6.344*** (0.820)	-6.236*** (0.811)	-6.164*** (0.807)	-6.041*** (0.824)	-6.667*** (1.027)
Sigma	4.466*** (0.248)	4.466*** (0.248)	4.466*** (0.248)	4.463*** (0.248)	4.448*** (0.248)	4.436*** (0.248)	4.455*** (0.247)	4.368*** (0.271)
Observations	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	26,210

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table 11: Governance Aid DV with Recipient Outliers Omitted

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.311*** (0.0676)	0.314*** (0.0686)	0.318*** (0.0713)	0.333*** (0.0640)	0.270*** (0.0662)	0.332*** (0.0670)	0.118* (0.0701)	0.499*** (0.0976)
Donor Rights	0.319 (0.393)	0.296 (0.391)	0.319 (0.394)	0.313 (0.394)	0.318 (0.393)	0.318 (0.393)	0.317 (0.391)	0.520 (0.481)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.934*** (0.171)	-0.935*** (0.171)	-0.919*** (0.167)	-0.918*** (0.170)	-0.964*** (0.172)	-0.941*** (0.171)	-0.876*** (0.170)	-0.858*** (0.192)
Ln Exports	0.772*** (0.115)	0.770*** (0.115)	0.770*** (0.115)	0.767*** (0.115)	0.761*** (0.116)	0.760*** (0.115)	0.757*** (0.114)	0.756*** (0.136)
Executive Constraints	0.662*** (0.135)	0.665*** (0.136)	0.663*** (0.135)	0.675*** (0.135)	0.567*** (0.135)	0.675*** (0.134)	0.799*** (0.135)	0.870*** (0.153)
State Capacity	-0.375** (0.164)	-0.376** (0.164)	-0.368** (0.168)	-0.381** (0.165)	-0.318* (0.167)	-0.294* (0.161)	-0.408** (0.165)	-0.207 (0.185)
Ln Terror Events	-0.0413 (0.0545)	-0.0438 (0.0549)	-0.0457 (0.0528)	-0.0246 (0.0545)	-0.0602 (0.0547)	-0.0585 (0.0550)	0.399*** (0.0617)	0.0441 (0.0626)
UN Shaming								-2.374*** (0.606)
Donor Rights x SV		0.134* (0.0771)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			0.0964 (0.0732)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0392** (0.0159)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.534*** (0.0755)			
State Capacity x SV						0.430*** (0.0418)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.447*** (0.0382)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.887*** (0.392)
High Dissent	0.247** (0.107)	0.250** (0.106)	0.241** (0.104)	0.270** (0.105)	0.211** (0.106)	0.211** (0.107)	0.216** (0.105)	0.301** (0.127)
Ln GDP	-1.657*** (0.129)	-1.655*** (0.129)	-1.663*** (0.129)	-1.644*** (0.130)	-1.641*** (0.130)	-1.623*** (0.130)	-1.657*** (0.129)	-1.592*** (0.142)
Ln Population	0.892*** (0.126)	0.890*** (0.126)	0.898*** (0.126)	0.893*** (0.127)	0.878*** (0.125)	0.815*** (0.124)	0.888*** (0.126)	0.617*** (0.137)
Conflict	-0.0623 (0.127)	-0.0678 (0.126)	-0.0641 (0.128)	-0.0810 (0.126)	-0.0632 (0.129)	0.0536 (0.126)	0.205 (0.132)	-0.212 (0.169)
Aid Concentration	-1.974*** (0.511)	-1.980*** (0.511)	-1.913*** (0.515)	-1.878*** (0.494)	-2.125*** (0.519)	-2.251*** (0.525)	-1.837*** (0.504)	-3.346*** (0.570)
Statist Donor	1.565*** (0.580)	1.566*** (0.575)	1.557*** (0.578)	1.545*** (0.580)	1.574*** (0.579)	1.583*** (0.578)	1.542*** (0.578)	1.537** (0.754)
Constant	-4.931*** (0.553)	-4.931*** (0.547)	-4.937*** (0.556)	-4.914*** (0.551)	-4.872*** (0.551)	-4.830*** (0.553)	-4.538*** (0.545)	-4.564*** (0.665)
Sigma	3.611*** (0.171)	3.610*** (0.170)	3.610*** (0.171)	3.611*** (0.171)	3.599*** (0.172)	3.594*** (0.172)	3.583*** (0.170)	3.520*** (0.183)
Observations	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	49,803	26,210

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

## E.4 Ordinary Least Squares

Table 12: Economic Aid DV with OLS Estimator

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence	-0.0168 (0.0354)	-0.0168 (0.0350)	-0.0155 (0.0352)	-0.0113 (0.0380)	-0.0473 (0.0336)	-0.000171 (0.0347)	-0.0352 (0.0324)	0.0219 (0.0344)
Donor Rights	0.0493 (0.223)	0.0507 (0.223)	0.0493 (0.223)	0.0499 (0.222)	0.0496 (0.222)	0.0491 (0.223)	0.0492 (0.223)	0.249 (0.276)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.0906 (0.0969)	-0.0903 (0.0969)	-0.0889 (0.0944)	-0.0951 (0.0955)	-0.0920 (0.0973)	-0.0898 (0.0970)	-0.0844 (0.0955)	-0.107 (0.102)
Ln Exports	0.259*** (0.0467)	0.260*** (0.0468)	0.259*** (0.0469)	0.262*** (0.0482)	0.256*** (0.0467)	0.258*** (0.0467)	0.258*** (0.0468)	0.252*** (0.0554)
Executive Constraints	0.356*** (0.0490)	0.356*** (0.0489)	0.356*** (0.0490)	0.353*** (0.0481)	0.334*** (0.0481)	0.365*** (0.0488)	0.370*** (0.0512)	0.383*** (0.0552)
State Capacity	-0.0113 (0.0694)	-0.0109 (0.0694)	-0.00973 (0.0696)	-0.00858 (0.0704)	-0.00314 (0.0708)	0.0171 (0.0707)	-0.0199 (0.0692)	0.0616 (0.0815)
Ln Terror Events	-0.0185 (0.0215)	-0.0182 (0.0216)	-0.0189 (0.0207)	-0.0215 (0.0231)	-0.0244 (0.0213)	-0.0192 (0.0215)	0.0218 (0.0295)	-0.0621* (0.0304)
UN Shaming								-0.638*** (0.190)
Donor Rights x SV		-0.0206 (0.0272)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			0.0126 (0.0390)					
Ln Exports x SV				0.00580 (0.00675)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.193*** (0.0486)			
State Capacity x SV						0.143*** (0.0277)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.0357* (0.0174)	
UN Shaming x SV								0.157 (0.124)
High Dissent	-0.0853* (0.0461)	-0.0856* (0.0462)	-0.0866* (0.0449)	-0.0915* (0.0494)	-0.0820* (0.0460)	-0.0981** (0.0466)	-0.0855* (0.0461)	-0.0629 (0.0538)
Ln GDP	-0.589*** (0.0880)	-0.590*** (0.0881)	-0.590*** (0.0882)	-0.591*** (0.0889)	-0.588*** (0.0878)	-0.574*** (0.0866)	-0.589*** (0.0880)	-0.614*** (0.104)
Ln Population	0.443*** (0.0792)	0.443*** (0.0792)	0.444*** (0.0795)	0.443*** (0.0789)	0.439*** (0.0783)	0.407*** (0.0764)	0.440*** (0.0786)	0.424*** (0.0881)
Conflict	-0.189*** (0.0591)	-0.189*** (0.0590)	-0.192*** (0.0620)	-0.188*** (0.0589)	-0.159*** (0.0537)	-0.131** (0.0576)	-0.163*** (0.0505)	-0.242*** (0.0692)
Aid Concentration	-0.142 (0.176)	-0.142 (0.177)	-0.134 (0.175)	-0.161 (0.169)	-0.186 (0.178)	-0.260 (0.170)	-0.135 (0.175)	-0.585*** (0.185)
Statist Donor	0.131 (0.336)	0.133 (0.336)	0.131 (0.336)	0.130 (0.336)	0.136 (0.336)	0.133 (0.336)	0.132 (0.336)	0.526 (0.442)
Constant	0.811*** (0.255)	0.809*** (0.255)	0.809*** (0.255)	0.809*** (0.254)	0.834*** (0.253)	0.850*** (0.253)	0.841*** (0.257)	0.467 (0.296)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113
R-squared	0.328	0.328	0.328	0.328	0.330	0.330	0.328	0.345

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

OLS model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table 13: Governance Aid DV with OLS Estimator

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.133** (0.0487)	0.133** (0.0486)	0.145*** (0.0474)	0.114** (0.0515)	0.108** (0.0431)	0.141*** (0.0478)	0.0773* (0.0428)	0.171*** (0.0423)
Donor Rights	0.135 (0.141)	0.132 (0.139)	0.135 (0.141)	0.133 (0.141)	0.135 (0.141)	0.135 (0.141)	0.135 (0.141)	0.179 (0.171)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.315*** (0.0906)	-0.316*** (0.0905)	-0.300*** (0.0883)	-0.299*** (0.0904)	-0.316*** (0.0912)	-0.315*** (0.0907)	-0.296*** (0.0882)	-0.255** (0.0997)
Ln Exports	0.258*** (0.0456)	0.258*** (0.0455)	0.257*** (0.0459)	0.251*** (0.0443)	0.256*** (0.0458)	0.258*** (0.0455)	0.255*** (0.0457)	0.245*** (0.0527)
Executive Constraints	0.324*** (0.0543)	0.325*** (0.0545)	0.323*** (0.0547)	0.335*** (0.0557)	0.306*** (0.0547)	0.328*** (0.0543)	0.367*** (0.0550)	0.385*** (0.0620)
State Capacity	-0.252*** (0.0674)	-0.253*** (0.0671)	-0.238*** (0.0684)	-0.261*** (0.0679)	-0.245*** (0.0677)	-0.239*** (0.0647)	-0.278*** (0.0680)	-0.145* (0.0738)
Ln Terror Events	0.0600** (0.0230)	0.0593** (0.0231)	0.0567** (0.0221)	0.0703*** (0.0235)	0.0551** (0.0230)	0.0597** (0.0230)	0.182*** (0.0335)	0.00729 (0.0268)
UN Shaming								-0.683*** (0.127)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0438 (0.0566)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			0.116** (0.0511)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0203** (0.00779)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.162*** (0.0492)			
State Capacity x SV						0.0634*** (0.0203)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.108*** (0.0205)	
UN Shaming x SV								0.441*** (0.104)
High Dissent	0.0754* (0.0421)	0.0760* (0.0419)	0.0637 (0.0396)	0.0974** (0.0420)	0.0782* (0.0422)	0.0697 (0.0421)	0.0747* (0.0421)	0.120** (0.0550)
Ln GDP	-0.605*** (0.0730)	-0.604*** (0.0730)	-0.614*** (0.0735)	-0.598*** (0.0718)	-0.603*** (0.0729)	-0.598*** (0.0725)	-0.603*** (0.0731)	-0.577*** (0.0814)
Ln Population	0.254*** (0.0505)	0.254*** (0.0505)	0.264*** (0.0505)	0.256*** (0.0510)	0.250*** (0.0498)	0.238*** (0.0509)	0.243*** (0.0495)	0.171** (0.0588)
Conflict	0.0374 (0.0551)	0.0370 (0.0550)	0.0176 (0.0590)	0.0340 (0.0551)	0.0626 (0.0503)	0.0632 (0.0556)	0.118** (0.0523)	0.0192 (0.0709)
Aid Concentration	-0.770*** (0.219)	-0.771*** (0.220)	-0.698*** (0.224)	-0.703*** (0.211)	-0.807*** (0.227)	-0.823*** (0.216)	-0.748*** (0.218)	-1.188*** (0.250)
Statist Donor	0.0647 (0.223)	0.0605 (0.222)	0.0646 (0.224)	0.0672 (0.223)	0.0686 (0.223)	0.0653 (0.223)	0.0665 (0.223)	0.166 (0.276)
Constant	0.504** (0.194)	0.509** (0.194)	0.488** (0.197)	0.509** (0.194)	0.524** (0.192)	0.522** (0.196)	0.596*** (0.190)	0.433** (0.201)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113
R-squared	0.348	0.348	0.349	0.349	0.349	0.348	0.350	0.367

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

OLS model with donor and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

## E.5 Variations of Donor, Region, and Recipient Fixed Effects

Fixed effects control for any time-invariant attributes of an individual unit. The problem with fixed effects is that they can control away important information about differences between units for variables that do not change over time or change slowly or rarely (Beck and Katz 2001; Beck 2001; Bell and Jones 2015; Plümper and Troeger 2007). In these cases, fixed effects filter out the between-unit effects of important explanatory variables. The benefit of fixed effects is that they can eliminate omitted variable bias that is caused by unobserved time-invariant confounds.

All models in the manuscript include donor and year fixed effects (except for models 2 and 10, which investigate donor rights as a moderator and prioritize between-donor comparisons). Including donor fixed effects focuses on within-donor changes by controlling for unobserved sources of between-donor heterogeneity. Leaving recipient fixed effects out of these models prioritizes capturing how differences between recipients drive donor strategy.

As shown in time series plots below, some of the theoretically-important recipient attributes investigated in this study are time-invariant within several recipient states and are slowly-changing in others. Throughout, differences between recipients tend to be much stronger than differences within. That being said, an important element of development research is understanding how changes *within* recipient countries affect outcomes. Including recipient fixed effects shifts the focus to within-recipient variation and assuages concerns that omitted variables are driving results.

Nielsen (2013) offers a middle ground between including and not including recipient fixed effects by including region fixed effects. This controls for region-specific attributes, capturing some potential sources of omitted variable bias, while allowing for variation between recipients.

I present robustness checks with region-year fixed effects, recipient-year fixed effects, donor-region-year fixed effects, and donor-recipient-year fixed effects below. The core results are consistent: coercive strategy is highly condition and catalytic strategy is positive and significant across models. There is some variation in the interaction: executive constraints are consistent throughout, and the results for state capacity and terrorist event moderators are consistent with donor and region fixed effects, but fall out of significance for the governance DV when recipient fixed effects are included.




Figure 10: Time series comparison of donor rights



Figure 11: Time series comparison of recipient state violence



Figure 12: Time series comparison of recipient executive constraints





Figure 13: Time series comparison of recipient state capacity



Figure 14: Time series comparison of recipient ln terrorism events

## E.5.1 Region Fixed Effects

Table 14: Economic Aid DV with Region-Year Fixed Effects

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence	0.178** (0.0697)	0.182** (0.0714)	0.179** (0.0714)	0.170** (0.0682)	0.0808 (0.0693)	0.219*** (0.0712)	0.0595 (0.0739)	0.209** (0.0933)
Donor Rights	0.557 (0.639)	0.555 (0.638)	0.560 (0.639)	0.557 (0.639)	0.560 (0.639)	0.565 (0.640)	0.565 (0.640)	0.715 (0.605)
UN Ideal Point Distance	1.211** (0.591)	1.210** (0.591)	1.222** (0.589)	1.196** (0.594)	1.238** (0.590)	1.251** (0.592)	1.250** (0.596)	1.215* (0.672)
Ln Exports	1.655*** (0.164)	1.655*** (0.164)	1.654*** (0.164)	1.658*** (0.166)	1.647*** (0.165)	1.646*** (0.164)	1.650*** (0.164)	1.698*** (0.159)
Executive Constraints	1.688*** (0.267)	1.688*** (0.267)	1.695*** (0.266)	1.670*** (0.272)	1.565*** (0.264)	1.702*** (0.266)	1.779*** (0.281)	1.651*** (0.291)
State Capacity	-0.0807 (0.179)	-0.0816 (0.178)	-0.0873 (0.178)	-0.0560 (0.181)	-0.0327 (0.183)	-0.00885 (0.177)	-0.147 (0.178)	0.250 (0.197)
Ln Terror Events	-0.125*** (0.0370)	-0.125*** (0.0371)	-0.124*** (0.0369)	-0.139*** (0.0374)	-0.135*** (0.0382)	-0.124*** (0.0365)	0.140** (0.0547)	-0.267*** (0.0516)
UN Shaming								-4.295*** (1.096)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0381 (0.0741)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			-0.0831 (0.0949)					
Ln Exports x SV				0.0363 (0.0261)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.629*** (0.0992)			
State Capacity x SV						0.425*** (0.0668)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.237*** (0.0550)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.273 (0.943)
High Dissent	-0.373*** (0.111)	-0.373*** (0.111)	-0.370*** (0.111)	-0.402*** (0.118)	-0.364*** (0.112)	-0.403*** (0.111)	-0.379*** (0.111)	-0.178 (0.171)
Ln GDP	-2.981*** (0.214)	-2.981*** (0.214)	-2.974*** (0.213)	-3.001*** (0.218)	-2.969*** (0.212)	-2.928*** (0.212)	-2.978*** (0.214)	-3.005*** (0.216)
Ln Population	1.778*** (0.200)	1.778*** (0.200)	1.772*** (0.199)	1.788*** (0.198)	1.751*** (0.195)	1.674*** (0.195)	1.756*** (0.198)	1.556*** (0.214)
Conflict	-0.620*** (0.127)	-0.622*** (0.126)	-0.614*** (0.128)	-0.616*** (0.126)	-0.550*** (0.126)	-0.482*** (0.121)	-0.437*** (0.110)	-0.657*** (0.162)
Aid Concentration	-0.564 (0.525)	-0.564 (0.525)	-0.609 (0.535)	-0.642 (0.500)	-0.688 (0.527)	-0.826 (0.536)	-0.514 (0.519)	-1.966*** (0.585)
Statist Donor	1.350 (0.917)	1.351 (0.917)	1.355 (0.917)	1.335 (0.913)	1.374 (0.919)	1.377 (0.918)	1.373 (0.917)	1.603* (0.878)
Constant	-4.748*** (0.946)	-4.745*** (0.947)	-4.727*** (0.943)	-4.760*** (0.948)	-4.663*** (0.943)	-4.710*** (0.946)	-4.702*** (0.943)	-4.671*** (1.086)
Sigma	5.133*** (0.212)	5.133*** (0.212)	5.133*** (0.212)	5.132*** (0.213)	5.123*** (0.212)	5.123*** (0.212)	5.129*** (0.211)	4.935*** (0.245)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with region and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table 15: Governance Aid DV with Region-Year Fixed Effects

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.617*** (0.0873)	0.622*** (0.0840)	0.616*** (0.0869)	0.615*** (0.0851)	0.575*** (0.0851)	0.635*** (0.0877)	0.451*** (0.0857)	0.647*** (0.0973)
Donor Rights	0.808* (0.482)	0.792* (0.478)	0.808* (0.483)	0.810* (0.482)	0.810* (0.482)	0.810* (0.482)	0.819* (0.481)	0.886* (0.463)
UN Ideal Point Distance	1.186** (0.530)	1.181** (0.531)	1.181** (0.529)	1.201** (0.528)	1.205** (0.532)	1.198** (0.532)	1.242** (0.529)	1.129* (0.649)
Ln Exports	1.290*** (0.130)	1.288*** (0.130)	1.290*** (0.130)	1.288*** (0.131)	1.285*** (0.131)	1.287*** (0.130)	1.283*** (0.130)	1.363*** (0.132)
Executive Constraints	1.391*** (0.191)	1.390*** (0.191)	1.388*** (0.190)	1.411*** (0.189)	1.325*** (0.187)	1.399*** (0.191)	1.534*** (0.197)	1.276*** (0.210)
State Capacity	-0.636*** (0.141)	-0.634*** (0.142)	-0.633*** (0.142)	-0.661*** (0.145)	-0.613*** (0.142)	-0.620*** (0.139)	-0.746*** (0.142)	-0.250 (0.159)
Ln Terror Events	-0.0168 (0.0301)	-0.0191 (0.0298)	-0.0166 (0.0301)	-0.00152 (0.0341)	-0.0256 (0.0316)	-0.0163 (0.0300)	0.379*** (0.0431)	-0.112*** (0.0389)
UN Shaming								-3.488*** (0.602)
Donor Rights x SV		0.152* (0.0879)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			0.0275 (0.0640)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0406** (0.0193)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.320*** (0.0925)			
State Capacity x SV						0.138** (0.0565)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.343*** (0.0353)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.939*** (0.378)
High Dissent	-0.0141 (0.0857)	-0.0138 (0.0852)	-0.0155 (0.0865)	0.0180 (0.0848)	-0.00447 (0.0854)	-0.0236 (0.0857)	-0.0281 (0.0843)	0.0584 (0.106)
Ln GDP	-2.560*** (0.171)	-2.561*** (0.171)	-2.562*** (0.171)	-2.537*** (0.175)	-2.557*** (0.171)	-2.543*** (0.173)	-2.551*** (0.172)	-2.520*** (0.167)
Ln Population	1.097*** (0.158)	1.099*** (0.158)	1.099*** (0.157)	1.085*** (0.157)	1.085*** (0.156)	1.062*** (0.157)	1.057*** (0.157)	0.851*** (0.171)
Conflict	0.111 (0.151)	0.103 (0.150)	0.108 (0.151)	0.0994 (0.150)	0.159 (0.143)	0.160 (0.142)	0.354** (0.143)	0.0947 (0.182)
Aid Concentration	-1.447*** (0.448)	-1.448*** (0.446)	-1.432*** (0.453)	-1.360*** (0.441)	-1.511*** (0.449)	-1.540*** (0.446)	-1.372*** (0.444)	-2.684*** (0.503)
Statist Donor	-0.488 (0.718)	-0.484 (0.718)	-0.490 (0.718)	-0.474 (0.720)	-0.473 (0.719)	-0.479 (0.718)	-0.458 (0.718)	-0.496 (0.726)
Constant	-2.486*** (0.817)	-2.476*** (0.818)	-2.490*** (0.817)	-2.472*** (0.819)	-2.461*** (0.817)	-2.472*** (0.819)	-2.419*** (0.816)	-3.267*** (0.886)
Sigma	4.122*** (0.204)	4.120*** (0.203)	4.122*** (0.204)	4.121*** (0.204)	4.118*** (0.205)	4.121*** (0.204)	4.107*** (0.203)	4.094*** (0.219)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with region and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

## E.5.2 Recipient Fixed Effects

Table 16: Economic Aid DV with Recipient-Year Fixed Effects

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence (SV)	0.0332 (0.0872)	0.0476 (0.0888)	0.0179 (0.0930)	-0.0120 (0.0973)	0.0303 (0.0887)	0.152 (0.109)	0.0227 (0.0869)	-0.0563 (0.143)
Donor Rights	0.593 (0.659)	0.572 (0.657)	0.592 (0.659)	0.593 (0.659)	0.595 (0.659)	0.600 (0.661)	0.593 (0.659)	0.860 (0.661)
UN Ideal Point Dist.	1.377 (0.876)	1.378 (0.876)	1.347 (0.892)	1.354 (0.876)	1.385 (0.877)	1.395 (0.879)	1.379 (0.876)	1.740* (0.955)
Ln Exports	1.738*** (0.171)	1.738*** (0.171)	1.737*** (0.171)	1.728*** (0.169)	1.736*** (0.171)	1.736*** (0.171)	1.738*** (0.171)	1.756*** (0.177)
Exec. Constraints	1.597*** (0.423)	1.595*** (0.423)	1.591*** (0.427)	1.587*** (0.422)	1.398*** (0.408)	1.655*** (0.432)	1.581*** (0.420)	1.168** (0.585)
State Capacity	-0.0758 (0.218)	-0.0766 (0.218)	-0.0877 (0.214)	-0.0779 (0.216)	-0.103 (0.220)	-0.259 (0.256)	-0.0732 (0.217)	-0.394 (0.295)
Ln Terror Events	0.0696* (0.0370)	0.0684* (0.0369)	0.0714* (0.0369)	0.0621 (0.0388)	0.0590* (0.0354)	0.0740* (0.0380)	0.130** (0.0565)	-0.0469 (0.0472)
UN Shaming								-3.152*** (0.996)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0701 (0.0687)						
UN Ideal Point Dist. x SV			0.0983 (0.111)					
Ln Exports x SV				0.0738* (0.0408)				
Exec. Constraints x SV					0.467*** (0.146)			
State Capacity x SV						0.592*** (0.200)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.0568* (0.0324)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.290** (0.501)
High Dissent	-0.192* (0.106)	-0.191* (0.105)	-0.191* (0.105)	-0.192* (0.106)	-0.191* (0.106)	-0.165 (0.111)	-0.195* (0.105)	-0.115 (0.128)
Ln GDP	-3.058*** (0.875)	-3.054*** (0.874)	-3.052*** (0.876)	-3.069*** (0.876)	-3.020*** (0.872)	-3.002*** (0.864)	-3.081*** (0.879)	-2.121** (0.944)
Ln Population	-4.127*** (1.147)	-4.154*** (1.152)	-4.139*** (1.150)	-4.170*** (1.152)	-4.138*** (1.156)	-4.435*** (1.153)	-4.049*** (1.145)	-3.095 (1.971)
Conflict	-0.222 (0.143)	-0.224 (0.143)	-0.224 (0.142)	-0.237* (0.140)	-0.255* (0.149)	-0.204 (0.137)	-0.177 (0.133)	-0.373** (0.185)
Aid Concentration	0.862*** (0.298)	0.866*** (0.298)	0.860*** (0.299)	0.869*** (0.298)	0.818*** (0.295)	0.892*** (0.301)	0.865*** (0.297)	0.283 (0.415)
Statist Donor	1.343 (0.914)	1.346 (0.914)	1.341 (0.913)	1.317 (0.911)	1.349 (0.915)	1.352 (0.914)	1.344 (0.914)	1.757** (0.886)
Constant	11.74*** (4.096)	11.80*** (4.105)	11.86*** (4.103)	11.55*** (4.086)	11.63*** (4.118)	11.76*** (4.103)	11.63*** (4.069)	6.439 (5.688)
Sigma	4.803*** (0.208)	4.803*** (0.209)	4.802*** (0.209)	4.801*** (0.210)	4.802*** (0.208)	4.800*** (0.209)	4.802*** (0.208)	4.589*** (0.235)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with recipient and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table 17: Governance Aid DV with Recipient-Year Fixed Effects

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.330*** (0.0872)	0.355*** (0.0918)	0.343*** (0.0921)	0.329*** (0.0862)	0.330*** (0.0868)	0.348*** (0.0889)	0.327*** (0.0851)	0.249*** (0.0834)
Donor Rights	0.920* (0.484)	0.858* (0.481)	0.922* (0.485)	0.920* (0.484)	0.921* (0.484)	0.921* (0.485)	0.920* (0.484)	1.044** (0.487)
UN Ideal Point Distance	1.667** (0.721)	1.665** (0.721)	1.696** (0.709)	1.666** (0.719)	1.672** (0.722)	1.669** (0.722)	1.668** (0.721)	1.822** (0.812)
Ln Exports	1.315*** (0.126)	1.312*** (0.126)	1.315*** (0.126)	1.313*** (0.124)	1.314*** (0.126)	1.314*** (0.126)	1.315*** (0.126)	1.365*** (0.139)
Executive Constraints	1.798*** (0.277)	1.791*** (0.278)	1.803*** (0.274)	1.796*** (0.275)	1.669*** (0.268)	1.807*** (0.279)	1.793*** (0.276)	0.919*** (0.286)
State Capacity	-0.690*** (0.217)	-0.689*** (0.217)	-0.678*** (0.216)	-0.690*** (0.217)	-0.701*** (0.218)	-0.717*** (0.229)	-0.690*** (0.217)	-1.025*** (0.274)
Ln Terror Events	0.110*** (0.0278)	0.107*** (0.0279)	0.108*** (0.0281)	0.109*** (0.0289)	0.104*** (0.0275)	0.111*** (0.0279)	0.130*** (0.0399)	0.0420 (0.0305)
UN Shaming								-1.780*** (0.676)
Donor Rights x SV		0.181** (0.0863)						
UN Ideal Point Dist. x SV			-0.0835 (0.133)					
Ln Exports x SV				0.00586 (0.0366)				
Exec. Constraints x SV					0.268*** (0.0789)			
State Capacity x SV						0.0800 (0.101)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.0187 (0.0218)	
UN Shaming x SV								0.515 (0.330)
High Dissent	0.106* (0.0634)	0.108* (0.0634)	0.105* (0.0636)	0.106* (0.0634)	0.107* (0.0634)	0.109* (0.0642)	0.106* (0.0634)	-0.00660 (0.0675)
Ln GDP	-2.497*** (0.541)	-2.476*** (0.541)	-2.502*** (0.542)	-2.498*** (0.542)	-2.483*** (0.541)	-2.494*** (0.539)	-2.505*** (0.543)	-1.544** (0.669)
Ln Population	-0.699 (0.812)	-0.782 (0.826)	-0.688 (0.810)	-0.701 (0.812)	-0.692 (0.815)	-0.731 (0.816)	-0.673 (0.806)	0.729 (0.961)
Conflict	0.134 (0.103)	0.132 (0.103)	0.135 (0.103)	0.134 (0.102)	0.116 (0.103)	0.138 (0.101)	0.147 (0.0999)	-0.195 (0.121)
Aid Concentration	0.192 (0.212)	0.201 (0.208)	0.192 (0.211)	0.193 (0.214)	0.161 (0.211)	0.195 (0.212)	0.194 (0.211)	0.00378 (0.281)
Statist Donor	-0.360 (0.755)	-0.351 (0.755)	-0.358 (0.754)	-0.362 (0.753)	-0.356 (0.755)	-0.359 (0.755)	-0.360 (0.755)	-0.272 (0.772)
Constant	4.786* (2.754)	4.917* (2.759)	4.683* (2.728)	4.771* (2.743)	4.726* (2.754)	4.778* (2.749)	4.751* (2.740)	-1.925 (3.484)
Sigma	3.738*** (0.196)	3.735*** (0.195)	3.739*** (0.196)	3.738*** (0.196)	3.738*** (0.196)	3.738*** (0.196)	3.738*** (0.196)	3.700*** (0.204)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with recipient and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

### E.5.3 Donor-Region-Year Fixed Effects

Table 18: Economic Aid DV with Donor-Region-Year Fixed Effects

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence	0.111 (0.0704)	0.112 (0.0706)	0.111 (0.0709)	0.117* (0.0705)	0.00214 (0.0684)	0.156** (0.0722)	0.00573 (0.0709)	0.122 (0.0903)
Donor Rights	0.390 (0.772)	0.388 (0.769)	0.390 (0.771)	0.389 (0.772)	0.390 (0.768)	0.390 (0.769)	0.390 (0.771)	0.918 (0.860)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.0311 (0.200)	-0.0312 (0.200)	-0.0258 (0.208)	-0.0256 (0.201)	0.00152 (0.202)	0.0284 (0.203)	0.0287 (0.202)	-0.562*** (0.196)
Ln Exports	1.181*** (0.182)	1.181*** (0.182)	1.181*** (0.182)	1.176*** (0.184)	1.172*** (0.183)	1.173*** (0.181)	1.180*** (0.181)	1.154*** (0.197)
Executive Constraints	1.330*** (0.168)	1.330*** (0.168)	1.333*** (0.168)	1.340*** (0.171)	1.200*** (0.162)	1.352*** (0.167)	1.417*** (0.174)	1.245*** (0.192)
State Capacity	0.0197 (0.184)	0.0192 (0.183)	0.0178 (0.183)	0.00559 (0.185)	0.0735 (0.189)	0.101 (0.184)	-0.0394 (0.183)	0.295 (0.203)
Ln Terror Events	-0.0776** (0.0366)	-0.0778** (0.0367)	-0.0775** (0.0363)	-0.0692* (0.0376)	-0.0870** (0.0377)	-0.0763** (0.0362)	0.156*** (0.0515)	-0.178*** (0.0433)
UN Shaming								-3.150*** (1.149)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0174 (0.0766)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			-0.0248 (0.0927)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0217 (0.0224)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.675*** (0.106)			
State Capacity x SV						0.451*** (0.0659)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.210*** (0.0432)	
UN Shaming x SV								0.935 (0.909)
High Dissent = 1	-0.304*** (0.107)	-0.304*** (0.107)	-0.304*** (0.107)	-0.285** (0.112)	-0.299*** (0.107)	-0.344*** (0.108)	-0.309*** (0.107)	-0.0364 (0.174)
Ln GDP	-2.540*** (0.239)	-2.540*** (0.239)	-2.539*** (0.238)	-2.525*** (0.242)	-2.525*** (0.237)	-2.484*** (0.236)	-2.540*** (0.239)	-2.465*** (0.251)
Ln Population	1.792*** (0.193)	1.792*** (0.193)	1.790*** (0.192)	1.786*** (0.193)	1.763*** (0.189)	1.679*** (0.189)	1.771*** (0.191)	1.568*** (0.201)
Conflict	-0.690*** (0.119)	-0.691*** (0.119)	-0.688*** (0.120)	-0.693*** (0.120)	-0.617*** (0.120)	-0.545*** (0.116)	-0.529*** (0.108)	-0.729*** (0.149)
Aid Concentration	-0.573 (0.500)	-0.573 (0.501)	-0.587 (0.512)	-0.524 (0.481)	-0.720 (0.503)	-0.873* (0.513)	-0.533 (0.495)	-2.048*** (0.608)
Statist Donor	2.309** (1.131)	2.307** (1.129)	2.308** (1.131)	2.314** (1.132)	2.299** (1.126)	2.297** (1.127)	2.299** (1.131)	3.611** (1.412)
Constant	-5.461*** (0.952)	-5.457*** (0.949)	-5.453*** (0.948)	-5.458*** (0.952)	-5.350*** (0.946)	-5.385*** (0.948)	-5.403*** (0.951)	-5.677*** (1.172)
Sigma	4.553*** (0.257)	4.553*** (0.257)	4.553*** (0.257)	4.553*** (0.257)	4.540*** (0.257)	4.541*** (0.257)	4.550*** (0.257)	4.377*** (0.275)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with donor, region, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table 19: Governance Aid DV with Donor-Region-Year Fixed Effects

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.557*** (0.0877)	0.560*** (0.0815)	0.555*** (0.0882)	0.561*** (0.0812)	0.509*** (0.0847)	0.577*** (0.0881)	0.405*** (0.0868)	0.573*** (0.101)
Donor Rights	0.319 (0.396)	0.296 (0.393)	0.320 (0.396)	0.309 (0.398)	0.319 (0.395)	0.319 (0.395)	0.317 (0.395)	0.581 (0.479)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.234* (0.141)	-0.234* (0.141)	-0.258* (0.139)	-0.207 (0.141)	-0.206 (0.141)	-0.213 (0.140)	-0.147 (0.141)	-0.578*** (0.196)
Ln Exports	0.871*** (0.129)	0.869*** (0.129)	0.870*** (0.128)	0.851*** (0.127)	0.865*** (0.130)	0.868*** (0.129)	0.867*** (0.129)	0.883*** (0.156)
Executive Constraints	0.981*** (0.145)	0.981*** (0.145)	0.969*** (0.145)	1.026*** (0.145)	0.913*** (0.145)	0.993*** (0.145)	1.122*** (0.147)	0.861*** (0.154)
State Capacity	-0.548*** (0.152)	-0.547*** (0.153)	-0.539*** (0.153)	-0.603*** (0.155)	-0.522*** (0.154)	-0.528*** (0.151)	-0.648*** (0.151)	-0.226 (0.180)
Ln Terror Events	0.0279 (0.0250)	0.0260 (0.0248)	0.0286 (0.0249)	0.0651** (0.0265)	0.0191 (0.0266)	0.0286 (0.0248)	0.387*** (0.0384)	-0.0248 (0.0299)
UN Shaming								-2.415*** (0.583)
Donor Rights x SV		0.135 (0.0968)						
UN Ideal Point Distance x SV			0.0952 (0.0649)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0963*** (0.0160)				
Executive Constraints x SV					0.348*** (0.0907)			
State Capacity x SV						0.153*** (0.0441)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.313*** (0.0298)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.635*** (0.347)
High Dissent	0.0792 (0.0872)	0.0803 (0.0867)	0.0747 (0.0875)	0.164* (0.0859)	0.0883 (0.0868)	0.0661 (0.0872)	0.0682 (0.0863)	0.232** (0.112)
Ln GDP	-2.150*** (0.178)	-2.150*** (0.177)	-2.157*** (0.178)	-2.083*** (0.172)	-2.146*** (0.178)	-2.131*** (0.179)	-2.145*** (0.178)	-2.019*** (0.182)
Ln Population	1.102*** (0.155)	1.103*** (0.155)	1.109*** (0.155)	1.074*** (0.154)	1.088*** (0.153)	1.063*** (0.154)	1.064*** (0.154)	0.837*** (0.169)
Conflict	0.117 (0.143)	0.110 (0.142)	0.109 (0.143)	0.0873 (0.140)	0.170 (0.136)	0.172 (0.138)	0.338** (0.141)	0.0802 (0.182)
Aid Concentration	-1.420*** (0.449)	-1.420*** (0.448)	-1.365*** (0.454)	-1.205*** (0.438)	-1.498*** (0.451)	-1.529*** (0.453)	-1.356*** (0.445)	-2.701*** (0.525)
Statist Donor	0.993* (0.558)	0.989* (0.554)	0.996* (0.559)	1.015* (0.559)	0.990* (0.558)	0.991* (0.558)	0.978* (0.557)	1.544** (0.757)
Constant	-4.314*** (0.553)	-4.302*** (0.545)	-4.333*** (0.555)	-4.310*** (0.549)	-4.276*** (0.553)	-4.288*** (0.552)	-4.230*** (0.550)	-4.759*** (0.684)
Sigma	3.626*** (0.165)	3.624*** (0.164)	3.624*** (0.166)	3.616*** (0.164)	3.620*** (0.167)	3.624*** (0.166)	3.611*** (0.165)	3.548*** (0.183)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with donor, region, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.



## E.5.4 Donor-Recipient-Year Fixed Effects

Table 20: Economic Aid DV with Donor-Recipient-Year Fixed Effects

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
State Violence	-0.0934 (0.0786)	-0.0916 (0.0799)	-0.116 (0.0851)	-0.0806 (0.0774)	-0.0834 (0.0795)	-0.0350 (0.0836)	-0.0977 (0.0795)	-0.191 (0.136)
Donor Rights	0.375 (0.747)	0.370 (0.745)	0.375 (0.748)	0.372 (0.748)	0.373 (0.747)	0.373 (0.747)	0.375 (0.747)	0.923 (0.830)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.155 (0.207)	-0.154 (0.206)	-0.188 (0.201)	-0.159 (0.207)	-0.143 (0.207)	-0.142 (0.207)	-0.154 (0.207)	-0.233 (0.225)
Ln Exports	1.313*** (0.199)	1.313*** (0.199)	1.311*** (0.199)	1.302*** (0.200)	1.312*** (0.199)	1.313*** (0.199)	1.313*** (0.199)	1.314*** (0.218)
Executive Constraints	1.312*** (0.213)	1.311*** (0.214)	1.295*** (0.217)	1.314*** (0.213)	1.228*** (0.208)	1.336*** (0.215)	1.305*** (0.213)	0.623 (0.498)
State Capacity	-0.00185 (0.209)	-0.00237 (0.209)	-0.0249 (0.205)	0.00464 (0.211)	-0.0257 (0.209)	-0.0189 (0.212)	-5.10e-06 (0.208)	-0.310 (0.278)
Ln Terror Events	0.0374 (0.0249)	0.0369 (0.0249)	0.0407 (0.0250)	0.0415 (0.0260)	0.0285 (0.0238)	0.0401 (0.0254)	0.0573* (0.0339)	-0.0429 (0.0421)
UN Shaming								-2.652*** (0.898)
Donor Rights x SV		0.0343 (0.0728)						
UN Ideal Point Dist x SV			0.161 (0.108)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.0463 (0.0404)				
Exec Constraints x SV					0.422*** (0.129)			
State Capacity x SV						0.255* (0.132)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.0240 (0.0287)	
UN Shaming x SV								1.157** (0.493)
High Dissent	-0.245*** (0.0724)	-0.244*** (0.0725)	-0.243*** (0.0726)	-0.247*** (0.0723)	-0.242*** (0.0727)	-0.232*** (0.0751)	-0.247*** (0.0721)	-0.133 (0.127)
Ln GDP	-0.267 (0.484)	-0.275 (0.486)	-0.240 (0.486)	-0.235 (0.481)	-0.295 (0.484)	-0.353 (0.470)	-0.283 (0.482)	-0.462 (0.638)
Ln Population	-2.550* (1.316)	-2.573* (1.314)	-2.575* (1.316)	-2.496* (1.331)	-2.652** (1.309)	-2.817** (1.261)	-2.524* (1.319)	-4.297** (1.864)
Conflict	-0.0470 (0.0869)	-0.0489 (0.0859)	-0.0505 (0.0865)	-0.0340 (0.0867)	-0.0831 (0.0887)	-0.0483 (0.0871)	-0.0284 (0.0878)	-0.258* (0.151)
Aid Concentration	0.938*** (0.281)	0.939*** (0.282)	0.932*** (0.282)	0.939*** (0.282)	0.892*** (0.277)	0.940*** (0.283)	0.939*** (0.281)	0.262 (0.407)
Statist Donor	2.056* (1.096)	2.050* (1.093)	2.064* (1.097)	2.073* (1.098)	2.053* (1.096)	2.050* (1.095)	2.055* (1.096)	3.421** (1.366)
Constant	-4.888* (2.638)	-4.804* (2.632)	-4.765* (2.660)	-4.907* (2.646)	-4.601* (2.608)	-4.319* (2.490)	-4.884* (2.637)	-1.093 (3.688)
Sigma	4.186*** (0.247)	4.186*** (0.247)	4.184*** (0.247)	4.185*** (0.247)	4.185*** (0.247)	4.185*** (0.247)	4.186*** (0.247)	4.047*** (0.257)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with donor, recipient, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.

Table 21: Governance Aid DV with Donor-Recipient-Year Fixed Effects

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
State Violence	0.267*** (0.0845)	0.265*** (0.0875)	0.265*** (0.0895)	0.270*** (0.0837)	0.275*** (0.0837)	0.263*** (0.0813)	0.265*** (0.0831)	0.120 (0.0846)
Donor Rights	0.295 (0.380)	0.263 (0.377)	0.295 (0.380)	0.286 (0.381)	0.294 (0.380)	0.295 (0.380)	0.295 (0.380)	0.564 (0.459)
UN Ideal Point Distance	-0.253** (0.115)	-0.247** (0.113)	-0.257** (0.120)	-0.266** (0.115)	-0.242** (0.114)	-0.253** (0.116)	-0.252** (0.115)	-0.166 (0.158)
Ln Exports	0.962*** (0.137)	0.959*** (0.137)	0.962*** (0.137)	0.943*** (0.132)	0.961*** (0.137)	0.962*** (0.137)	0.962*** (0.137)	0.986*** (0.171)
Executive Constraints	1.362*** (0.143)	1.356*** (0.143)	1.360*** (0.142)	1.380*** (0.142)	1.288*** (0.138)	1.360*** (0.144)	1.359*** (0.142)	0.490** (0.193)
State Capacity	-0.405** (0.187)	-0.403** (0.187)	-0.407** (0.185)	-0.387** (0.187)	-0.413** (0.187)	-0.403** (0.189)	-0.404** (0.187)	-0.851*** (0.231)
Ln Terror Events	0.0828*** (0.0228)	0.0806*** (0.0227)	0.0832*** (0.0231)	0.0927*** (0.0232)	0.0767*** (0.0227)	0.0826*** (0.0226)	0.0919*** (0.0255)	0.0364 (0.0303)
UN Shaming								-1.544** (0.642)
Donor Rights x SV		0.156 (0.0966)						
UN Ideal Point Dist x SV			0.0158 (0.114)					
Ln Exports x SV				-0.102*** (0.0338)				
Exec Constraints x SV					0.290*** (0.0737)			
State Capacity x SV						-0.0157 (0.0776)		
Ln Terror Events x SV							-0.0107 (0.0189)	
UN Shaming x SV								0.490 (0.345)
High Dissent	0.0174 (0.0474)	0.0202 (0.0481)	0.0175 (0.0472)	0.0151 (0.0481)	0.0196 (0.0475)	0.0167 (0.0471)	0.0171 (0.0475)	-0.0505 (0.0742)
Ln GDP	-1.520*** (0.342)	-1.537*** (0.344)	-1.518*** (0.348)	-1.423*** (0.333)	-1.552*** (0.345)	-1.513*** (0.337)	-1.528*** (0.343)	-0.620* (0.355)
Ln Population	-0.583 (0.877)	-0.700 (0.887)	-0.586 (0.878)	-0.462 (0.889)	-0.635 (0.878)	-0.566 (0.868)	-0.573 (0.880)	-0.731 (1.422)
Conflict	0.262*** (0.0899)	0.256*** (0.0896)	0.261*** (0.0901)	0.283*** (0.0870)	0.238*** (0.0865)	0.261*** (0.0898)	0.269*** (0.0914)	-0.0717 (0.114)
Aid Concentration	0.344 (0.211)	0.349* (0.209)	0.344 (0.211)	0.340 (0.213)	0.306 (0.211)	0.344 (0.211)	0.345 (0.211)	-0.0187 (0.218)
Statist Donor	0.729 (0.543)	0.719 (0.539)	0.730 (0.543)	0.765 (0.544)	0.728 (0.543)	0.729 (0.543)	0.729 (0.543)	1.296* (0.722)
Constant	-3.176** (1.441)	-2.864* (1.475)	-3.163** (1.430)	-3.318** (1.455)	-2.968** (1.464)	-3.217** (1.414)	-3.168** (1.437)	-4.897** (2.435)
Sigma	3.216*** (0.156)	3.213*** (0.154)	3.216*** (0.156)	3.211*** (0.154)	3.215*** (0.156)	3.216*** (0.156)	3.216*** (0.156)	3.164*** (0.166)
Observations	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	52,950	27,113

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tobit model with donor, recipient, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on donor in parentheses.